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Abstract 
 
Inspired by the Italian tradition of Operaismo (Workerism), or Autonomist Marxism, 
this thesis provides an analysis of labour composition and of the struggles that have 
recently affected the Auto cluster of the National Capital Region (NCR), the 
metropolitan conglomerate of Delhi, in India. The analysis builds on Operaismo not 
only by deploying its key methodological tool, namely the workers' enquiry, but also 
by adopting its main interpretative paradigm of exploring industrial conflict through 
the 'lens' of the working class. In line with a Workerist perspective, the investigation 
of labour struggles in the NCR, and of the Maruti case in particular, becomes an 
opportunity to reflect on working class formation and agency within capitalist 
development, and on the relationship between working class and institutions, through 
the concept of autonomia. Within what Tronti defined as a Copernican Revolution, the 
working class determines the trajectory followed by the process of capitalist 
development, seen as a ‘reactive formation’ where capital strategies are nothing but a 
response to labour struggles. With reference to the global Auto sector, capital strategies 
are unveiled by debunking myths associated with the lean manufacturing paradigm. 
For such purpose, a critical social relations approach is deployed to complement 
the analysis of the real politics of production that lie behind the global restructuring of 
manufacturing and labour regimes within the Indian Auto industry. Through a 
combination of these two theoretical approaches, the thesis illustrates the overall 
features of the NCR workforce, in order to explain motivations and dynamics of 
struggle in the area. Indeed, the case discussed here is an example of ‘where lean may 
fail’, and of how capital strategies cannot prevent labour from organising, even in 
settings characterised by high levels of casualisation. In this light, what discussed in 
here may prove of theoretical and political relevance also beyond the Indian case. 
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Introduction 
 
 
In 2011-12, an unprecedented wave of strikes shook the Delhi Auto cluster, in the 
National Capital Region (NCR). Workers from one of the Indian Auto ‘champions’, 
Maruti Suzuki, engaged in one of the most prolonged and intense forms of collective 
action India witnessed since liberalisation. The strike was unprecedented in all 
respects. It was unprecedented for its duration and the modalities of struggle. It was 
unprecedented for the demands that were raised. It was unprecedented for the location 
where it broke out. It was unprecedented for the composition of the workers who took 
action. It was unprecedented for the unity and solidarity workers managed to build 
despite the numerous lines of fragmentation. It was unprecedented for the violent 
repression that followed, leading to utter violation not only of labour and union rights, 
but also of basic human rights.  
The observation of what was happening at Maruti inspired, and informed, the present 
research. The perception of what was at stake determined the direction of this work, 
which, ultimately, aims at explaining what happened, how, why there, and in that 
precise moment. In fact, reflections on the scope and the relevance of the Maruti events 
led to question the very meaning of industrial conflict. Specifically, they led to 
considerations about the role of industrial conflict as an indicator of the most profound 
contradictions embodied in the process of capitalist development; and on the role of 
conflict in revealing the nature of the power relations involved in the industrial 
development process.  
In this way, industrial conflict became the core subject of the present research. The 
idea of exploring the industrial conflict triggering the Maruti strike shaped the research 
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field, and guided the analysis in its specific task of understanding the motivations, 
dynamics, and impact of the struggle.  
In practice, these objectives inspired both the methodological and theoretical trajectory 
this research work followed. This trajectory is defined by the combination of two 
different theoretical approaches, deemed to supply complementary interpretative keys 
for the investigation of an industrial conflict. One approach draws from the Italian 
tradition of Operaismo (Workerism) from the 1960s-70s. This unique theoretical and 
political experience provided not only the main methodological tools employed in this 
research, in the form of a workers’ inquiry, but also the key analytical paradigm based 
on the centrality of the industrial conflict within the process of capitalist development, 
and on its exploration through the ‘lens’ of the working class. Furthermore, Italian 
Workerism, or Autonomist Marxism, offered a crucial conceptual apparatus for the 
understanding of the relations between different actors involved in the industrial 
conflict, and in particular of the relationship between spontaneous movements and 
labour institutions. In particular, the workerist concept of autonomia was essential to 
develop an understanding of the dynamics between the emerging Maruti movement 
and the unions established in the NCR. 
To complement the workerist perspective, a more recent critical social relations 
approach, as adopted by scholars of Marxian inspiration who closely studied the 
restructuring of the Global Auto Industry, was chosen to investigate capital strategies 
deployed in the Indian Auto sector. In this regard, applied studies conducted by 
Stewart, Charron, Pulignano, Danford et al. (see Charron and Stewart, 2004; 
Pulignano, Stewart, Danford and Richardson, 2008; Stewart et al, 2009) were used to 
debunk myths associated with the worldwide implementation of the lean 
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manufacturing paradigm, and to highlight the impact of changing management and 
production systems on the workforce.  
Combined together, these two approaches allowed shedding light on material causes 
and dynamics of the industrial conflict observed. In particular, these allowed, on one 
side, to reflect on the relation between processes of working class formation and 
agency, and on that between the working class and institutions. On the other side, these 
approaches also provide a useful platform to investigate how capital strategies affect 
labour organising. Eventually, the exploration of the NCR industrial conflict through 
the ‘lens’ of its emerging working class, aims to provide theoretical and political 
lessons which may contribute not only to a discussion of the role and the progressive 
potential of the Indian working class, but also to a broader debate on global labour 
organising.  
This thesis is structured into six chapters. The first chapter focuses on Italian 
Autonomist Marxism. It firstly describes Operaismo as a theoretical practice built on 
the ‘point of view’ of the working class (Tronti, 2006; 2009), and then discusses what 
this implies in both analytical and methodological terms. Here, a contextualisation of 
the workers’ enquiry as a method of militant research is also provided. The chapter 
frames the historical and political trajectory of the workerist experience. It then builds 
on its intellectual legacy to discuss working class agency within the process of 
capitalist development and the relation between working class and institutions, in the 
light of the concept of autonomia.  
The second chapter draws on the research conducted by Stewart et al. to debunk myths 
related to the implementation of the lean manufacturing paradigm within the Global 
Auto industry. It first engages with the official discourse that accompanied the ‘Lean 
Revolution’, to then unveil the real politics of production lying underneath its surface, 
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and highlight what the advocated flexibility meant in practice (see Burawoy, 1985; 
Charron and Stewart, 2004; Danford, 2004). The core tenets of the lean model are 
dismantled here by looking at the actual impact of the new managerial practices and 
production techniques on the workforce employed.  
The third chapter introduces the Indian Auto sector. It traces the historical evolution 
of the industrial policies that determined its current configuration; it analyses its main 
competitive advantages; and discusses the major challenges it is going to face.  
The fourth chapter opens the empirical section of the present research, whose findings 
are reported in chapter five and six. This chapter outlines the methodological approach 
adopted throughout the field investigation, and illustrates in detail the overall 
fieldwork architecture. The chapter returns to the discussion of the workers’ enquiry, 
and presents it as a tool for the analysis of industrial conflicts. Moreover, it presents 
how this enquiry was applied for the purposes of the present research. Finally, the 
chapter also deals with issues of ethics and politics.  
Chapter five and six discuss the findings obtained through the field research carried 
out in India in 2011-12. In line with the workerist original conceptualisation and use 
of the workers’ enquiry as a tool to explore industrial conflict, the field research first 
aimed at mapping labour composition in the NCR, and then moved on to analyse the 
motivations and dynamics of the Maruti struggle. Effectively, the enquiry consisted of 
two phases. One was a phase of ‘extensive’ research, based on a survey aimed at 
mapping labour composition, and working and living conditions in the NCR, whose 
findings are reported in chapter five. Survey findings were then deployed as a basis for 
understanding and interpreting the causes, demands and developments of the struggles 
occurred in the area and of the Maruti strike in particular. These issues are discussed 
in chapter six. This last chapter highlights the main issues and tensions emerging from 
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recent labour struggles in the NCR, and then narrows the focus down to the Maruti 
case. Core demands, strike dynamics, and relations between the different actors 
involved in the Maruti dispute are discussed here in detail. A workerist approach is 
then applied to derive a political analysis of the strike. This analysis focuses on class 
formation; on the autonomy of the labour movement that emerged; and on its 
relationship with existing labour institutions.  In relation to the Maruti struggle, local 
specificities related to class composition and the overall labour regime at work in the 
area are also emphasised. Arguably, in fact, these have represented the main obstacles 
to the functioning of the ‘Indian lean model’.  
Overall, this thesis aims to provide different theoretical and political contributions to 
the existing literature. Theoretically, it aims, on one side, to highlight the individual 
value of the two approaches it rests upon in relation to the case under scrutiny. On the 
other hand, however, it also aims to show how the combination of these two 
approaches may further enrich our understanding of industrial conflicts. Considered 
separately, this thesis aims to show the current validity of a workerist contribution, 
and the wider validity of the studies conducted by Stewart et al. First, the analysis 
shows how a workerist perspective can still significantly enrich the study of labour, 
and of capital-labour conflicts. Second, the analysis also illustrates how a critical 
social relations approach, like the one applied to the Global Auto Industry by the 
authors reviewed here, could be extended to a broader investigation of industrial 
restructuring occurring across different productive sectors, in different regions of the 
world. Furthermore, this study also indicates how the combination of these two 
approaches enables a deeper, complementary exploration of both working class agency 
and capital strategies. In particular, this combined approach anchors the study of 
working class formation to the rise and development of industrial conflicts.  
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From a more applied theoretical perspective, this thesis aims at contributing to several 
debates. Firstly, it aims to prompt further reflections on the industrial development 
path India is following. Within this broad objective, the thesis aims to shed light on 
the industrial labour regime India has deployed and is deploying in order to ‘achieve’ 
such development. In this regard, this thesis also hopes to provide a contribution to the 
understanding of the nature and potential effects of casualisation within Indian 
manufacturing. Finally, in its investigation of the relationship between working class 
and institutions, this thesis aims at participating in the discussion on trade unions 
renewal in India.  
Politically, this thesis aims to contribute to several debates. On one side, and linked to 
its theoretical and methodological objectives, it wishes to cast light on the need for 
labour studies to ‘ground’ their research, in order to foster a transformative and 
progressive agenda. For this purpose, the methodological choice of a grounded 
workers’ enquiry was advocated as an effective tool to combine theory and political 
praxis. Secondly, and still in line with its theoretical and methodological aims, this 
thesis wishes to induce further discussion on working class strategies and on the 
challenging role of trade unions in labour organising, both in relation to the Indian 
scenario, and in comparative perspective.  
 
Both theoretically and politically, this thesis is dedicated to the NCR workers, and their 
struggles. 
 
 
 
  19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  20 
Chapter 1  
Labour agency and institutions within Italian Autonomist Marxism 
 
Within the theoretical architecture of the present research, an analysis of the Italian 
Operaismo (Workerism) represents a particularly meaningful building block. The 
theoretical and political experience of the Italian ‘Autonomist Marxists’ is in fact 
recalled to derive both methodological tools and interpretative keys applied to 
investigate the Indian case which constitutes the core of this work. In particular, a 
workerist approach informs the centrality attributed to the working class within the 
process of capitalist development; the method of workers’ enquiry is employed as a 
tool to explore the industrial conflict in question; and the concept of autonomia helps 
to analyse the relationship between a spontaneous labour movement and established 
institutions. In relation to the NCR case and to the Maruti struggle, the chosen 
theoretical perspective and the selected methodological tools expressly shaped the 
direction followed in the present work. They determined the selection of informants 
and the data collection techniques preferred in the field, and the decision to analyse 
labour composition in order to explain motivations and dynamics of the witnessed 
struggle. Eventually, a workerist approach influenced the political conclusions drawn 
from the case studied.  
Overall, we believe that rediscovering a workerist approach may significantly enrich 
the study of capital – labour relations within processes of industrial development. In 
doing so, by looking at industrial conflicts through the ‘lens’ of the working class, 
through the Copernican revolution described by Tronti (2006), a workerist perspective 
can help shed light on dynamics of class formation, on the material determinants of 
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class composition, and on practices of labour resistance. On the ground, a workerist 
approach, by identifying workers’ enquiry and militant research as methods for both 
the understanding of, and the involvement in,1 labour struggles, can help achieve 
valuable insights on the link between theory and practice, and on the role of the 
intellectual, of the researcher within it. In this sense, embracing a workerist perspective 
can profoundly influence and shape not only the interpretation of research contents 
and data collected, but also the research experience per se, whereby the distinction 
between labour researcher and political activist nearly dissolves, and research 
objectives become part of the ultimate goals of the political struggle. Finally, an 
analysis inspired by Operaismo can provide a significant contribution when 
investigating the relationship between spontaneism and institutions. In our case, it 
critically informed our understanding of the dynamics between the Maruti movement, 
the emerging working class in the NCR, and the existing trade unions. Indeed, 
reflecting on the concept of autonomia may facilitate the comprehension of the 
trajectories followed by historically determined labour movements, whether 
proceeding in the direction of progressive radicalisation, gradual institutionalisation or 
simply failing to gain a proper political subjectivity.  
For the purposes of the present research, this chapter will focus on the theoretical 
contributions elaborated during the initial phase of ‘political Operaismo’ (Filippini and 
Macchia, 2012), revolving around Panzieri, Alquati, Tronti and the Quaderni Rossi 
(Red Notebooks)2 experience (see Red Notes, 1979). Operaismo as part of a political 
and cultural tradition of what can be defined as ‘Autonomist Marxism’ (Wright, 2002) 
                                                          
1 What distinguishes a militant research from a more general participatory approach. Such difference 
will be clarified later on in this chapter and in further detail in the methodology section of the present 
work. 
2 Title of the review that marked the first experience of collective writing by some of the founders of 
workerism, like Tronti, Alquati, Panzieri. 
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will first be contextualised, with reference to its broad historical, political and 
theoretical trajectories. Its main methodological and theoretical tenets will then be 
analysed in further depth, in particular dwelling upon the use of workers’ inquiry as 
an expression of militant research, on the centrality attributed to the working class 
within the process of capitalist development, and on the concept of autonomia with 
regard to the relationship between the working class and institutions. Specifically, this 
chapter is structured into three main sections. The first traces the historical evolution 
and outlines the context in which Operaismo came into existence and developed, 
despite rifts and internal differences. The second discusses the role assigned to the 
working class as the primary agent within the process of capitalist development, also 
touching upon the centrality this assumes in relation to the idea of militant research 
(see Panzieri, 1976). The third section focuses on the concept of autonomia and on the 
relationship between the working class and institutions. In the concluding remarks, 
some observations will be made on the current validity of a workerist approach within 
the study of labour movements and industrial conflicts. 
 
1.1 Framing the experience: the historical, theoretical and political trajectories 
of Italian Operaismo 
 
In Tronti’s words (2009), Operaismo was a ‘thought experience’ (p.9) which marked 
a new way of ‘producing political culture’ (p.38) along lines of ‘revolutionary realism’ 
(p.39) centred on the working class as a subject, as a primary agent of development. It 
constituted a cultural and intellectual experience which converged upon the factory as 
a crucial site structuring overall social relations and on the working class as a source 
of both knowledge and social change through struggle. When trying to cast light upon 
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Operaismo’s different legacies, Corradi (2011) highlights its most significant 
contributions. These not only include its analysis of class composition, its use of 
workers’ enquiry and co-research as political tools, but also its reading of radical 
political economy as a science of class antagonism, and its remarkable attempt to 
report a kind of ‘historiography’ of workers’ struggles. Indeed, Operaismo represented 
a unique phase in the history of Italian radical thought, one inspired by Marx’s critique 
of political economy but which aimed to go beyond Marx. It attempted to put into 
practice his critique of bourgeois ideology in order to look at the actual, material 
sources of knowledge production and at the real foundations of capitalist social 
relations (Marx, 1867; Tronti, 2009). In his introduction to workerism, Roggero (in 
Brophy, 2004) lauds the way this moved beyond an idealised view of labour typical of 
the traditional left and managed to forge a new form of revolutionary theory and 
practice, through a socio-economic reading which identified in the working class a 
revolutionary subject able to destabilise established configurations of production. As 
we shall see, the working class does not merely acquire a simple subjectivity, but 
through political organisation and struggle assumes a sort of ‘counter-subjectivity’ 
able to potentially overturn capitalist power relations.3 Borio, Pozzi and Roggero 
(2005), reviewing the historiography of workerism through a collection of its 
contributors’ subjective experiences, interestingly highlight how this was both a 
theoretical and organisational experiment. Through scientific and political analysis, 
methodological challenges, and even tactical mistakes, this experiment managed to 
radically question the existing political culture of the Italian left and to shake the 
foundations of orthodox Marxism.  
                                                          
3 In the sense that it can potentially make an ‘antagonistic use of its antagonism’, (Toscano 2009: 4). 
For an interesting account of revolutionary subjectivity within current processes of capital valorisation, 
read also Hartmann, 2013.  
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Operaismo emerged in the first decade following Italy’s post-war economic boom, in 
an historical phase when the country was achieving its industrial maturity and its 
working class was progressively solidifying its subjective consciousness. It aimed to 
unveil the proper functioning mechanisms of the capitalist society in order to formulate 
a concrete strategy to challenge them and, ultimately, overcome them. Describing the 
scenario which gave rise to this unique product of Italian political culture, Brophy 
(2004) points at how workerism emerged as a reaction to the observed alienation of 
the growing working class from the traditional political institutions, namely the 
Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano, PCI) and the major trade unions, during 
post-war industrial development. As reported by Bellofiore (2006), it was from the late 
1950s that a whole generation started to perceive a strong feeling of ‘stagnation’ of the 
traditional left, which was deemed incapable of grasping the profound scope of the 
social changes accompanying the capitalist boom, the nature of the struggles linked to 
industrial modernisation, and the evolving composition of the working class. On these 
premises, all economistic and passive views of the working class were radically 
rejected (see also Bellofiore and Tomba, 2008). Indeed, it was precisely the attempt to 
fill such gaps that generated both the theoretical discourse on autonomia and the 
organisational forms of the extra-parliamentary left 4 that emerged through the 1960s 
and the 1970s. Overall, although deeply embedded in the practices of Italian Fordism 
and in the manifestations of the country’s industrial modernisation, workerist 
theoretical elaborations also reflected a broader analysis of the international capitalist 
system and of the working class as a subject, while providing enlightening 
observations on factory politics and organisation. This way, while as political 
experience Operaismo was limited to the Italian scenario, and in this setting it 
                                                          
4 Autonomia Operaia (AO), Potere Operaio (PO), Lotta Continua – and others that will be mentioned 
in the following pages. All were radical groups that rejected the idea of party representation. 
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encountered failures and critiques, its theoretical legacy may well go beyond the case 
in question (see also Filippini and Macchia, 2012). Certainly, its more general lessons 
and concepts, as we will argue in this work, can still be deployed as a powerful critique 
of dominant theories of industrial relations.  
In order to properly put Operaismo into context, we must first trace its evolution, the 
rifts that characterised it, its historical and political trajectories. Operaismo may be 
deemed to cover almost two decades, from the first issue of Quaderni Rossi circulated 
in 1961 until the end of the 1970s. However, the two decades were marked by profound 
differences, both in terms of theoretical debates and political strategies. The 1960s 
were undoubtedly the most prolific and significant period for the formalisation of a 
method of enquiry, the definition of a properly workerist perspective and the most 
interesting insights on class composition.  
The post-1960s period was marked instead by a substantial divide on the basis of 
diverging strategies and tactics. In this later phase, some autonomist groups started 
advocating the need for armed struggle, becoming closely associated, rightly or 
wrongly, with the violent escalation of the so-called Anni di Piombo.5 This drove early 
workerists, and the group from Rome gravitating towards Tronti in particular, to 
distance themselves from later autonomist manifestations, to such an extent that Tronti 
himself distinguishes between Operaismo, from the 1960s, and Post-Operaismo 
(Tronti, 2009). Overall, comparing some of the earliest contributions, like those from 
                                                          
5 Literally, ‘Years of Lead’, indicating the period from the late 1960s to the early 1980s, when Italy was 
shaken by intense political turmoil, culminating in frequent terrorist attacks on behalf of both extremist 
right- and left- wing groups. Amongst the most violent episodes were the terrorist attack at Piazza 
Fontana, Milan, in 1969 and the bombing at the Bologna railway station in 1980. In the 1970s, several 
autonomist thinkers, amongst whom were Toni Negri and Oreste Scalzone, were arrested for having 
‘inspired’ armed actions of the extremist left, especially revolving around the Brigate Rosse – Red 
Brigades. A broad police operation, named after the public prosecutor who inspired it, Pietro Calogero, 
occurred in 1979, with the aim of expressly detecting the ‘cattivi maestri’ (bad teachers) of the armed 
groups. See also Brophy (2004), and Borio, Pozzi, Roggero (2005). 
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Alquati, Tronti, Panzieri to some later interventions by, for example, Negri or Bologna 
proves extremely helpful when trying to engage with the idea of autonomia. This 
concept is crucial to reflect upon the relation between working class spontaneism and 
the institutionalisation of labour movements, a theme which is particularly relevant for 
the purposes of the present research. 
 The origins of the workerist experience can be traced back to the publication of the 
first edition of Quaderni Rossi (Red Notebooks) in 1961. This review, edited by 
Raniero Panzieri, came to light as an outcome of a series of political and cultural 
debates which saw the participation of a group of young intellectuals from different 
political traditions, ranging from communism, to socialism, to anarcho-syndicalism. 
Following a season of renewed struggles amongst the Milanese metalworkers and an 
intense offensive organised by FIAT workers against a long wage freeze imposed by 
the company,6 this group gathered around the observation of a growing gap between 
the new composition of the Italian working class and its organisation (see Red Notes, 
1979). There was need of re-defining the subjectivity of the emerging working class 
in order to eventually provide the intellectual tools for a possible new organisation. 
According to Tronti (2006), such an endeavour initially required a re-reading of 
Capital in order to grasp the mechanisms of capitalist development. This is why, 
despite the revolutionary plan, this first workerist experiment remained mainly 
                                                          
6 The years following a damaging defeat which occurred in 1955 were marked by intensified labour 
struggles, especially at FIAT, where a new generation of young workers migrated from the poor South 
to the industrialised North carrying new aspirations and frustrations, ultimately inducing one of the most 
significant changes in working class composition Italy ever witnessed.  Bologna (2013:127) reports how 
the Milanese metalworkers strikes organised in 1960 were particularly inspiring: after years of silence 
and fear, unprecedented ‘unity, compactness and combativeness’ in struggle were observed. This period 
culminated in the famous events of Piazza Statuto, 1962. Despite an eventual defeat and violent State 
repression that saw nearly a thousand workers being stopped and/or arrested, the Piazza Statuto moment 
represented a meaningful push for both workerism and the Italian labour movement as a whole. In 
particular, this episode left a strong imprint in terms of increasing disillusionment towards labour 
institutions, both party and unions. In Italian, read http://www.infoaut.org/index.php/blog/storia-di-
classe/item/2052-8-luglio-1962-la-rivolta-di-piazza-statuto.  
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confined to Marx’s critique of political economy, hence to a predominantly theoretical 
level (Tronti, 2009). However, while it can be argued that Quaderni Rossi never 
managed to actually insert the scientific scrutiny of social relations of production 
within a proper ‘theory of action’, aimed at directly intervening in the organisation of 
the working class, it still paved the way to what were probably the most insightful 
contributions Operaismo left. It was already in this phase, for example, that Raniero 
Panzieri (1976; 1994) supplied his most valuable inputs on co-research and workers’ 
enquiry as methods for co-production of revolutionary knowledge. In the same period, 
Romano Alquati provided his crucial testimonies from FIAT plants (Alquati, 1975), 
while Mario Tronti, leading figure of Operaismo, developed his ‘theses’ on the 
centrality of  the working class within capitalist development and on the autonomy of 
the political (Tronti, 2006; 2009; 2010). 
Pic.1 Quaderni Rossi (Red Notebooks) #1, original frontpage  
 
Source: web (www.operaismoinenglish.wordpress.com)  
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During the years of Quaderni Rossi, the young, brilliant Panzieri7 elaborated his ideas 
on the non-neutrality of production forces and machines, on the ‘plan of capital’ 
affecting not only capitalist development but also the organisation of society, and his 
seminal conceptualisation of workers’ enquiry as a method (Bellofiore, 2006; 
Bellofiore and Tomba, 2008). In the same years Tronti started articulating his on the 
distinction between Marxism as a science of capital and Marxism as a revolutionary 
theory, which would be further developed within the following experience of Classe 
Operaia (Working Class) (1964-67). It is here that Operaismo aims at distancing itself 
from traditional Marxism as a theory of economic development. By investigating the 
scientific laws which determine the functioning of the ‘plan of capital’, traditional 
Marxism only views workers as labour power, integrated within capital, and fails to 
acknowledge the revolutionary subjectivity of the working class which refuses to be 
politically incorporated within such rules (see also Toscano, 2009). Here perhaps lies 
the most significant legacy of the whole workerist experience: the refusal of looking 
at labour through capital, the idea to look instead at capital through the eyes of the 
working class (Bellofiore, 2006).  
A reading of Marx directly contributing to the formulation of a revolutionary theory 
for action, closer to the Grundrisse than to Das Kapital (see Negri, 1991), was more 
central in the years following Quaderni Rossi, from 1963-64. After Quaderni Rossi, 
the original group split, generating journals like the aforementioned Classe Operaia 
(Working Class) and Gatto Selvaggio (Wildcat).8 At that time, there was a progressive 
separation of different ‘nuclei’. A ‘Rome core’ emerged, organised around Tronti, 
                                                          
7 Unfortunately, Panzieri tragically died in 1964. Most of his contributions have been published 
posthumously.  
8 This was a factory journal based in Turin, where it voiced the experience of FIAT and Lancia workers.  
Romano Alquati was one of its active members.  
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more strongly connected to the political-institutional setting of the capital city and 
more markedly devoted to research.9 On the other side, there were different groups 
based in the industrial North, mainly in Turin and in the Veneto region, closer to the 
factory realm and more substantially inclined to activism (see also Red Notes, 1979). 
In the same years, and throughout the 1970s, the predominantly theoretical focus that 
had characterised the Quaderni Rossi phase shifted in favour of increasing attention 
placed upon political strategies, tactics and organisation. Eventually, this led to an 
irreparable divide between those like Tronti, advocating entryist positions towards 
institutions, and the autonomist groups, mainly following Negri’s path, rejecting any 
form of compromise with party and union organisations (see, for example, Wright, 
2002; Tomba, 2007). In itself, Classe Operaia denoted the highest peak of classical 
workerism, with key theses being defined exactly in the years of its existence. The 
journal lasted only from 1964 to 1967, but it was in this period that Tronti properly 
refined his theory of the ‘overturning’ 10 in the capital-labour perspective, formally 
identifying the working class as the driving force within capitalist development, and 
thus officially consecrating Operaismo as ‘working class science’11 (ibid.). These 
years also constituted one of the few, maybe only, phases of major intellectual 
correspondence between different workerist thinkers, whereas the following 
theoretical and tactical divergence proved instead to be irreparable. As Wright 
highlights (2002), Classe Operaia’s analysis of class composition, conceptualisations 
of mass worker, and the identification of wage struggles as a terrain of political 
                                                          
9 This core still survives through the currently existing Centro per la Riforma dello Stato (Centre for 
State Reform), Rome. 
10 In Italian ‘rovesciamento’, translation provided by Wright, 2002. 
11 According to Ciccariello-Maher (2006), within the idea that ‘each ideology is always bourgeois’, 
Tronti formulates this conceptualisation of ‘working class science’ as corresponding to a sort of ‘non-
objective objectivity’, whereby only the partisan perspective of the working class may truly help 
disclosing the material conditions of the capitalist system. 
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conflict, created a platform for debate among workerists and a sort of commonality of 
concerns and practices. These would evaporate with the demise of Classe Operaia in 
1967. From this moment onward, widening gaps and disagreements between different 
groups, in relation to both theoretical interpretations and political strategies, were 
observed. In particular, past 1967, we note growing dissension between entryists and 
autonomists,12 polarised around the leading figures of Tronti and Negri. Such 
divergence resulted in a tighter hold of the Rome group around the national PCI circles, 
and a more pronounced deviation of the autonomist area towards extra-institutional 
settings. The latter was marked by a progressive radicalisation that even touched 
violent peaks, in the wake of advocated insurrectionalist perspectives. As mentioned 
above, this opened a dark phase in Italy’s political history and practically sentenced 
classical Operaismo to its end. During the Anni di Piombo, in fact, the autonomist 
groups were extensively accused of having inspired leftist terrorist actions, and with 
the complicity of State and police apparatuses, radical thought and political extremism 
were progressively silenced. In terms of theoretical elaborations produced from the 
end of the 1960s and throughout the 1970s, these years were characterised by a gradual 
broadening of the strictly ‘factoryist’ perspective, whereby the analysis of class 
composition was increasingly stretched beyond the immediate labour process taking 
place inside the factory (Aufheben, 2003). Within the workerist debate, such a process 
was accompanied by the evolution of the initial conceptualisations of mass worker 
towards the incorporation of Negri’s formulation of socialised worker, and the 
opposition of Tronti’s autonomy of the political to Negri’s autonomy of the social (see 
Bologna, 1987; Bowring, 2004; Corradi, 2011; Melegari, 2011; Negri, 2007; 
Turchetto, 2008; Tomba, 2007). This occurred within a changing social scenario, 
                                                          
12 The former advocating the entry in institutional settings, the latter rejecting any institutional 
compromise. This will be further clarified in the next section. 
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where (from 1968 up to the 1977) working class struggles were paralleled by student 
and new civil society movements, within a more complex structure of social and 
political struggles. Abandoning the relatively rigid ‘factoryism’ which had dominated 
the 1960s and applying working class analysis to a wider spectrum of social relations,13 
also meant the adoption of a broader set of tactics. These went beyond the physical 
workplace and the mere wage claims: they ranged from self-reductions and the refusal 
of bills and fares, to the complete abolition of wage-labour and the demand of a 
‘guaranteed salary’ for all,14 inspired by desires and needs which radically transcended 
the previous economism (see Aufheben, 2003).  
In terms of actual organisation, aside from a short period (1968-1973) where Potere 
Operaio (Workers’ Power), based in Veneto and led by Negri, Balestrini, Piperno, 
Scalzone among others, still acted as a reference point, the 1970s were crossed by a 
proliferation of groups, journals, and assemblies. Most notable in characterising the 
later workerist tendencies being La Classe (The Class), Lotta Continua (Continuous 
Struggle), Avanguardia Operaia (Workers’ Vanguard), and the original nucleus of 
today’s Manifesto,15 Contropiano (see Wright, 2002). Theoretically, within this wide 
constellation of groups, Potere Operaio probably represented the last attempt to bring 
together the different fringes of class struggle around the concept of mass worker as a 
class reference point, and to keep the centrality of wage claims on the political platform 
(Red Notes, 1979). According to Wright (2002), this also corresponded to the strongest 
expression of anti-parliamentarist, anti-union, and insurrectionalist feelings, before the 
                                                          
13 As Negri did. After the conceptualisation of social worker, and due to the later post-structuralist 
influences received during the forced exile in France, he shifted to even broader and more ‘nuanced’ 
categories like multitude, and definitively abandoned his initial materialism by exploring the whole 
realm of immaterial labour (read ‘Empire’, ‘Multitude’, or with reference to the present work, Bowring, 
2004 or Turchetto, 2008). Negri’s late theorisations, however, go beyond the scope of this research.  
14 Like the wages for housework, theorised by autonomists feminists like Dalla Costa and Federici.  
15 Which still survives today as a national newspaper, source of leftist critical information.   
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further radicalisation of tactics embraced by Lotta Continua and Autonomia Operaia. 
Overall, while the 1970s in Italy were marked by an explosion of intense struggles and 
political manifestations, the end of the decade also corresponded to the actual decline 
of the workerist experience. On the one hand, the intricate plot of autonomist 
manifestations, charges of terrorist ties, and State and police repression during the Anni 
di Piombo practically suffocated radical thought and political extremism. Negri and 
many of his followers were forced either to imprisonment or exile, while Tronti and 
the entryists converged around the PCI circles. On the other hand, the evolution of the 
theoretical and political debate towards a wider spectrum of social relations and the 
‘dilution’ of original conceptualisations, alienated segments of the working class, 
determining an increasing detachment between ‘factory and society’,16 as originally 
meant (Bologna, 1991). However, a distinction should be made here between 
Operaismo as historical and political experience, which remained confined within 
Italian borders and a span of less than two decades, and its overall theoretical legacy.17 
This, as this thesis aims to demonstrate, can still be valid, and is worth rediscovering.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16 From the title of Tronti’s famous essay ‘Fabbrica e società’, part of Operai e Capitale, his ‘epoch-
making’ collection of writings first published in 1966. 
17 For an historical assessment based on such distinction, interesting readings are given by Filippini, 
2011, and Filippini and Macchia, 2012. 
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Pic.2 Potere Operaio demonstration in the 1970s 
 
Source: web. 
 
1.2 Working class agency and capitalist development 
 
Among the most important contributions Operaismo provided, there is what Tronti 
defines as the theoretical practice of the ‘point of view’,18 the idea of a ‘partisan 
reading of reality’ which assigns working class a primary role both in the production 
of knowledge and in determining the direction followed by capitalist development 
(Tronti, 2006; 2009). This probably constituted one of the most salient features  
characterising Operaismo as a unique cultural and political experience, and set a 
milestone within radical thought of Marxian inspiration. According to Tronti (2009), 
the theorised ‘practice of the point of view’, and its partisan reading, involved an 
‘overturning of intellectual forms’ (2009). This entailed the shift from a capital-centric 
                                                          
18 In Italian, ‘pratica teorica del punto di vista’. 
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to a worker-centric interpretation of history and industrial relations. Here, we will 
analyse what this meant on two fronts: one, the production of knowledge, based on co-
research and workers’ enquiry as preferred methodology (see Alquati, 1975; Panzieri, 
1976; 1994); two, the capacity of the working class to act as the political engine of 
capitalist development, implying a critique of classical Marxism.  
Tronti’s (2006; 2009) groundbreaking thought, laying the core foundations of  the 
workerist theoretical contribution, begins by delineating what he considers to be a 
‘Copernican revolution’ within the analysis of capital-labour relations characterising 
the capitalist system. First, he advocates what comes to be a ‘partisan reading of 
reality’, the interpretation of the system as a whole through a specific point of view, 
that of the working class. This, in the firm belief that in order to grasp the functioning 
of the system as a ‘totality’, one has to look at a ‘partiality’, carefully choosing a 
vantage point. In this sense, the lens chosen to investigate reality becomes the 
incarnation of a determined theoretical and political choice (see also Filippini, 2011). 
Such choice, as discussed earlier, requires a departure from classical Marxism, which 
stands accused of ‘reifying’ capital when scientifically analysing economic 
development by looking at labour through capital. In Tronti’s view, instead, 
Operaismo had to involve a complete reversal of this relationship, by interpreting 
capitalist development through the lenses of the labour that through struggle makes 
itself working class (2006). This relates to both the idea of ‘partisan research’,19 
informing practices of militant research as workers enquiry20 and co-research, and the 
interpretation of what conflict entails. Tronti’s starting point is that ‘knowledge is tied 
to struggle’ (Tronti, 2006; 2009; Wright, 2002), and that it is within the process of 
                                                          
19 ‘Partigianeria della ricerca’ in his own words. See Tronti, 2009:8-9. 
20 In Italian, ‘inchiesta operaia’.  
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struggle that the working class not only gains awareness of itself as a revolutionary 
subject, but becomes a source of revolutionary knowledge. This is necessary for both 
the understanding of capitalist dynamics and for the design of organised actions. And 
it is this source of knowledge that the ‘organic workerist intellectual’ needs to refer to, 
within a process that becomes one of mutual support, mutual understanding, joint 
production of thought, aiming to the ultimate realisation of a revolutionary strategy. In 
Bologna’s words (2013:123), workerists aimed at grasping the ‘knowledge that was 
never formalised and impossible to transmit except through direct participation in 
factory- and worker-affairs’.  
While Tronti provides a first theoretical definition of how class struggle yields 
knowledge, Panzieri and Alquati concretely attempt to formalise a research approach 
able to epitomise the overturning, and to ultimately link political theory and praxis 
(Alquati, 1975; Panzieri, 1976; 1994). In their pioneering work, the analysis of class 
composition and of dynamics of conflict occurs through practices of ‘militant 
research’, namely ‘co-research’ and methods proper of ‘workers enquiry’. As first 
experienced by Dolci and Montaldi in the 1950s and by Alquati during his works at 
FIAT and Olivetti in the early 1960s, co-research aims at establishing a new 
relationship between intellectuals and workers, based on the joint production of ‘social 
knowledge from below’ (Wright, 2002: 22). As Borio, Pozzi and Roggero point out 
(2005), this highly evocative practice seeks to overcome the distinction between 
interviewer and interviewee, in order to generate a shared process yielding knowledge, 
political subjectivity, theory and organisation. Through his concept of ‘workers’ 
enquiry’, Panzieri also suggests a path for political investigation on workers struggle. 
Notwithstanding critiques of ‘bourgeois science’, he reconsiders some of the methods 
of sociological surveys (1976), to be associated with a collection of materials produced 
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by workers themselves, and complemented by the direct observation of processes of 
productive restructuring (Tronti, 2009). As experienced in our case, survey methods 
may help ‘systematising’ the data collected in order to map labour composition, while 
only direct accounts from workers can shed light upon real motivations and dynamics 
of struggle.21  What particularly distinguishes a workers’ enquiry as expression of 
militant research though, is the ultimate use that will be made of the knowledge 
produced. While in fact the whole enquiry, following an initial phase of ‘inchiesta a 
caldo’,22 also involves a detachment from spontaneous practices and a moment of 
scientific analysis on the grade of consciousness reached by the working class, the 
final use will be purely political, aiming at the design of revolutionary actions 
(Panzieri, 1976, 1994). The militant, organic intellectual and the struggling worker are 
therefore united throughout the process by shared practices and common objectives, 
while there is an evident continuum between theory and praxis. The workers’ enquiry, 
as initially defined by Panzieri, was also adopted, during the following decade, by the 
group Primo Maggio, founded by Sergio Bologna. Subordinating historical research 
to struggle, these late ‘rationalist’ workerists, openly advocated a ‘history of and for 
the workers’ and peasants’ movements’, which could ‘only be a history written by a 
militant for militants’ (Wright, 2002:186). Overall, besides guidelines provided in 
terms of suggested methods for data collection, and the definition of a specific role for 
the intellectual/researcher, who becomes part of the struggle and expresses his/her 
voice in unison with workers, what has to be emphasised here is, once again, the 
primacy of the working class as an essential source of knowledge and expertise. 
Bologna (in Wright, 2007), highlights how the central role played by the working class 
                                                          
21 For a more detailed account, see chapter 4. 
22 Research developed within the highest peak of social conflict (the ‘hot’ peak, caldo), where the 
relationship between working class and capitalist system appears clearer. 
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in producing knowledge was not only designed for research purposes, but generated a 
sense of ownership, where workers felt active part of the narration of their own history, 
as it was taking shape. At the same time, there was a widespread perception amongst 
workerists that collective effort, the joint production of a discourse, could fill the gaps 
which party militants and leftwing intellectuals were neither able to perceive, nor to 
interpret. Institutional, top-down analyses were in fact considered unable to 
comprehend the needs of the class they were supposed to defend.23 
The primacy of the working class as a subject also emerges from workerist 
interpretations of the capitalist development process. Overall, the analysis of what 
triggers development can be conducted at two different levels. One concerns the 
agency able to set in motion capitalist development, according to the Copernican 
revolution Tronti describes. The other relates to which sphere determines the process 
of change, and where the highest potential to challenge the system lies. This is 
discussed within the controversial opposition between Tronti’s autonomy of the 
political and Negri’s autonomy of the social,24 which also underlies the evolution of 
the mass worker as interpretative category towards the later socialised worker (see 
Bologna, 1987, 2013; Bowring, 2004; Corradi, 2011; Farris, 2013; Melegari, 2011; 
Negri, 2007; Turchetto, 2008; Wright, 2005). With regard to the former, Toscano 
(2009) provides a brilliant account of how the working class determines the direction 
taken by capitalist development and of how it can potentially undermine it by 
exercising its power as an antagonist subject. Within Tronti’s Copernican Revolution, 
                                                          
23 Even Tronti’s Leninist conception of organic intellectual as still linked to the Communist Party, never 
completely detached from an institutional apparatus deemed necessary to guide a revolutionary 
overturning, can be inscribed within such critique. Despite his explicit entryism, in fact, he was always 
extremely critical towards the ‘old guard’ of the PCI bureaucracy, and advocated a shift in direction of 
a more markedly ‘class party’, built around the centrality of the working class. 
24 Since this distinction closely pertains to the role that institutions play within dynamics of social 
change, it will be discussed in more detail in the next paragraph.  
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where the epistemological overturning is not separable from the political one, the 
working class anticipates, precedes, provokes capital’s moves through struggle. Such 
moves come as a reaction, or an attempt to restore command over the system of 
production once class conflict has been triggered. Here, Toscano explains (2009), 
labour-power is not seen as a mere factor within the production process and its political 
rationalisation, able to gain political subjectivity only by delegating its representation 
to party and union institutions, but is a subject of antagonism, able to determine its 
own political destiny. This way, within the process of capitalist development we find 
a perpetual, inner tension, which determines a dialectical clash between the working 
class seeking to make an ‘antagonistic use of its antagonism’ (Toscano, 2009:4) and 
capital’s attempt to take advantage of the ruptures caused by labour in order to 
ultimately make its own ‘capitalistic use of struggle’ (Tronti, 2011 in CRS, 2011). In 
this sense, the whole process of development turns out to be nothing but the ‘history 
of the successive attempts of the capitalist class to emancipate itself from the working 
class’ (Toscano, 2009:3), which nonetheless anticipates and provokes the dynamic of 
change. We have, on one side, a working class which refuses to be incorporated into 
the rules of capital, which rejects the capitalisation of antagonism itself, and can 
potentially break the cycle – representing simultaneously both the ‘presupposition and 
the principal threat to capitalist reproduction’ (Toscano, 2009). On the other, there is 
capital seeking to discipline labour and re-establish its command over the production 
process. In practice, this can be observed in frequent managerial decisions to 
strategically introduce new technologies, or in the constant attempts to flexibilise and 
de-politicise the labour-force.25 Within Tronti’s Copernican Revolution, Toscano 
continues to illustrate, the working class becomes the independent variable that 
                                                          
25 Concerning capital strategies to weaken labour, see chapter 2. 
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anticipates capital’s reaction, while capital is left as a function of the working class. In 
relation to Marx’s thought, such overturning does not simply aim at complementing 
the original critique of political economy with a theory of voluntarism and a mere 
reflection on subjectivity, but it intends to depict capitalist development as a reactive 
formation, where resistance anticipates, precedes and provokes exploitation and 
domination (Toscano, 2009). Taken to its extremes, this leads Tronti to envisage 
exploitation as essentially ‘born, historically, from the necessity for capital to escape 
from its de facto subordination to the class of worker-producers’ (Tronti, 1980, in 
Toscano, 2009:5). Corradi (2011), in her valuable reconstruction of the history of 
Italian Marxist thought, analyses both Tronti’s and Panzieri’s contributions to the 
definition of working class placement within capitalist development. In his works, 
Panzieri clearly outlines the way Operaismo distances itself from a classical Marxian 
reading of capitalist development, powerfully unveiling the false rationality and 
universality of its progress. Here, capital is moved by the political need of restoring 
command over the production process, forms of domination and mechanisms of 
regulation of the labour process26 are propelled by political and not technical needs, 
crises have a social and not purely economic nature.27 And the only limit to capital lies 
in labour insubordination, which does not represent progress but a breaking point 
within capitalist development, entailing the attempt to oppose a completely new social 
regulation of the production process28 to the previous ‘rationality’ of capitalist 
relations. Already in the early 1960s, Panzieri pointed at how capital’s endeavours to 
maintain control upon the labour process do not necessarily manifest themselves 
                                                          
26 He refers to division of tasks, wage differences, strategic use of skilled/ unskilled labour etc. 
27 In workerist terms, the socio-political nature attributed to crises prevails over explanations to be 
connected to consumption/production patterns, the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, etc. (read 
Corradi, 2011). This would however require further analysis, which falls outside the scope of the present 
chapter.  
28 Ultimately, through the establishment of socialism.  
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through authoritarian rule or overt coercion, but often achieve full realisation within 
flexible systems of regulation and democratic forms of government (Corradi, 2011).29 
As it emerges from Tronti’s theses, Marxism is read through a valorisation of the 
subjective element, of the agency within the socio-historical process of capitalist 
development. It becomes the science of antagonism and workers’ insubordination, 
rather than the theory of the scientific development of capital (Corradi, 2011). This is 
the reason why Tronti symbolically proposes to place ‘Lenin in England’: 30 capitalist 
chains must be broken not where capitalism is weaker, but where the working class is 
stronger, where a revolutionary subjectivity is more likely to be engendered and 
provoke a rupture (see Tronti, 2006; Corradi, 2011; Wright, 2004). In this regard, 
Operaismo faces a clearly defined objective, that of “identifying the specific 
development needs of capital, to then turn them into subversive possibilities for the 
working class” (Tronti, 2006: 22).31 However, in order to fully grasp the revolutionary 
potential of the working class, a phase of objective analysis is also necessary. As 
Roggero underlines (in Brophy, 2004), in order to understand how workers can free 
themselves from capital and from the system, we must first appreciate the nature and 
the material conditions of the working class. This entails, according to Tronti 
(2006:14), understanding “the inner composition of the working class, how it functions 
within capital, how it works, how it engages in struggle, to what extent it tactically 
accepts the system, in what forms it strategically rejects it”.32 The emphasis placed on 
the analysis of class composition is what leads workerists to delineate a sort of ‘ideal-
type’ of worker, emblem of the Fordist system: such is the mass worker as 
                                                          
29 For a more detailed investigation of capital strategies of labour control within flexible modes of 
production, see chapter 2. 
30 ‘Lenin in Inghilterra’ (1964), title of one of the most famous essays included in Operai e Capitale. 
31 Translation by the author.  
32 Translation by the author. 
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interpretative category, which later evolves into Negri’s conceptualisation of 
socialised worker (Negri, 2007). In his paradigmatic essay ‘Factory and Society’,33 
Tronti outlines the nature of social relations under Fordism, where the entire social 
production comes to be identified with industrial production, and more than a mere 
‘construction that houses men and machines’, the factory can rather be seen as the 
nucleus and the ‘highest degree of capitalist production’ (Wright, 2002:41). The 
subsumption of the whole society into the production relations of the Fordist factory 
are personified by the key figure of the mass worker – whose main attributes are those 
of being massified, of performing simple labour and of being located at the core of the 
immediate production process (see Wright, 2002). Bologna (1987) highlights how, due 
to the highly evocative scope of the concept of mass worker, this was gradually 
absorbed into the common language of a wide range of disciplines, from sociology to 
political science and historiography.34 Turchetto (2008:288) also helps to identify the 
main features embodied within the category of mass worker, as first defined by Alquati 
in his studies of the Olivetti plant: the new productive subject of the Fordist factory. 
This becomes the symbol of that ‘technically deskilled, subjectively expropriated’, 
socially and politically rootless workforce, that while subordinated bears enormous 
potential for generating conflict. The workerist study of class composition, in this 
sense, serves the purpose of helping to disclose connections between the technical 
composition of this new productive subject, and his/her political potential as a class. 
Corradi (2011) points at how the mass worker epitomised all the characteristics of the 
working class emerging within the Fordist system –low technical skills, scarce 
discipline compared to the craft worker, highly exploited, revealing substantial 
                                                          
33 1962, included in ‘Operai e Capitale’. 
34 One of the principal aims of the journal Bologna founded in 1973 and edited until 1980, ‘Primo 
Maggio’, was precisely that of retrieving a process of historical reflection upon the category of mass 
worker. See Bologna, 1987.  
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potential for conflict. In short, he/she constitutes an exemplary representation of 
abstract labour.35 Bowring (2004) discusses how the mass worker is a ‘human 
appendage to the assembly line’ (Baldi, 1972, in Bowring, 2004). He is born from 
capitalism’s assault on the skilled craft worker, and soon becomes recomposed as a 
new class subject ‘empowered by the organisational advantage of workers' 
concentration in huge factories’ (p.107). However, despite the centrality of the concept 
of mass worker within workerist analysis of class composition, its technical and 
political configuration started to be challenged during the 1970s. The concept was in 
fact accused of no longer representing the changing nature of capitalist productive 
relations. While on one side the end of the 1960s marked the highest point in terms of 
workers’ offensive and subsequent gains achieved through struggle,36 the 1970s also 
witnessed an enlargement of social and political demands,37 the increasing 
financialisation and tertiarisation of advanced economies, industrial restructuring and 
a gradual shift to post-Fordist strategies in the factory realm. Such an evolving scenario 
also led to a theoretical reconsideration of previous epistemological references, based 
on the assumption that each phase of capitalist restructuring, induced by labour 
struggles, determines a new technical – and accordingly political – composition of the 
labour-force, thus generating new hegemonic figures (see Corradi, 2011). In this way, 
the identity factory-society and the exasperated ‘factoryism’ of the early workerists 
comes into question, with Negri introducing his conceptualisation of socialised 
                                                          
35 ‘Labour which is independent of the particular concrete form it takes at any given time’, see Bowring 
(2004: 106).  
36 The 1970s represented a momentous milestone on the terrain of labour advancement, whereby 
following a whole decade of intense struggles and the ‘Hot Autumn’ of 1969, the new ‘Statuto dei 
Lavoratori’ (Workers’ Statute) was conceded. This included proper regulations regarding freedom of 
association and union rights on the workplace, and specific references to the right to strike, wrongful 
dismissals and discriminatory practices within employment relations.  
37 As outcome of the 1968 movements, growing students contestations, an increasing feminisation of 
the labour force, anti-war mobilisations, environmental concerns etc. 
  43 
worker38 and progressively embracing post-modernist and post-industrialist 
discourses, paving the way to the debate on immaterial labour (see Bowring, 2004; 
Corradi, 2011; Negri, 2007; Turchetto, 2008). From Negri’s analysis, it emerges how 
capital, facing a systemic crisis and the related fall in the rate of profit, seeks to extend 
the valorisation process to the whole society. Productive relations are here stretched 
beyond the immediate production process, and the conflict terrain can be identified 
with the society as a whole, which thus becomes a ‘social factory’ (Corradi, 2011). As 
Bowring (2004) clearly explains, the concept of socialised worker comes to indicate 
that the productive capacities of the worker are now embedded in a whole network of 
social relations that goes well beyond the factory domain. In this sense, antagonism is 
now to be found within a new proletariat ‘disseminated throughout society, 
congregating in the spheres of both production and reproduction’ (Wright, 2005: 1). 
Not dwelling on this specific debate further, as it strays into theoretical controversies 
that go beyond the focus chosen for the present research, what is mainly of interest 
here is what this conceptual differentiation was associated with in terms of political 
practices and theorised strategies. This pertains to the divide that progressively 
separated the circles surrounding Tronti and Negri, and the concept of autonomia, 
which is the focus of the analysis developed in the next and concluding section of this 
chapter. 
 
 
 
                                                          
38 Which later evolves into the idea of multitude – ‘characterised by a hybrid of material and immaterial 
labouring activities linked together in social and productive networks by highly developed labouring 
co-operation’ (Hardt and Negri, 1994, in Bowring, 2004). These debates, however, fall outside the scope 
of the present research.  
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Pic.3 Gasparazzo 
 
Famous comic strip drawn by 
Roberto Zamarin in the 1960s, it 
represented the story of a Southern 
worker migrated to the Northern 
factories – and came to personify 
the mass worker as defined by the 
workerists. 
 
1) BREAD AND WINE: Half kg 
and 1litre! (100 liras) 
2) Yes! There is crisis! 
3) Four hectograms and ¾! (150 
liras) 
4) This is what you wanted! 
5) Three hectograms and half a 
litre! (200,5 liras) 
6) Too many wage increases! 
7) A glass and a small loaf! (350 
liras) 
8) Luckily, the lira is strong! 
9) ARMORY. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://digilander.libero.it/romolimarco/satira.htm (Copyright R. Zamarin) 
 
1.3 Working class and institutions: on the concept of autonomia 
 
In order to properly understand the way Operaismo39 engaged with the debate 
concerning the relationship between working class and institutions, it is necessary to 
outline the concept of autonomia – although its multiple interpretations and political 
manifestations are definitely too wide and varied to condense within the scope of a 
single chapter. As Bologna suggests (in Cuninghame, 2000), the term itself is 
                                                          
39 With reference to the distinction between Operaismo and Post-operaismo mentioned earlier, we 
should actually refer to post-workerism here, as the debate around working class autonomy and 
institutions was properly developed during the 1970s. 
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undeniably complex and ambiguous, and can relate to different meanings. First, the 
term is often associated with (a) the political experience of the group Autonomia 
Operaia (AO), which dominated the 1970s and definitively marked the divide between 
earlier workerists and autonomist ‘nuclei’.40 Second, and in line with such political 
differentiation, the term often refers to (b) the debate between Tronti’s autonomy of 
the political and Negri’s autonomy of the social, which frames the controversial 
relationship between working class and institutions. Building on Negri’s 
conceptualisation of the autonomy of the social, post-modern theorisations of social 
movements’ subjectivities have often been drawn.41 Third, and closely connected to 
the above controversy, the term is also linked to a broader discussion on the (c) 
alternative between spontaneism and organisation. In this regard, the contributions 
provided by Sergio Bologna can be of particular interest (1977; Cuninghame, 2000). 
Finally, the term is often used to indicate (d) practices of autonomia, meant as forms 
of independent organisation not belonging to the realm of formal labour institutions – 
a crucial example being the historical experience of the Italian Comitati Unitari di 
Base (CUB). In this chapter, the discussion will not dwell upon the specific trajectory 
followed by AO, but will focus on a theoretical conceptualisation of autonomia with 
regard to the debate around spontaneism vs institutions. In addition we also report the 
main lines of the argument between Tronti’s and Negri’s view of autonomy. The CUB 
experience will also be touched upon, as it can provide interesting insights on the 
relationship between workers’ organisation and traditional union associations, 
especially in relation to the Maruti case analysed in chapter 6.  
                                                          
40 This is how autonomist groups used to refer to themselves. 
41 These are not related to the present work, though. 
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Autonomia cannot be defined as a national movement, nor as a precise political 
strategy, or associated with only one group. It was a sort of ‘thought-for-action’, 
manifesting itself in various forms, that is, in certain groups, certain tactics, and certain 
background theoretical and political principles. In Wright’s words (2002:152), we can 
think of it as ‘ideologically heterogeneous, territorially dispersed, organisationally 
fluid’. Mainly inspired by Negri’s ideas and gathering the most radical fringes of the 
earlier Operaismo, it was an experience which, while raising substantive controversies, 
nevertheless represented a milestone within the Italian 1970s, and has undeniably 
influenced the leftist thought well beyond its geographical and temporal boundaries. 
Today, many social movements can be deemed to trace their origins and modus-
vivendi back to autonomist thoughts and practices. In Italy, this is certainly the case 
for the groups born, and built, around the ‘centri sociali’ (social centres) 42 tradition 
and the ‘no-global’ movement. In relation to the previous workerist movement, the 
development of autonomia not only set a profound divide, but somewhat induced its 
decline, due to a gradual detachment from the original analysis of class composition 
and from the focus on the factory as epicentre of social relations of production.43  
In itself, autonomia combined the libertarian - often nearly anarchist - manifestations, 
which emerged through the 1968 movements, and the autonomous practices which had 
characterised workers’ insurgencies during the Italian ‘Hot Autumn’ of 1969 
(Cuninghame, 2000). It revolved around a diffuse rejection of both political élites and 
                                                          
42 Occupied, self-managed social centres – a phenomenon originally born in the 1980s in the North-
East, which then spread widely all over the country. These have somewhat reflected the increasing 
incorporation within extra-institutional politics of a broad range of subjects and issues, all converging 
towards anti-globalisation claims: from students, to feminist, to environmental groups, generally 
agreeing on a rejection of traditional tactics and forms of expression, highly mediatised, and focusing 
on specific matters rather than on ‘grand, ideologised, old-fashioned’ discourses adopted by the 
traditional left.  
43 With the gradual emergence of the concept of social factory. See also the previous section on the 
evolution from mass to socialised worker.  
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the institutional left, seen as incapable of properly understanding grassroots needs and 
of adequately voicing rank-and-file demands. It was characterised by a widespread 
refusal of all sorts of delegated democracy and of traditional forms of labour 
representation, including both party and union (see Aufheben, 2003; Cuninghame, 
2000; Fuller, 1980). As reported in Red Notes (1979:4), the term itself was not simply 
meant to describe an independent movement but alluded to a strong ‘counter-language’ 
of independent class politics, ‘outside and against 44 official politics and the 
established Marxist tradition of the Communist Party and the official labour 
movement’. In principle, this can be connected to the assumption, related to the early 
workerist conceptualisation of working class as revolutionary subject, that 
spontaneism per se does not exist, that even spontaneous actions are the expression of 
a ‘sophisticated system of political consciousness’ that already exists at grassroots 
level (Bologna, in Cuninghame, 2000). In this sense, what was termed ‘spontaneity’ 
did not indicate lack of organisation, bur constituted instead a ‘micro-system of 
struggle’ composed by politically mature organisms, directly emerging from the 
working class without external political mediation. In this way, autonomia implied a 
profound anti-institutionalism and the refusal of the mechanisms of bourgeois 
representation. In line with the revolutionary agency attributed to the working class, 
seen as an antagonist subject able to influence capital’s moves, even the refusal of 
taking part in union actions and organised strikes was never read as passivity or as an 
absence of class conflict, but rather as an expression of workers autonomy. 
Theoretically, autonomia emerged from groups of militants who started questioning 
Leninist forms of organisation and political practice, especially linked to party 
structures, while placing emphasis back on working class needs (Aufheben, 2003). To 
                                                          
44 Opposed to this, there was the ‘within and against’ position advocated by Tronti. We will come back 
to this shortly.  
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this extent, ‘organization was to be rooted directly in factories and neighbourhoods, in 
bodies capable both of promoting struggles managed directly by the class itself, and 
of restoring to the latter that 'awareness of proletarian power which the traditional 
organisations have destroyed'’ (Comitati Autonomi Operai, 1976, in Wright, 
2002:153). This was exactly the meaning of the CUB (Comitati Unitari di Base, 
similar to factory committees) experience, and of all the ‘factory councils’ which 
began to be built inside workplaces. The first CUB was founded at the Pirelli plant in 
Milan in 1968. Born as an autonomous workers’ unit, this started from the contestation 
against the signature of a new collective contract (CCN – contratto collettivo 
nazionale) on behalf of the national unions and the consequent, widespread 
disappointment that had grown amongst the plant’s workers. It then became an 
independent organism, run by workers themselves, progressively focussing on a wide 
set of demands, ranging from a decrease in working rhythms to the abolition of 
different ranks of workers and equal wage improvements for all.45 Above particular 
claims, there was also an overarching discourse built on the opposition to the imposed 
correlation between productivity and wages, between performance and compensation. 
Against union and party bureaucracy, the aim was to establish a proper ‘workers’ 
democracy’, direct and free from any mediation. Such was the logic behind the enacted 
‘self-imposed reductions’ in working rhythms and the ‘performance strikes’. After 
Milan, in the same year, CUBs made their appearance also at Siemens, Rex in 
Pordenone, at Necchi in Pavia, and at Pirelli, Ceat and Michelin in Turin, and were 
                                                          
45 Slogans commonly used in those years were calling for the separation of wages from productivity, 
for the abolition of all gradings and hierarchies on the workplace and against forms of delegated 
democracy – ‘Equal wages for All!’, ‘Grade 2 for Everybody!’, ‘No Delegation of Demands!’.  Read 
Red Notes, 1979.  
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later followed by similar experiences occurring even outside the main industrialised 
areas in the North (Dalmasso, 2000).  
Besides forms of direct democracy, autonomia also meant the adoption of creative, 
pointed, often unpredictable practices, ranging from wildcat strikes, slow-downs, 
targeted absenteeism and sabotage at factory plants to self-reductions, occupations, 
and expropriations in opposition to broader social issues. Beyond the factory realm, 
the diffusion of Negri’s concepts of social factory and socialised worker and the 
emergence of new social groups (students, feminist movements, environmentalists, 
etc.) corresponded to an increase in the attention paid to the relation between 
qualitative needs and self-organisation in struggle (see Red Notes, 1979).  
However, besides a changing social composition and the establishment of new political 
subjectivities, it is important to bear in mind that the 1970s were also marked by one 
of the most severe economic crises that ever shook the advanced economies.46 Without 
dwelling upon causes and dynamics of what resulted in a severe global recession and 
substantially affected world economic relations, it is worth noting how this led to 
industrial restructuring and to a gradual shift in state-capital-labour relations in Italy 
as well. This obviously also impacted upon the nature and the modalities of anti-
capitalist resistance, as well as upon institutional settings. On one side, a decline in 
industrial productivity reduced the leeway in terms of wage claims, justifying 
restrictive measures and productive restructuring.47 On the other, crisis management 
entailed an increasing need to regulate social conflicts. It is within such a scenario that 
the role of the Italian State and of labour institutions gradually evolved, and that social 
                                                          
46 And gradually a crisis which spread to the whole developing world, as it was shocked by the debt 
crisis, the imposed structural adjustment programmes and strict aid conditionalities. This will not be 
treated here though as it goes beyond the scope of this chapter.  
47 Not only in terms of reorganisation of labour structures, but also concerning a spatial reconfiguration 
of manufacturing. It is in this period that the study of post-fordist ‘industrial districts’ takes shape.  
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conflict increasingly polarised. Indeed, facing one of the strongest and best organised 
working classes in Europe – at that time – capital embarked upon an attempt to regain 
control over the business cycle, while the Italian State opted for a combination of fiscal 
restrictions and political repression (see Red Notes, 1979). It was in this context that a 
progressive alignment of left parties and labour unions was observed, particularly 
strongly after the launch of the so-called ‘historic compromise’.48 In his analysis of the 
‘crisis of the planner State’,49 Negri highlights how the shift in the role of the State 
from Keynesian-style planning towards a commitment to restoring capitalism’s 
stability drew upon repressive functions, and was accompanied by the need to rely on 
unions and parties to contain and mediate class conflict (read also Bologna, 1977). 
Within this framework, while autonomous groups maintained the scene throughout the 
decade and workers’ struggles intensified again between 1971 and 1973,50 the debate 
around the working class and institutions gained particular prominence. It reached 
relatively heated peaks in the opposition between Tronti’s autonomy of the political 
and Negri’s autonomy of the social. Tronti’s late thought somewhat reflects a relative 
pessimism matured in the years of the crisis, and reveals the consideration of lessons 
learnt from an experienced defeat.51 Negri, on the other hand, partly anticipates, partly 
describes the diffusion of conflict to the whole society theorising new shades of 
antagonism which almost result in a mystification of material class relations. Tronti  
elaborates the assumption that although structurally workers’ struggles may influence 
direction and modes of capitalist development, where a strong and organised 
                                                          
48 This was a political alliance between the Christian Democrats (DC) and the Communist Party (PCI), 
initiated by Aldo Moro in the 1970s. This marked a definite ‘moderation’ of the parliamentary left.  
49 The original Italian version is titled ‘crisi dello Stato piano’ - excerpts can be found at 
https://libcom.org/library/crisis-state-antonio-negri.  
50 Long and intense strikes occurred, for example, at FIAT Mirafiori in 1973 – read Negri’s account 
translated in Red Notes, 1979.  
51 Despite the persistence of working class struggle, the 1970s were a decade of State and police 
repression, arrests, and treason by unions and parties – which overall represented a severe assault on 
labour.  
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subjectivity is absent and therefore a proper revolutionary process, able to overturn 
existing power relations, is not sparked, capitalist development will eventually absorb 
and make use of workers’ struggles to its own advantage (Tronti, 2009). In order to 
avoid this, and to finally divert mechanisms of capitalist production, the working class 
needs to attack the principal material obstacle, ‘the political’, interfering between 
workers and capital. According to Tronti - and here lies his most controversial claim - 
this can be done only by comprehending its internal logic and functioning, penetrating 
its realm in order to eventually turn its opposing forces towards working class needs. 
Working class must therefore be ‘dentro e contro’ (inside and against).52 This brings 
to the ‘instrumental role’ assigned to political institutions, terrain where the major rifts 
between Tronti’s political realism and the autonomist groups emerged. Tronti thus 
advocates the ‘entryism’ into institutions, and into the Communist Party (PCI) in 
particular. Workers can still access and make use of the traditional institutions of party 
and union while keeping an ‘autonomous strategic perspective free from restrictions 
and compromises’ (Wright, 2002: 64). The ultimate goal will be that of building a 
‘party in the factory’ and a ‘class union’53 (see Wright, 2002). As highlighted by 
Corradi (2011), here the distance with Negri, who sees institutions as merely 
bureaucratised and corrupt, functional only to capital, is irreparable. Negri’s 
autonomist positions remain instead on a ‘fuori e contro’ (outside and against) line, 
where the autonomy of the political is pictured as crushing any previous form of 
antagonism while paving the way to that reformist political strategy inaugurated by the 
historic compromise, and the Roman workerists, Tronti’s group, are depicted as mere 
‘bureaucrats of the working class movement’ (Negri, 2007). Throughout Negri’s 
discourse, that while claims a stronger attachment to the material basis of the working 
                                                          
52 Within (dentro) the system, within political institutions, but against (contro) them. 
53 In Italian, ‘partito di fabbrica’ and ‘sindacato di classe’. 
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class touches extremely radical and often unrealistic peaks, State and party are 
represented as agents of pure repressive mediation and any kind of political 
compromise is interpreted as a reactionary turn inimical to the working class.  
The debate about entrysm vs extra-institutional strategies not only determined that 
theoretical rift between Tronti and Negri which has never been bridged, but also 
provoked that separation in tactics which saw Tronti’s group coming closer to the PCI 
and Rome’s institutional settings, and Negri following the line of Autonomia Operaia 
(AO). Undoubtedly a strong reference point for the whole extra-parliamentary left 
throughout the 1970s, once AO’s profound anti-institutionalism came to justify the 
radicalisation of class conflict to include forms of insurrection involving armed 
struggle, its destiny was inevitably compromised. Negri, Scalzone and the other 
leaders were accused of having inspired the terrorist acts of groups like the Red 
Brigades, and by the end of the decade were either arrested or forced into exile. Such 
repression officially brought the whole workerist experience to a close – silencing, at 
least in Italy, those who are still remembered as ‘cattivi maestri’.54 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
As analysed in this chapter, despite its arguable political trajectory, Operaismo left 
some highly remarkable, both theoretical and methodological, hints which are 
absolutely worth re-exploring and bringing back to light. Indeed, if appropriately 
contextualised and employed, these can still incredibly enrich the study of capital-
labour relations and of conflicts occurring within the process of industrial 
                                                          
54 As before, ‘bad teachers’. 
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development. In particular, embracing the scope and the tools of a workers’ inquiry or 
of a co-research project can make a substantial difference in the research experience 
of a scholar or a ‘militant intellectual’ wishing to investigate dynamics of labour 
struggles or the subjectivity of a determined working class. At the same time, reflecting 
on capitalist development as a ‘reactive formation’, where struggle ‘precedes, 
provokes, causes’ capital’s reaction may help unveil the real motivations prompting 
capitalist strategies and the way the institutional apparatus may be integrated, and 
functional, to dominant needs and chosen directions. Undoubtedly, even by 
questioning the trajectory followed by the Italian autonomous movement, thinking 
over the concept of autonomia, analysing the relationship between spontaneous 
practices and organisation may considerably enlighten the comprehension of dynamics 
between labour movements, the State, and institutions. These methodological and 
intellectual tools will be here applied to the Indian case – somewhat bringing 
‘Operaismo to Gurgaon’ – thus rejecting the original idea that ‘chains must be broken 
only where capitalism is stronger’. Fifty years ago, the early workerists partly refused 
the third-worldism that was emerging in certain leftist circles. Today, we will aim to 
demonstrate how globalised capital may face resistance and encounter disruptions 
everywhere. Even where working class subjectivity is less likely to emerge, and is less 
likely to show an ‘autonomous’ character, against State and labour institutions. Before 
doing so, we will analyse how capital attempts to build global strategies and narratives 
to contain labour power. This will be done by debunking myths associated with the 
imposition of a lean manufacturing paradigm within the global Auto sector.  
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Chapter 2   
Lean Production and the Global Auto Sector: debunking myths 
 
Building on the workerist understanding of capitalist development as reactive 
formation, where capital strategies are seen as a response to working class struggles 
and their power to destabilise the system, this chapter aims to analyse corporate 
attempts to contain working class antagonism within the Global Auto sector. 
Historically, the promotion of the Japanese Lean Manufacturing paradigm, can be 
interpreted as a managerial response to the increasing labour power and the established 
working class consciousness achieved within the Fordist auto factory, whose 
conflictual contradictions were unveiled by Operaismo.  
Within this framework, the present chapter embarks on a specific task, namely that of 
deconstructing the lean production paradigm through the review of a set of studies, 
which to date still remain narrowly applied and are mostly confined to debates 
concerned with industrial restructuring within the Auto industry. The chapter will 
analyse the relevance of these studies, - which can be defined as critical analyses of 
social relations within the field of industrial sociology of Marxian inspiration, and their 
possible applicability to a broader spectrum of productive sectors. Subsequently in the 
following chapters, this kind of research, mainly elaborated in England since the 
1990s, will be connected to the Italian Workerism from the 1960s-70s in order to 
analyse a case quite far in space and time: labour struggles which have shaken the 
Indian Auto sector in the past decade. This rather complex endeavour, which aims to 
build a linkage between the categories deployed by the two theoretical traditions and 
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the case study, will then be better highlighted and clarified in the final section of this 
work, where the whole story will be drawn to a conclusion. 
The first goal of this chapter, however, is to debunk the myths diffused through the 
highly evocative rhetoric of lean manufacturing by arguing that its implementation 
was neither revolutionary in terms of production process nor in terms of the 
employment relations it engendered. In particular, this chapter will question its 
worldwide application and its universal exportability through the example of different 
historical settings where the thorough success of the model may be rebutted. On the 
basis of the case study investigated here, and with reference to the embraced workerist 
perspective, this chapter will identify working class composition and the sustainability 
of the implemented labour process as elements that are able to potentially undermine 
the full applicability of the lean paradigm. Indeed, these determine the level of 
resistance to the applied model, and lead to question its core ideological underpinning, 
which shapes the powerful rhetorical apparatus used to impose it. 
 Before reaching these conclusions, however, this chapter will first unhinge the core 
principles on which the lean manufacturing model is built, in order to unveil its 
questionable, rhetorical claims. The chapter will then challenge the substantive logic 
of this paradigm with the help of a series of applied cases, which show the real 
implications of ‘lean restructuring’ in terms of its concrete impact on those who 
materially allow lean production to function: the workers. Finally, in the last section, 
the chapter assesses how the lean paradigm proves to be much less credible and 
revolutionary than it initially appeared.  
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2.1 The Auto sector and the Lean revolution 
 
The whole mythology of lean production starts with the appearance of what can now 
be reasonably considered as the ‘Bible’ of lean thinking, a study which first 
consecrated the core principles of the Japanese revolutionary manufacturing system 
which would have entailed a substantial, structural improvement of production 
techniques worldwide. Commissioned by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT), the International Motor Vehicle Program (IMVP)55 was, at that time, one of 
the most comprehensive surveys on the Automobile manufacturing process ever 
undertaken. The results of this survey culminated in 1990 in the legendary book‘The 
Machine that Changed the World’, by Womack et al. (Womack, Jones, Roos, 1990). 
Relying upon an extensive data-set of more than 90 car assembly plants around the 
world, the study represented the first attempt to define and systematize the changes 
that had affected the ‘industry of industries’ (Womack, Jones, Roos, 1990: 11) in the 
previous two decades, with the objective of explaining to the whole world ‘what lean 
is, where it came from, and how it works and can be spread everywhere for mutual 
benefit’ (p.12). In the authors’ words, lean production is blatantly introduced as a 
superior system that, if integrally and uniformly applied across the globe, will help 
overcome all inefficiencies and faults previously encountered by the dominant Fordist 
factory. Unlike the Fordist model of mass production, the new, flexible structure first 
designed by Taichii Ohno for the Toyota factory plants will allow producers, 
consumers and workers to meet their needs and preferences within an efficient but 
                                                          
55 5 years research project launched by the Massachusetts MIT in 1985.  
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‘human’ system, far from the hierarchies and the alienation of the large Fordist 
organisation (Coffey, 2006; Womack, Jones, Roos, 1990). 
In their work, Womack et al. (1990) not only outline the historical evolution from mass 
to lean production, but also illustrate in detail all the advantages and the key elements 
embodied in the ‘new’ lean factory, and provide precise guidelines for the model to be 
exported and successfully implemented. Here, in order to eventually grasp the core 
logic underlying ‘lean thinking’, and to ultimately disclose the reasons that make its 
rhetorical claims so unconvincing, it is important to dwell on the main features of the 
model, as reported by the original work by Womack et al.  
To start with, the term lean alludes to a light, agile system of production and 
management, where all unnecessary burdens are eliminated – excess stocks, prolonged 
times, superfluous spaces and unneeded human efforts – within a flexible structure that 
aims at optimising times and linkages between producer and consumer on one side, 
and between managers and employees on the other. The core target is to produce a 
wide variety of models in order to meet changing consumer demands (as opposed to 
the rigid standardization of mass manufacturing), while reducing costs, limiting 
inventories, idle times and minimising wastes and defects (Womack, Jones, Roos, 
1990). In practice, the system first experimented at Toyota entails clear innovations 
within the entire management and production process, as well as in the relationship 
with dealers and customers. The main focus of the designed changes are the phase of 
production planning in relation to customer preferences, spaces and times of 
manufacturing operations within and outside the factory, and workers involvement 
through the establishment of a complete new set of company values and practices. 
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For what concerns the planning and design of new models to launch onto the market, 
the lean system aims at radically reversing the ‘producer-driven chain’ (see Gereffi, 
1994) typical of the Fordist factory. Partly as a reaction to the saturation of the demand 
for standardised products and partly in the attempt to avoid risky accumulation of 
stocks, the Toyota-style production is tailored upon customers’ requests, which 
determine both quantities and varieties of products - to be manufactured, assembled 
and delivered just-in-time. The customer is given an absolutely central role, whereby 
his/her needs are carefully cherished through a direct relationship and constant 
communication with the manufacturing company, with no unnecessary mediation of 
dealers, and his/her orders straightly turn into production inputs. This way, not only 
are product volumes and varieties meant to be adjusted to the exact demand received, 
but the company will make sure to maintain a prolonged market niche thanks to the 
loyalty developed by customers who feel looked after (Womack, Jones, Roos, 1990).   
This built-to-order system, or just-in-time achieved through the kanban method,56 
requires, of course, a rapid and continuous supply of components, manufactured 
outside the assembly plant by several functional tiers of ancillary units (Womack, 
Jones, Roos, 1990). This becomes possible through the spatial restructuring of 
production operations and the vertical disintegration of manufacturing activities, 
earlier concentrated inside the big factory. Here processes of clusterisation, 
ancillarisation, outsourcing, and the progressive formation of production chains can 
be observed, all aimed to the flexibilisation of productive relations between assemblers 
and component suppliers. 57 What this spatial reorganisation generally entails in terms 
                                                          
56 Designed by the same Taichii Ohno, Toyota engineer celebrated as the architect of lean 
manufacturing, it is a method to control the whole logistics of the chain in order to reduce the 
accumulation of stocks to the bare minimum, by setting a strict limit to work-in-progress inventory.  
57 See for example classical studies like Piore & Sabel, 1984; Scott, 1988; Becattini, 1990. Or more 
recent research, also on India, like Tewari, 2008; Knorringa, 2005; Das, 2005; Landy and Chaudhuri, 
2004.  
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of corporate strategies and employment relations will be discussed in the next sections. 
Here, it is relevant to stress how the attempt to lighten the productive organisation of 
the previous manufacturing system, deemed inefficient and conducive to the waste of 
time and resources, involves the restructuring of spaces both outside and inside the 
factory. Outside the factory, the vertical disintegration of previously centralised 
operations and the outsourcing of component manufacturing may lead to the re-design 
of territorial configurations.58 This is particularly evident in the Auto sector, where 
such processes have generally led to the creation of large clusters, with a network of 
component suppliers, often organised along a tiered structure, located all around the 
main assembling plant.59 Inside the factory, a re-arrangement of space, time and 
methods of production occurs as well. The attempt to eliminate idle times and 
minimise defects and waste in order to make the whole process as agile and efficient 
as possible, induces in fact a restructuring of assembly lines, where spaces amongst 
lines and workstations are reduced so that workers can communicate face-to-face, all 
workers are actively employed on the line and are asked to perform their tasks at the 
same pace. This is supposed to guarantee fast, efficient, and balanced operations. 
While rapid communication amongst workers is encouraged, a system to quickly spot 
faults and identify defective parts is also devised, where all workers can easily stop 
and re-start the line without causing prolonged or irreparable glitches (Womack, Jones, 
Roos, 1990). The way workers directly contribute to detect production flaws on the 
line is undoubtedly related to the idea that everyone can participate in ensuring that 
the manufacturing machine achieves continuous improvements. Known as kaizen, the 
Japanese concept refers to the collective effort all company employees can devote in 
                                                          
58 Besides a redistribution of production costs, as we will later see. 
59 For a discussion of the overall structure of the Indian Auto industry, see chapter 3. For a description 
of the cluster where our research was conducted, see instead chapter 5.  
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order to allow a successful advancement of production activities and processes. This 
takes place by both diagnosing faults and suggesting possible solutions to overcome 
them. The engagement of workers in the kaizen system is obtained via the creation of 
teams and the appeal to company values, reinforced by the provision of material 
incentives. Teams or ‘workers units’ are established not only to facilitate the best 
performance of certain operations, which they follow from the beginning to the end, 
throughout the whole set of tasks composing them, but also to let workers develop a 
sense of ‘strong belonging’ to the company, of ‘ownership’ towards the activities they 
undertake, and of responsibility towards their fellows. The loyalty to the company is 
also built through the provision of benefits, like seniority bonuses or productivity 
prizes, and through the promise of long term employment, sometimes even lasting for 
life (Womack, Jones, Roos, 1990). All this is supposed to engender a ‘community’ 
atmosphere, where workers feel motivated to contribute to the ‘collective effort’ by 
being as efficient and productive as possible, where by perceiving to be entitled to 
rights and benefits they are committed to pursue what is best for the company, 
continuously pushing for improvements in its production targets.  
Based on the combination of these core ingredients, lean production as first designed 
and experimented within the Toyota factory was presented by Womack et al. as a 
revolutionary recipe which would re-shape the destiny not only of the global Auto 
industry, but of the entire manufacturing system worldwide, prescribed as a  
‘superior way for humans to make things…providing better product in wider variety 
at lower cost…and more challenging and fulfilling work for employees at every level, 
from the factory to headquarters’ (Womack, Jones, Roos, 1990:225).  
Womack et al.’s forecast was that the lean system would spread worldwide to achieve 
world-class manufacturing production. This would take place, either applied by 
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Japanese firms taking over companies abroad or through Western mass-producers 
autonomously adopting lean systems. However, 25 years later, it is clear that things 
did not exactly go as predicted. The lean production model was rarely applied 
integrally, and often encountered glitches. Indeed, even where prescribed changes in 
the manufacturing system did lead to improvements in productive performances, the 
whole package including workers’ involvement and peaceful industrial relations was 
often hardly digested. In practice, lean manufacturing appeared rather different from 
the romantic idea of a universal recipe to be unconditionally prescribed and 
implemented worldwide. When facing ground realities, on the contrary, it revealed to 
be fairly distant from the discourse which had accompanied its inception, disclosing a 
wide gap between the technological and managerial changes it entailed and the 
ideological apparatus which stood beneath their surface. Such ‘divide’ will be explored 
in the following sections, and re-discussed in relation to the Indian case, in order to 
eventually provide an assessment of why lean ‘may fail.’ 
 
2.2 ‘Politics of production’: managerial practices and ‘class struggle from above’ 
 
As a few case studies will reveal shortly, lean in practice meant something starkly 
different from the romanticised representation initially offered by Womack et al. 
(1990) and numerous, similar studies which followed. The original ‘package’ could 
hardly be integrally applied in its entirety, due to context-based circumstances. 
Glitches occurred all the time, and the hoped for ‘harmony’ in the workplace, based 
on serene and collaborative industrial relations where productivity would increase due 
to everybody being happy and motivated, rarely materialised. Reality is actually 
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tougher and more complex, while industrial peace is often a euphemism hiding 
silenced interests in conflict. Here, in order to unveil what really lied behind the 
introduction and implementation of the lean production system, we will refer to a 
Critical Social Relations approach, epitomised by studies in Industrial Sociology of 
Marxian inspiration by authors like Paul Stewart, Andy Danford, Elsie Charron, 
Valeria Pulignano or Mike Richardson (Charron and Stewart, 2004; Pulignano, 
Stewart, Danford and Richardson, 2008; Stewart, Richardson, Danford, Murphy, 
Richardson, and Wass, 2009). These works, mainly revolving around the GERPISA 
Network (Groupe d'Etude et de Recherche Permanent sur l'Industrie et les Salariés de 
l'Automobile), all apply a critical perspective toward analysing production and 
employment relations in the Automobile sector with the aim of materially investigating 
the impact of industrial restructuring inspired by the Japanese lean thinking.  
The starting point for all these studies is that new production regimes cannot be 
understood in isolation, as abstract paradigms endowed with universal validity, 
operating in a ‘social and institutional vacuum’ (Stewart et al, 2004: 267). Rather, they 
highlight how material circumstances characterising the social and economic structure 
in which they are embedded determine their success or failure. In this sense, national 
features and historical paths may have a substantial degree of influence upon corporate 
strategies (Stewart et al, 2004). Thus, the context in which a given production system 
is introduced must be analysed in its concrete specificity. As a matter of fact, this 
explains the nature of these studies, which generally refer to applied cases of single 
factory plants or companies in a defined location and time-frame, where management-
labour relations are investigated within their historical, geographical, social and 
political space (see Yates, Lewchuck and Stewart, 2001; Pulignano et al. 2008). The 
second key feature of this literature is the belief that corporate practices and production 
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strategies never induce politically neutral changes, but are moved by clearly 
ideological contents, shaping well defined ‘politics of production’ (Burawoy, 1985; 
Charron and Stewart, 2004;  Danford, 2004). This finds its origin in Burawoy’s initial 
theorisation of the process of production as going well beyond the pure economic 
moment, to rather deeply fall within the political and ideological sphere. In his view, 
the labour process, composed by the network of social relations of production, is 
controlled by the political apparatuses that guarantee its reproduction through the 
regulation of struggles. According to Burawoy’s reading of Marx, the only politics of 
production which can allow the capitalist system to sustain the pressure for profits is 
market despotism. Inside the factory, the form of labour control which allows the 
capitalist to respond to the imperatives of market despotism lies in technology, 
represented by the assembly line, where the extraction of profit occurs through the 
coercive subjection of workers to paces and modes of the mass production regime. 
However, within the regulation of production, as capitalism develops, the labour 
process reaches a point where arbitrary coercion is no longer sufficient, where further 
exploitation of workers for surplus extraction is only possible through persuasion, 
whereby workers must be convinced to cooperate with management, to coordinate 
their interest with that of the capitalist class for mutual benefit. Here, consent prevails 
over coercion, and a hegemonic factory regime replaces the previous despotic regime 
(Burawoy, 1985). In current times, however, what we experience is a further evolution 
of the hegemonic regime, towards new forms of despotism. Allowed by almost 
unconditional capital mobility and reinforced by the blackmail of restrictive measures 
presented as inevitable recipe to overcome crises of profitability, global capital has 
now re-gained terrain to impose a new onslaught over labour. Under the most recent 
form of hegemonic despotism, labour is no longer granted concessions but makes 
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concessions, within a form of ‘rational tyranny’ of capital mobility over the collective 
worker (Burawoy, 1985: 150). If still formally achieved through consent and not 
coercively demanded, this may be observed whereas workers find themselves 
defenceless in facing the opportunity costs of capital. In this sense, and particularly 
evidently within globalised industries like the auto chain, workers are often forced to 
choose between wage cuts, more precarious and insecure conditions, and job losses, 
which may follow capital flight, plant closures, disinvestment and transfer of 
operations (Burawoy, 1985: 150).   
Indeed, Burawoy’s transition from a despotic to a hegemonic regime can be traced in 
the passage from the old system of mass manufacturing to the post-Fordist lean 
production, where the labour process is controlled and struggles are regulated through 
the direct involvement of the workers in the factory regime. Within the current stage 
of global capitalism, instead, the most recent applications of the lean paradigm, where 
the rhetoric of consent rests upon only fakely democratic tradeoffs, can be related to 
new forms of hegemonic despotism of capital over labour. 
Making sense of Burawoy’s original conceptualisation in relation to the politics of 
production deployed within the contemporary Auto industry, Charron and Stewart 
(2004) understand the lean system as the ‘current form of hegemonic control at the 
level of the firm’ (p.14), as a specific regime of labour subordination which extends 
from the factory to the whole community through a powerful ideological discourse, 
aimed at ultimately determining ‘how hard, how long and under what conditions 
labour is driven’ (p.6). Also drawing upon Burawoy’s reading of production politics, 
Danford (2004) explains how the implementation of lean strategies was an outcome of 
a long-standing managerial agenda to increase flexibility, intensify work and meet the 
cost-cutting imperatives of the market, based on the ability of ‘footloose global 
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capital’ to weaken previous organised form of labour resistance. However, as it will 
later be argued, Danford also points at how the ‘lean version’ of hegemonic despotism 
does not necessarily lead to a successful, total managerial control, but is often hindered 
by new forms of collective resistance inspired by the inevitable discontent it generates 
(Danford, 2004). Both Stewart et al. (2004) and Pulignano et al. (2008), still drawing 
on Burawoy, contextualise lean production as a particular form of hegemonic 
despotism embodied in defined managerial strategies, which allowed capital to reverse 
the labour standards established through the post-WWII Fordist production regime – 
including strong union capacities and bargaining powers acquired within large factory 
settings. In the later work ‘We sell our time no more’, Stewart et al.  (2009) make even 
clearer how lean production has come to represent one of the core tenets of the 
neoliberal paradigm of business organisation, allowing capital to fulfil a systematic, 
‘ideological assault’ upon organised labour. However, despite the powerful rhetoric 
on labour subordination, insubordination remains persistent and unresolved. In their 
words: 
‘lean production, then, is a managerial agenda that gives capital the leverage to 
restructure not just for good times, but also for bad – specifically in the face of 
declining profitability. As such, it can be seen as creating a range of organisational 
and ideological resources for subordinating opposition to the rule of capital. This is 
what we mean when we describe it as a new regime of subordination which strives, by 
necessity, to exclude organised and independent labour’ (p. xi). 
 
While acknowledging certain innovative features in terms of technical and 
organisational assets,60 which nevertheless embody all but a socially neutral character, 
                                                          
60 According to Moody (1997), while some ‘near-qualitative’ innovations like reduction in die-changing 
time occurred, quantitative innovations, like the improvements the introduction of the kaizen 
methodology should have brought about, were marginal. In his view, organisational restructuring as the 
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lean production can thus be seen as a process of capital restructuring carrying no real 
revolutionary improvement for labour. Far from becoming empowered, labour remains 
only deceptively involved in the quest for higher profitability through the rhetoric of 
consent, collective effort and teamwork. In this respect, the authors’ reference to Ralph 
Miliband’s concept of class struggle from above (Miliband, 1989; Stewart et al, 2009), 
is undoubtedly worth exploring. Through a thought-provoking analysis of the different 
forms defining class struggle ‘from above’ within modern capitalist societies,61 
Miliband provides a description of the way in which those who control the means of 
domination within a society, mainly represented by the employers and the state, 
impose an hegemonic social order upon subordinate classes. The concept of 
hegemony, in his formulation, draws directly on Gramsci’s understanding of the 
capacity of dominant classes to spread their values and ideas in order to subsume the 
subordinate classes into their own social order (Miliband, 1989). Interestingly in 
relation to our own discussion, Miliband (1989) points at how, in order to turn formal 
command into effective control, employers may seek legitimisation by resorting to an 
extremely democratic rhetoric, sometimes even apparently radical or revolutionary. 
However, this in reality just disguises the attempt to discipline labour movements, left 
parties, and all the progressive social forces in a society. This move is generally 
accompanied by the deployment of different devices, aimed at ultimately securing the 
privileged position of the dominant groups. They can combine supervision, coercive 
control, persuasion and enticement – in essence, whatever enables the winning of ‘the 
hearts and minds’ of the subordinate classes.  
 
                                                          
extensive outsourcing and the adoption of the just-in-time delivery system constituted nothing but 
‘quantitative cost-cutting measures in the context of value maximisation’ (p.87). 
61 Including social policy, taxation, the use of the media and political repression.  
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In this sense,  
‘ideological class struggle from above constitutes a gigantic enterprise in political 
socialization and indoctrination, and amounts in effect to a daily, massive assault on 
popular consciousness’ (Miliband, 1989:145). 
Addressing the methods adopted within the Japanese industrial relations system, and 
shortly before the above-mentioned conceptualisation of lean production officially 
came to light, Miliband (1989) strongly referred to them as a form of ‘daily terrorism’. 
Through a mix of control, ‘family-like’ interference, political repression and welfare 
schemes, the objective of this system was, for Miliband (1989), to earn workers’ 
loyalty and grateful recognition, in order to eventually secure an enthusiastic 
endorsement of the imposed order, and to contain conflict. Investigating the concrete 
implications of lean techniques in terms of impact on the factory workforce, Moody 
(1997) elaborates instead the idea of ‘management-by-stress’, highlighting the level of 
pressure workers are still subject to in order to satisfy management’s needs. The next 
section, will build on these overall interpretations of what the ‘lean turn’ concealed 
behind a declared revolution in the world manufacturing process and what the adoption 
of the new management and production system effectively entailed. 
2.3 Lean in practice: flexibility for whom? 
Having framed the way in which lean production can be conceived as a managerial 
strategy epitomising the vehement attack ‘from above’ that labour has suffered in the 
neoliberal era (see Harvey, 2005; Saad-Filho, 2005; Saad-Filho and Johnston, 2005), 
it is now worth unveiling what the core tenets associated with the new manufacturing 
system meant in practice. To begin with, it is critical to explain what the advocated 
flexibility concretely represented, or better, who actually benefitted from the 
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flexibilisation of the production process, and what this implied for the workforce. 
Second, it is also crucial to challenge the main principles on which the lean revolution 
was built and the key changes it entailed. In particular, in this section, the concept of 
continuous improvement, the creation of teams of workers and the spatial 
reconfiguration described above, will be rebutted. The analysis will then conclude with 
some final reflections on why ‘lean may fail’ and where its most critical rifts may 
potentially emerge. These remarks will then be elaborated further in the light of the 
case study presented in this thesis, which will be discussed in chapters 5 and 6. 
The insistence on the increasing flexibility achievable through the implementation of 
a leaner production system has been one of the core arguments of the advocates of the 
post-Fordist factory evolution. The rhetorical claims by which a less rigid organisation 
of both manufacturing process and labour regime would be the recipe for raising 
efficiency and productivity levels highlighted the reality of fierce cost-reduction 
strategies, not necessarily leading to improved quality in industrial output and better 
labour performances. Indeed, the Toyota production model was praised for allowing, 
through the just-in-time delivery mechanism and the consumer-oriented design-
production line, to rapidly switch process and product configurations and to swiftly 
adapt output quantities to market inclinations, while avoiding waste and hefty 
accumulation of stocks (Storper, 1992, in Kiely, 1998). Overall, the lean 
manufacturing system was designed to rely on flexible technologies, able to respond 
to different quality and quantity in demand, flexible relationships between core firms 
and suppliers, linked to the spatial re-organisation determined by the described 
innovations, and a flexible organisation of the labour process (Kiely, 1998). The point 
made here is that not only the demand for labour flexibility has enormously surpassed 
the innovations implemented within the factory productive process, but that all forms 
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of required flexibilisation have negatively and heavily impacted on the workforce. In 
this sense, as it will be illustrated in more detail later and mainly with reference to the 
Auto industry, the adoption of more flexible technological assets and the partial 
restructuring of assembly lines (aimed at reducing idle times and spaces between 
workers and workstations), has generally caused the intensification of the working 
pace and of the pressure put on workers. In terms of the linkages between assembling 
operations and components supply, the internal disintegration of manufacturing 
activities and the following outsourcing of productive segments to external firms were 
often accompanied by processes of informalisation and growing insecurity in 
production relations. Finally, the flexibility imposed on workers, a crucial node of the 
lean manufacturing system, far from leading to a progressive empowerment of the 
labour force, has rather contributed to its increasing precarisation and depoliticisation. 
Arguably, these were the real targets of the ‘lean revolution’. 
In line with this interpretation, Moody (1997) clearly illustrates how the employers’ 
demand for functional, numerical, and time flexibility, which the workforce is expected 
to conform to, well exceeds the emphasis placed on flexibility of new technological 
assets and spatial configurations. Allowed by the overall standardization of tasks on 
the lean assembly line, where demarcations between different jobs are reduced, 
functional flexibility refers to the tendency of employers to deploy workers or rotate 
tasks according to temporary industrial needs, sometimes even within the same shift. 
Numerical and time flexibility are connected instead to employers claiming the 
freedom to adjust the amount of workers employed and the length of operations these 
perform. The possibility of smoothly varying the number of occupied workers is 
achieved via two different channels. On one side, adjustments are managed internally, 
through the pursuit of specific corporate strategies like the sub-contracting of part of 
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the workforce to external companies or recruitment agencies, and the increasing 
employment of casual/ temporary workers, easy to dismiss. On the other hand, 
pressure is put externally by lobbying on political institutions for the flexibilisation of 
labour market regulations: easier hiring & firing procedures, fewer limitations on the 
use of contract labour, simplification of bargaining mechanisms are all part of a 
concerted effort to freely dispose of labour in accordance to market and production 
needs. As for time flexibility, this not only concerns an often uncontrolled use of 
overtime work, in the sense of absolute surplus extraction,62 but also the arbitrary 
arrangement of shifts and rotations in case of sudden variations of corporate 
requirements. 
Investigating recent restructuring at the FIAT Pomigliano plant in Southern Italy, the 
CRS63 Group (2011) observes how the need to increase flexibility in order to improve 
efficiency and productivity was mainly imposed on workers from above. This was 
based on forced adjustments of working times and on imposed mobility. In terms of 
working schedule, weekly shifts were extended, breaks were reduced, extra hours were 
added to the annual grand total, productive catch-ups were introduced.64 Mobility 
meant instead the possibility for the employer to freely relocate workers in response 
to changing needs: internally, assigning workers to different workstations whenever 
                                                          
62 Surplus extracted by lengthening the working time. Marx, 1867. 
63 Centro studi e iniziative per la Riforma dello Stato, ‘Centre for studies and initiatives on State 
Reform’. Established in 1972 by scholars and intellectuals belonging to the Italian Communist Party 
(PCI, Partito Comunista Italiano) and located in Rome, Italy, this is an historical place for studies, 
research, political debate on Italian politics and institutions. Long chaired by Pietro Ingrao, since 2004 
it has been presided by Mario Tronti, one of the ‘founding fathers’of Operaismo, already mentioned in 
chapter 1. 
64 The recently introduced industrial plan – Piano Fabbrica Italia - demands 18 shifts per week, places 
the lunch break at the end of the working shift and reduces the length of each break allowed,  adds up 
to 120 compulsory extra working hours per year,  includes the possibility to amend the mandatory  11 
hours between two shifts, imposes ‘productive catch-ups’ (compulsory over time when required by 
production needs). See CRS, 2011 and Monaco, 2015. 
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required65 (as for the functional flexibility described by Moody), and also externally, 
moving workers across plants at company’s discretion. In both cases, besides 
providing the chance to quickly react to changes in production needs, mobility also 
proved to be a dangerous tool in the hands of the employer. Often used as an instrument 
to reward more efficient and disciplined workers and penalise less productive and 
submissive ones, it seems to have served the twofold purpose of selecting the ‘best’ 
workforce while de-politicising it (CRS, 2011).  
Overall, the constant focus on flexibility, a core component of the lean production 
design, must be read not only in terms of cost-reducing strategies aimed at increasing 
capital profitability, but as a key part of the highly ideological and concealed attempt 
to weaken and discipline labour. This point also emerges when deconstructing the 
main tenets of lean thinking, to disclose its actual implications. The next section 
focuses on these issues. 
 
2.4 The lean mantra: beyond teamwork, continuous improvements and spatial 
restructuring 
 
Going back to what have been identified as the guiding principles of the lean 
revolutionary turn, it is important to unveil what these conveyed in practice. Before 
                                                          
65 According to A. Di Luca (Prc Fiat Auto – Avio 2011), internal mobility raises several issues. First, 
by suddenly shifting the worker to a different workstation, the quality of the final product is not 
guaranteed, as the worker might have been trained for a different process or operation, and turn out to 
be unprepared for the demanded task. Second, when immediately assessed by his/her supervisor on a 
task totally new to him/her, the worker is exposed to a high stress level and to inevitable psychological 
pressure. Third, due to the lack of information about the risks related to that workstation, whereas there 
is often no time to warn union representatives, the worker’s security is undermined. Fourth, there is a 
concrete danger connected to the introduction of ‘lean’ metric systems as involving standardised tasks 
and reduced health risks, where therefore every worker can be freely located. This is untrue, and 
contradicted by the high number of workers presenting work-related pathologies and still frequent 
accidents recorded in the plant at issue. 
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doing so, however, it is necessary to reassert two equally important and interconnected 
points. On one hand, lean production never meant the same thing in different places. 
As mentioned before, it did not constitute a universally applicable recipe, nor a 
‘monolithic entity’ (Cooney and Sewell, 2008), and it did encounter diverse obstacles 
and forms of resistance. On the other hand, though, it can be argued that despite the 
differences in concrete applications and degrees of assimilation/adaptation, lean 
production was part of a global agenda of capitalist restructuring that needed to subject 
labour to renewed forms of exploitation, and whose rhetorical discourse, now 
profoundly embedded in global industrial relations, conceals the same reality 
worldwide. Even more, the rhetorical and ideological apparatus disclosed through the 
promotion of lean thinking, permeates today the political economy discourse of fields 
that go well beyond the manufacturing sphere.66 Twenty-five years after its first 
diffusion, it has undoubtedly invaded all spaces and productive activities – from 
services to the production of knowledge. Overall, we may argue that the harsh forms 
of subordination labour keeps facing today, involving processes of casualisation and 
informalisation, and attacks to labour organisations and union representation – are 
nothing but the end-product of over thirty years of ‘class struggle from above’, across 
different production activities and spheres. A severe onslaught of global capital over 
labour, that continues, taking new and more aggressive shapes, but does not always 
advance unhindered. 
In order to exactly understand the scope and intensity of the attack perpetuated through 
the diffusion of the lean model, it is crucial to deconstruct the rhetorical apparatus 
which has accompanied it. This can be done by analysing the three core concepts it is 
                                                          
66 This interestingly emerges from recent studies on managerial practices in the service sector. See for 
example Carter, Danford, Howcroft, Richardson, Smith and Taylor, 2011 and 2013. 
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built upon. One is the idea of workers’ involvement, through the creation of teams and 
the constant emphasis put on their participation within the ‘collective productive 
mission’. Second, the conveyed belief that the common effort may lead to continuous 
improvements in the production process. Third, attention is paid to the implications of 
the implemented just-in-time system, in terms of spatial reorganisation inside and 
outside the factory and restructuring of production relations between assemblers and 
suppliers. All these ‘myths’ will be questioned mainly by providing evidence collected 
through applied research conducted within Auto manufacturing plants, but also 
mentioning, at least briefly, studies more recently performed in non-manufacturing 
segments.  
The idea of involving workers in the production process, through a constant and direct 
communication with management, the formation of teams, and a restructuring of 
assembly lines in a way that allows each worker to interrupt the manufacturing chain 
in case of detected faults, also connects to the belief that everyone can contribute and 
suggest continuous improvements of the factory system. The attempt is that of 
apparently reducing hierarchical structures, prompting a sense of ownership and 
belonging in the ‘hearts and minds’ of all those involved in the productive effort, whist 
simultaneously instilling the faith that what is good for the company will accordingly 
be good for everyone. Cardoso (2004) spells out how the restructuring of workplace 
relations at the Betim FIAT plant in Brazil involved the functional integration and the 
horizontal distribution of workers in Elementary Working Units (EWUs) 67 of not more 
than 50 workers each, together with the establishment of more flexible communication 
between workers and management, facilitated by REPOs acting as both supervisors 
                                                          
67 From the Italian Unità Tecniche Elementari (UTE): teams in the FIAT style. 
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and intermediaries.68 The loyalty of the workers towards the benevolent Familia FIAT, 
recalling the same attitude FIAT management used to perform in the Italian plants 
already in the years of mass consumption during the post-war economic boom, is also 
induced via the distribution of both material and symbolic benefits, in the form of 
prizes, status, and private assistance. This sort of caring paternalism, however, while 
apparently contributing to build a progressive kind of participative management, hides 
a well designed model of hegemonic control, which manifests itself in the selection of 
a greenfield site with no history of labour organisation and through repeated, firm anti-
union behaviour (Cardoso, 2004). In a study conducted at the Hyundai Asan plant in 
Korea, Chung (2004) also shows how a greenfield strategy was combined with 
traditional authoritarian and paternalistic control, based on a mix of familyism, work 
ethics and discipline inspired to Confucianism. Here, industrial peace was achieved 
through the rigid exclusion of the union from the entire decision-making process at 
plant-level, and the continuous reference to workers as individuals, abstracted from 
any idea of collective with ‘co-determination rights’. Examining cases of restructuring 
at FIAT, Renault and Volkswagen, Pulignano and Stewart (2008) effectively note how 
the implementation of teamwork was expressly employed as a tool to discipline 
workers, whereas the systematic use of punitive measures and rewarding mechanisms 
in the form of welfare benefits and incentives specifically acted as a structure of labour 
regulations aimed at controlling labour. The integrated system of team working, they 
argue, was designed to push for higher productivity while establishing mechanisms of 
mutual dependency ‘amongst workers and employers alike’ (p.33). At the same time, 
the provision of incentives to raise performance standards officially generated 
behavioural rules that even reinforced bureaucratic control at work, within the same 
                                                          
68 More than simple representatives, these practically act as facilitators with the aim of integrating 
workers towards the objectives of the enterprise. See Cardoso, in Charron and Stewart, 2004. 
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lean system supposed to be more flexibly regulated. Vallas (1999) highlights how, 
although the use of teams and employees’ involvement programmes has spread rapidly 
and widely, this remains confined to a mere rhetorical significance, rarely leading to 
substantial changes in jobs organisation and actually subordinated to the imperatives 
of increasing productivity and improving quality. Even more, he points at how such 
programmes respond to their underlying, predominantly ideological function, namely 
that of providing management with tools to keep social cohesion inside the factory, in 
order to prevent conflict and overcome the disparities between individuals and groups 
created by the system itself. Stewart et al. (2009) further underline how even where 
worker involvement and worker autonomy are somewhat promoted, their meaning is 
nevertheless defined by management itself. No spontaneous and self-determined 
organisation is contemplated, while union representation and independent actions are 
radically obstructed, within a broader design of labour de-politicisation and conflict 
prevention.  
The adoption of the kaizen methodology, or the idea of continuous improvements, 
must likewise be challenged. First, because constant improvements simply seem to 
represent the pursuit of continuous cost reductions rather than actually providing any 
substantive betterment of either product quality or working conditions (see Moody, 
1997; Pries, 2004). Second, because the instilled conviction that workers can 
perpetually contribute to spot flaws occurring on the assembly line and to suggest ways 
to overcome them, is inscribed into a just formal involvement of employees in the 
collective mission. More often instead, productive improvements are achieved through 
the partial reorganisation of assembly lines. In order to minimise waste and idle times, 
spaces between workers and workstations are reduced, tasks are standardised, work 
pace is made uniform. This translates into increasing pressure on the line, intensifying 
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rhythms, and growing stress. Investigating the impact of lean manufacturing on labour 
within the British Auto-component segment, Danford (2004) notes how the 
combination of team-working and kaizen methodology intensifies disciplinary 
pressure and more pervasively subordinates the worker to supervisors and the machine, 
enhancing the whole system of labour control. Overall, this responds to nothing more 
than the capitalist imperative to eliminate idle time, to maximise the utilisation of 
labour and to reduce the individual control of the worker over pace and rhythm of the 
work performed. Pulignano et al. (2008) and Danford et al. (2008) highlight how even 
in this sense, the gap between the rhetorical discourse, focusing on workers’ 
empowerment, and the actual experience of workers, who face the degradation of their 
employment conditions through the intensification of work, increasing managerial 
surveillance and higher levels of stress, is substantial. Pulignano and Stewart (2008) 
also describe how continuous improvements at FIAT, Renault and Volkswagen 
involve pay rewards linked to the quality of the product and the service provided, 
within an overall increasing pressure on the employees to meet the company standards 
at any time. Stewart et al. (2009) underline how continuous improvements can be 
reduced to a never-ending demand to be more and more efficient, competitive, careful 
on the line, where the ‘pace of work and the relentless push for more with less is simply 
mind-blowing’ (p.122). As part of what he defines as ‘management by stress’, Moody 
(1997) describes how the continuous search for marginal improvements in costs, to be 
achieved through constant readjustments of the production system and increasing 
stress of the labour process is undoubtedly one of the distinctive features of lean 
manufacturing. Within the lean factory, therefore,  
‘all costs associated with non-value added functions are waste and are to be 
eliminated, whether it is buffers between operations, slack time, waiting time, walking 
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space at work stations or more generally indirect labor such as the skilled trades’  
(CAW,69 in Moody, 1997:88).  
 
Quality, in this conception, acquires the meaning of a zero defects-zero waste ideal 
target, to be achieved by stretching the labour process to its extremes and ensuring that 
workers perfectly conform to standardised requirements fixed by the company. 
Studying the impact of one the most recent version of kaizen, the Total Quality 
Management system (TQM),70 on the labour process at the FIAT Pomigliano plant in 
Italy, CRS (2011) reports how the rationalization of the production process and the 
minimization of most waste, implied the elimination of all the ‘not-value-adding’ 
operations, the reduction of any dysfunction or fault potentially compromising the 
product’s quality, the maximisation of labour productivity through the cancellation of 
any idle time, and the optimisation of the worker-machine relation (ergonomics).71 In 
practice, by implementing the TQM, FIAT managed to eventually reduce breaks, 
obtain the full utilisation of the plant, and overall make employees work harder and 
faster, rather than smarter and more comfortably as it proclaimed. 
The acceleration of working rhythms and the spatial reorganisation of assembly lines 
were also a direct outcome of the implemented just-in-time system, the idea that the 
speedy delivery of components and the strict compliance with customers needs would 
lead to a substantially more efficient manufacturing process and to the avoidance of 
unnecessary accumulations of stocks. Indeed, this also translated into an overall 
obsession with cost-reduction, which in turn triggered a whole series of processes 
                                                          
69 Canadian Auto Workers. 
70 Integrated management system aimed at enabling a firm/organisation to continuously improve its 
capacity to deliver high-quality products and services to customers.  
71 The basic idea is that working more ‘comfortably’ allows the worker to work faster and harder and 
to reduce useless breaks. 
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impacting on both the spatial configuration of production sites, and on the organisation 
of the labour process. Inside the large factory, the pursuit of ‘leaner’ structures led not 
only to the optimisation of times and spaces on the assembly line, but also to the 
vertical disintegration of manufacturing operations, whereby the Fordist factory model 
used to concentrate all phases - from component production to assembly -  within the 
same site. The mass manufacturing system entailed in fact the vertical integration of 
all functions in-house, coordinating the whole chain within the same plant; a structure 
which proved too rigid, expensive and hard to transfer and re-produced, in case a 
change of setting was necessary (Womack et al. 1990; Moody, 1997). The shift to the 
lean system therefore involved a radical restructuring of manufacturing operations, 
which mainly revolved around the externalisation of most components production 
through the outsourcing and sub-contracting to smaller suppliers located outside the 
large assembling plant.  
These processes, as we will see later on in relation to the Indian case, reshaped 
geographical settings, leading to the formation of industrial clusters characterised by 
layered structures of large to smaller firms, within a tiers-based system linking the 
mother factory to smaller ancillary units. Moreover, such restructuring profoundly 
affected the workforce, in line with the corporate strategies outlined in earlier sections. 
Indeed, outsourcing meant not only cutting production costs, but also reducing labour 
costs. It meant shoving workers to firms generally dispensing lower salaries, forcing 
them to more precarious employment relations, to more ‘flexible’ labour regulations 
that often provided less protection. In countries like India, this has involved the 
contractualisation, informalisation, and casualisation of the labour force in particularly 
harsh ways, and the progressive move from more protected and regulated to less 
protected and less regulated segments. On the other hand, at global level, outsourcing 
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was a key part of the exportation of the Toyota lean system abroad, within a trend 
which has seen labour being progressively pushed down the production chain, 
confined to lower wages, less job security and poorer working conditions (Moody, 
1997). Besides allowing the main company to reduce costs, outsourcing and the threat 
of outsourcing have also served the purpose of raising competition between workers 
of different plants (ibid.). Arguably, the same interconnection of manufacturing units 
within a production network could be used as a deterrent against labour organising, 
whereby if one node of the chain ever stops, due to a strike for example, the effects of 
any interruption will be automatically felt along the other nodes, and the consequences 
of the stoppage will be borne by all the other actors operating in the cluster. On the 
other hand, as we shall see, this could also be used as an incentive towards more 
effective industrial actions.  
Finally, the will to turn to leaner forms of production also involved the closure of 
specific plants and the relocation to new industrial areas. This often meant the 
downsizing of existing units, together with the frequent dismissal or lay-off of 
previously employed workers, often in the pursuit of new greenfield sites72. Not strictly 
related to the restructuring required by the implementation of just-in-time systems, this 
is rather a response to the overarching strategy identified above: that of escaping or 
preventing labour organising, in order to ultimately avoid any sort of conflict, in an 
attempt to mainstream an ideal factory model where collective efforts could be 
embraced by consensus through a full, enthusiastic endorsement of corporate 
strategies. 
                                                          
72 Areas of new industrial formation, these are generally characterised by the absence of rooted forms 
of unionisation and labour organisations.  
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Going back to the starting point, as argued by Stewart et al. (2009:x) in We Sell Our 
Time No More, lean can be seen as  
‘the means by which capital today seeks with ever-increasing intensity to drive work. 
It is, we argue, the reason for the deterioration in the employment experience for many 
millions of workers. The elements of lean just described can be interpreted as a means 
to manage workers and the workplace by stressing them to their limits in order to find, 
and hence eliminate, obstacles to success.’   
Indeed, the managerial attack represented by the evolution towards a lean factory 
regime has not ended, neither it has remained confined to manufacturing segments like 
the Auto sector. Today, what we observe is the permeation of the original lean thinking 
inside all productive spheres, the acquisition of the flexibility mantra within the most 
diverse managerial agendas, the attempt to politically neutralise workers by only 
apparently involving them in the decision-making process, at all levels. In most cases, 
the impact over workers’ lived experiences has just become more pervasive, leading 
to more precarious and deleterious working conditions also for those traditionally 
better off. For example, the studies conducted by Carter, Danford, Howcroft, 
Richardson, Smith and Taylor (2011; 2013) on the UK civil service, interestingly 
reveal how lean restructuring has affected also the service sector, and tasks performed 
by white-collar workers, previously considered the most safe and protected. In 
particular, their findings show how the redesigned workloads, the standardisation and 
fragmentation of tasks, which accompanied the implementation of the lean working 
system, led to increasing stress and worsening occupational health and safety (OHS), 
even within clerical jobs. In this sense, the lean paradigm might be seen as having 
advanced more and more powerfully, and progressively invaded all productive spheres 
with few exceptions. As we argue here, and we will substantiate by analysing our case 
study, this is only partly true. Indeed, while still dominating global management and 
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production strategies, the lean system is not invincible. It can generate substantial 
internal contradictions and incur severe obstacles. While we have already 
acknowledged some, in relation to different cases discussed by critical scholars, in 
chapter 6 we will illustrate in detail how these contradictions have manifested in the 
case of India. 
 
2.5 Concluding remarks: where lean may fail 
 
What discussed in this chapter leads to some concluding remarks. First, despite the 
revolutionary claims, the ‘lean turn’ did not entail substantive innovations in terms of 
production organisation and in particular in terms of configuration of the labour 
process. Rather, it mainly involved deepening methods of labour exploitation. To an 
extent, this questions the same novelty of the system. The intensification of working 
rhythms, the extension of labour time, the growing pressure placed on workers in the 
name of efficiency and productivity, is nothing more than old wine in new bottles. 
Second, despite the emphasis put on workers involvement and empowerment, these 
proved to be nothing more than a ‘trojan horse’ (Yates, Lewchuk and Stewart, 2001), 
a channel towards a more complete subsumption of labour to fiercer capital 
imperatives. This confirms a huge gap between the rhetorical claims that accompanied 
the rise of the lean production system and the rather different lived experiences of what 
the system entailed on the shopfloor. Overall, this system has mainly been an attempt 
to de-politicise labour, to prevent labour from organising and contain conflict. 
However, such goals, do not always, and fully succeed. And here lies the potential drift 
lean may encounter: a glitch based on different omissions. First, by promoting a model 
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as a universal recipe it neglects the material conditions characterising the recipient 
context. Material settings that also involve a specific class composition of the 
employed – and exploited - workforce. In this sense, class composition may vary, and 
it undoubtedly affects the way a new production system is potentially ‘welcomed’. 
Second, a drift may be generated due to the wrong assumption that the rhetoric of 
workers involvement and the underlying modes of exploitation, which still rely on fast 
pace of work, intense rhythms, unbearable workloads, may keep resting on 
increasingly precarious forms of employment. Stable and protected forms of 
employment may have led, in the past, to an apparent perception of empowerment and 
ownership functional to capitalist needs, casual and precarious occupations do not. 
Finally, that conflict may simply be avoided by fragmenting labour, shifting locations, 
restructuring lines in ways that prevent workers from interacting, dressed with a 
captivating rhetorical discourse. This may not be sufficient – as our case will prove.  
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Chapter 3  
Industrial Policy and the Auto Sector in India: an overview 
 
Before introducing our case study and discussing the findings of our field research, it 
is worth outlining the framework in which particularly explosive contradictions related 
to the industrial development path India followed, suddenly emerged. This chapter 
describes the configuration of the Auto sector in India, and traces the evolution of the 
policies that have shaped its restructuring over recent decades. Indeed, it is important 
to highlight how this sector played a leading role within the industrial growth of the 
country, and how it represented a testing ground for the introduction of new policy 
settings, new manufacturing and labour regimes. In particular, it is crucial to note how 
Maruti performed a key function within India’s liberalisation process, channeling both 
the entry of foreign capital and the penetration of the Japanese management and 
manufacturing system, through the establishment of the first joint venture with Suzuki. 
In this sense, labour struggles occurred in the NCR since the early 2000s can be seen 
as a clear indicator of how the ‘Maruti revolution’73 (Ishigami, 2004) did not succeed. 
In the past few years Europe and the West have been severely hit by the global crisis, 
experiencing stagnation, industrial downturns, and financial collapses. However, 
looking East we find several ‘success’ stories, worth exploring both for their 
theoretical relevance and for the political implications they entail. India, based on its 
industrial development path, is one of those. With its huge domestic market, a fast 
expanding middle class which is prompting a marked upsurge in both production and 
                                                          
73 Expression frequently used to indicate the way Maruti allowed the access of Japanese capital and of 
the Japanese lean manufacturing model to the Indian Auto industry, and consequently to the Indian 
factory system as a whole. This will be discussed again in chapter 6.  
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consumption patterns, and an overall well educated workforce, India holds an 
enormous development potential. Looking at its manufacturing sector, which has been 
lately characterised  by a substantial growth in both capital and consumer durable 
goods, increasing investment and an emerging, lively entrepreneurship culture, 
Majumdar (2012) refers to India as undergoing a ‘late late industrial revolution’. 
However, whether India will assert itself as an international industrial power will 
depend not only on its key manufacturing sectors, but also on the way these will 
overcome their internal conflicts. In this sense, the automotive segment, recognised as 
a ‘sunrise sector’ able to operate a leading function and promote India’s international 
competitiveness, deserves particular attention. Together with staggering growth and a 
potentially pioneering role within India’s integration on global markets, this sector has 
also been shaken by the most intense industrial conflicts the country has experienced 
in the past decades. While the ‘bright side’ of the sector’s expansion will be outlined 
here, the actual ‘darker’ side of such growth will be analysed in chapters 5 and 6.  
The present chapter is composed of five main sections. The first two outline the 
historical evolution of Indian industrial policy regimes. As we shall see, even pursuing 
the target of progressively liberalising the industrial sector in order to align it with 
international standards and global competition, the country followed its own path, 
which makes the Indian case rather different from other emerging economies. Contrary 
to neoliberal accounts which point at the pre-liberalisation period as essentially leading 
to failures and inefficiencies, this chapter argues that it was actually through the 
planning experiments and the slow pace of reforms that the national industrial basis 
was set, and that significant industrial growth could later be achieved.74 Sections three 
and four explore the Indian automotive case, first in relation to the gradual 
                                                          
74 A similar argument is developed by Tewari (2008) in relation to garment production. 
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liberalisation of auto policies, then by providing a current overview of the sector, 
including recent growth trends and factors of competitiveness. Indeed, as for the 
organisation of production and the labour regime implemented, which will be 
discussed in the following chapters with reference to the NCR, even in terms of 
industrial policy the Indian auto sector performed an interestingly precursory function, 
somewhat anticipating dynamics that have more slowly affected the whole economy. 
The concluding section discusses the potentially leading role that this segment can play 
within the Indian economy and how this is undoubtedly linked to the way it will deal 
with present challenges, especially the management of capital – labour conflicts.  
 
3.1 India before 1991: from a state-led industrial regime to the liberal turn 
 
For three decades after independence, India followed a unique path of mixed economy, 
combining multi-party democracy with development planning, and a relative leeway 
for the private sector with substantial state intervention. Inspired by both Western 
socialism and Soviet planning, India’s developmental experience aimed at achieving 
economic self-sufficiency and high rates of growth whilst at the same time 
guaranteeing an even distribution of its benefits, sustaining consumption and reducing 
unemployment; it was therefore overall welcomed by the people (Chandrasekhar and 
Gosh, 2004; Goyal and Chalapati Rao, 2001; Singh, 2009; Pathak, 2007; Mehta, 2004). 
In terms of industrial policy, a strong presence of the state was supposed to coordinate 
private and public investment and identify leading industries in the economy, to be 
kept under state ownership. This was governed by the Industries (Development and 
Regulation) Act (1951), which regulated industrial licensing, reservation of strategic 
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industries for the public sector, protection of small scale units from the entry of large 
producers, and ensured targeted investment. At the same time, excessive concentration 
of economic power was prevented through the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade 
Practices Act (MRTPA, 1969) (Goyal and Chalapati Rao, 2001). In this way, the state 
maintained its monopoly on all industries identified as key priorities for national 
development (defence, energy, transport and communications, coal, iron and steel, 
etc.), while the private sector, highly controlled and regulated, was meant to only 
complement government’s operations. In principle, the first post-independence 
Industrial Resolutions (IR -1948, 1956, until the Janata Government Industrial Policy, 
1977), included a marked emphasis posed on equitable distribution and social justice, 
on national interest, and on growth with stability. Compared to the first two industrial 
frameworks, instead, the Industrial Resolutions from 1977 and 1980 involved a 
progressive de-centralisation in favour of small scale industries, more attention to rural 
industry and employment generation, an initial re-direction towards export-oriented 
units (Pathak, 2007; Satyanarayana, 1996).  
For what concerns their overall strategic orientation, the pre-liberalisation industrial 
plans focused on heavy industry and on the enhancement of the capital goods sector. 
With the ultimate target of achieving national self-reliance and of promoting a 
domestic industrial base, import substitution was combined with a marked inward-
orientation, through a specific set of measures including not only industrial licensing, 
but also strict import controls, subsidisation of exports, severe limitations imposed on 
foreign investment and administered prices (Singh, 2009). Moreover, in order to 
protect domestic, infant industries, firms’ entry to the market was rigorously controlled 
and phased import programmes were used to track the indigenisation of production 
(Auty, 1994).  
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Unsurprisingly, free-market advocates have generally blamed India’s pre-
liberalisation industrial strategy for leading to imbalances and inefficiencies. The main 
criticisms have been against the limitations imposed on domestic competition, the 
misallocation of resources, the too high barriers to entry and exit of firms, the lack of 
incentives to entrepreneurship and technology upgrade, the poor performances of 
state-owned enterprises (Singh, 2009). In addition, employment generated through the 
industrial growth produced by the interventionist design of the planned economy was 
deemed insufficient to stimulate substantial increases in demand. The industrial 
capitalist class, dependent on the state which through trade protection and import 
substitution guaranteed a market for domestic manufactures, while promoting 
investment through infrastructure-building and industrial development banks, was 
seen as still scarcely dynamic (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh, 2004).  
Overall, the state-led industrial regime functioned for at least two decades after 
independence, undoubtedly conveying an important modernisation of Indian 
manufacturing. Already between the 1960s and the 1970s, however, an apparent 
exhaustion of the import substitution stimulus and a decline in industrial growth begun 
to pave the way for a turn which eventually led to the liberalisation of the sector.75 
While in fact in the first years after independence manufacturing output grew at an 
overall sustained rate, registering an average annual growth of 7.8% between 1951 and 
1965, by the early 1970s this had dropped to 3.3%, and by the end of the decade only 
increased to 4% (Chandrasekhar and Gosh, 2004). The stagnation of the 1960s/70s, 
actually already overcome by a recovery experienced in the 1980s, was then partly 
used as a justification by those pointing at the inadequacies of the interventionist model 
                                                          
75 On the other hand, the IS model was perceived as exhausting its potential everywhere. See Hirschman, 
1968; Bruton, 1998. 
  88 
and advocating a progressive opening to the market, which formally occurred with the 
reforms package inaugurated in 1991. India’s shift towards a more liberal regime was 
actually determined by several internal factors, which together characterise the 
country’s liberalisation experience in a sense much different from hetero-directed 
paths followed by many other developing economies during the Washington 
Consensus era. Following the socialist compromise of the Nehruvian period,76 the 
country found itself facing complex internal challenges. On one hand, a fiscal deficit 
caused by a prolonged inability of the state to extract adequate resources through an 
efficient taxation system (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh, 2004). On the other, internal 
power balances were progressively shifting in favour of large agrarian and industrial 
capitalist groups, widening the gap with those masses who had constituted one of the 
pillars of the Nehruvian developmental project. What happened during the years of the 
planned economy then, was a gradual diversification of the industrial capitalist class, 
which undoubtedly contributed to the drive towards the market. Firstly, while 
benefitting from state protection and import-substitution, a new generation of 
capitalists who had earlier accumulated capital outside traditional monopolies started 
entering manufacturing, investing in industries characterised by economies of scale 
and prompting the acquisition of new technologies. Indeed, these would later welcome 
deregulation, market competition, and, in particular, new import inflows. Secondly, 
established capitalists who after years of protection and limited competition had seen 
their position relatively worsening, began to push for expansion abroad and for the 
abolition of business restrictions in order to explore new venues of accumulation. In 
addition, there was a third mixed group, external to industrial capital, which also 
supported the liberalisation project: this was composed of Non-Resident Indian (NRI) 
                                                          
76 The first president of independent India, forefather and author, together with the economist 
Mahalanobis, of the economic planning model, died in 1964. 
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businessmen and traders, layers of the top bureaucracy close to international financial 
institutions and urban middle classes, eager to gain access to consumption goods from 
abroad (Ghosh, 2004). Pedersen (2000) also provides an excellent explanation of 
changing power balances which facilitated India’s turn towards a liberal economy, by 
analysing the role of the state within the interplay of economic and political interests 
which determined a shift in the industrial policy regime. Looking at both relationships 
between state and society and state and international actors, he rightly grasps the most 
peculiar feature of India’s transition to an open economy, namely the strong internal 
pressure which almost outplayed the influence exerted by the external environment. 
From the late 1970s in fact, while ties between Indian businessmen and foreign capital, 
and between Indian bureaucracy and international financial institution, together with 
a partial interference of foreign institutions offering conditional solutions to solve debt 
issues, undoubtedly played a role, it was the emerging industrialist class and the 
expanding consumer-oriented middle class that mostly urged a change. In this sense, 
while the Indian state somehow started easing its attitudes towards private capital, it 
also managed to resist pressures from outside, maintaining a rather firm ‘ownership’ 
on the whole liberalisation process. 
3.2 The liberalisation experience: an overall assessment   
Such was the political-economic scenario which led India throughout its neoliberal 
turn, partially occurring during Rajiv Ghandi’s government in the late 1980s but 
officially endorsed through the reform package approved in 1991, under Singh’s rule. 
In terms of industrial policy, liberalisation meant that industrial controls were 
gradually dismantled, the number of industries under state monopoly was 
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progressively reduced, 77 industrial licensing was almost completely abolished except 
for selected sensitive areas, 78 and the MRTPA was practically replaced by softer rules 
governing anti-competitive behaviour. For what concerns related trade policies, import 
restrictions and duties were also progressively lowered (Ahluwalia, 2004). In sum, the 
industrial policy reforms that started in 1991 moved along three main lines: 
deregulation and reduction of the public sector by ‘dereserving’ and ‘delicensing’, 
which allowed broader leeway to domestic private investors; easing of anti-monopoly 
prescriptions and limitations on large firms through the abolition of MRTPA; 
liberalisation of FDIs through gradual concessions of higher equity participations for 
foreign firms and the increasing abolition of import controls (GoI, 1991; 
Chandrasekhar and Gosh, 2004; Satyanarayana, 1996). Since 1991, India has 
endeavoured to make its industry globally competitive, seeking to attract foreign 
investors, facilitating technology acquisitions and innovations, supporting private 
initiatives. Five Year Plans (FYPs) designed in the liberal era have tried to re-orient 
the role of the state, freeing the private sector from excessive bureaucratic and 
governmental interference. As we shall later see, this has been reflected both in the 
way capital has been allowed to pursue its strategies at the expenses of existing labour 
regulations, and in the way industrial relations have progressively evolved. In terms of 
proposed targets, post-liberalisation plans have prioritised the need to encourage 
entrepreneurship in small scale industries, technology upgradation and investment in 
infrastructure (GoI, 1997; 2002; 2007). Interestingly, the 12th FYP (GoI, 2012; 
ongoing), following a recorded downturn in manufacturing performances in the 
previous five years,79 resumes the need of active government participation in 
                                                          
77 Within ten years from the start of the liberalisation process these were drastically reduced to three: 
defense aircrafts and warships, atomic energy generation, and railway transport (see Ahluwalia, 2004).  
78 Like for industries linked to security or having a substantial environmental impact. 
79  2007 – 2012, covering the highest peak of the global financial crisis.  
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addressing industrial policies: state inefficiencies and unnecessary bureaucratic 
hindrances are still ‘deplored’, but government is deemed to have a ‘key role in 
facilitating the process of learning and collaboration between producers and 
policymakers’ (GoI, 2012: 56), in building institutional capabilities, formulating sector 
strategies in order to enhance the performance of the most promising industrial 
segments.  
Given this framework, and in order to appropriately contextualise the specific case of 
the Auto sector that will follow, it is important to provide an overall assessment of the 
liberalisation experience, as opposed to the trends and dynamics observed in the years 
of the planned economy model. Indeed, an interpretation based on economic growth 
rates can be misleading, and it has often been used as a ‘confirmation bias’ to neglect 
long term tendencies. Whilst it is true that India underwent a substantial decline in 
manufacturing growth between the 1960s and the 1970s, as previously reported, it is 
equally true that before officially resorting to market opening in 1991, the country 
experienced a significant recovery throughout the 1980s (Kolhi, 2006; Singh, 2009; 
Chandrasekhar and Gosh, 2004). This can be observed in the table n. 1 on the following 
page. 
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Tab. 1: Total and Sectoral GDP Growth Rates (percentage, per year) 
 
 
 
 
         Total GDP 
Growth 
 
Sectoral Growth of GDP            . 
Agriculture Industry Services 
1970-72 to 1980-81 
(average) 
 
3.2 
 
2.0 
 
4.0 
 
7.2 
1981-82 to 1990-91 
(average) 
5.7 3.8 7.0 6.7 
1991-92 1.3 -1.1 -1.0 4.8 
1992-93  5.1 5.4 4.3 5.4 
1993-94 5.9 3.9 5.6 7.7 
1994-95 7.3 5.3 10.3 7.1 
1995-96 7.3 -0.3 12.3 10.5 
1996-97 7.8 8.8 7.7 7.2 
1997-98 4.8 -1.5 3.8 9.8 
1998-99 6.5 5.9 3.8 8.3 
1999-2000 6.1 1.4 5.2 9.5 
2000-01 4.0 0.1 6.6 4.8 
2001-02* 5.4 5.7 3.3 6.5 
1992-93 to 1996-97 
(average) 
6.7 4.6 8.0 7.6 
1997-98 to 2001-02 
(average) 
5.4 2.3 4.5 7.8 
 
Source: Ahluwalia, (2002:68), based on 2001-2002 Economic Survey from Minister of Finance, 
Government of India 
 
On one hand, already before 1991 small steps towards a partial liberalisation had been 
taken by Rajiv Gandhi, at least as concerns the import of capital goods and components 
needed for the production of luxury goods, including automobiles. This was aimed at 
pleasing the increasingly demanding upper class, with the idea that growth would then 
‘trickle down’ to the poorer masses. A marked departure from previous socialist goals 
of equitable growth and even distribution in the national interest was, thus, evident. 
On the other hand, state intervention in the 1980s was still a significant part of Indian 
political-economic strategies. What in fact also allowed to revive total and sectoral 
growth was an increasing fiscal stimulus linked to larger government spending, 
together with the state’s decision to rely more on external commercial borrowing 
  93 
(Chandrasekhar and Ghosh, 2004). By contradicting the pro-market view, according 
to which the pre-liberalisation sluggish growth was a clear outcome of excessive state 
intervention and of misguided import substitution policies, whilst market opening 
spurred capital accumulation, improved efficiency and conduced to accelerated 
growth, Kolhi (2006) goes further. He points at how, not only economic growth 
returned to a more expeditious track already during the decade preceding 1991 
reforms, but also at how, despite substantial deregulation and liberalisation, industrial 
production did not accelerate significantly in the aftermath of reforms (see charts n. 1 
and 2 below). 
 
Chart 1: Growth of Per Capita Net National Product in India (1950-2004) 
 
                             
Source: Kohli (2006: 1254) – based on National Account Statistics, Government of India 
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Chart 2. Industrial Growth in India (1950-2004) 
 
Source: Kolhi (2006: 1254), based on Economic Survey, Government of India. 
 
Singh (2009) provides a critical and thorough evaluation of Indian industrial policy 
pre- and post-liberalisation, by interestingly deconstructing neoliberal interpretations. 
He firstly questions the discontinuity that neoliberal scholars have stressed between 
industrial policy frameworks adopted and economic growth trends, suggesting how 
peaks in growth rates did not actually correspond to a shift in industrial and trade 
regimes, but rather followed other shocks.80 Second, and most relevant in relation to 
the automotive case that will be analysed in the following section, the growth rates 
registered in the Nehru-Mahalanobis era81 - not outstanding but averagely positive - 
do not reflect the substantial structural progress which the country achieved in terms 
of scientific and technical infrastructure. Thirdly, Singh analyses the nature of the 
                                                          
80 The most onerous shocks were endured by the Indian economy in the 1965-75 decade, in conjunction 
with the two wars with Pakistan (1965 and 1971), shortly following the previous war with China (1962), 
the corresponding suspension of foreign aid, the heavy drought in the late 1960s and the oil shocks in 
1973-74.  
81 First industrial plans after Independence. 
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industrial growth recorded in recent decades: despite an acceleration in growth rates, 
some trends like a premature de-industrialisation in certain areas, a relatively slow 
structural change, the much discussed jobless growth in modern industry and services, 
and the increasing informality of the economy could potentially seriously affect Indian 
industrial growth and undermine its sustainability in the long run. D’Costa (1995) 
highlights how in the post-colonial period considerable changes occurred. First, 
between 1950 and 1980 the manufacturing share on the total national income increased 
from 15% to 27%. Second, in the period 1950-1984 the number of public sector 
enterprises rose from five to 214. In addition, in the years 1961-81, while private sector 
employment grew at 45%, public sector employment increased by 120%.  
Indeed, if lessons can be learnt from a reading of economic trends and political 
strategies which accompanied India from the early post-independence years to market 
reforms embraced from the 1990s, we should start by rejecting a narrow perspective 
looking at the planning experience as only leading to failures and inefficiencies. 
Marked state intervention in industrial development did help build a sufficiently strong 
industrial basis which could later face market competition. It is also absolutely 
important to endorse a long term analysis, whereby concrete outcomes of a strategy 
aimed at developing heavy industries and at establishing a sounder domestic 
manufacturing base could not have been observed in the short run. However, what 
considerably contributed to India’s later success and what makes the industrial 
development path followed by the country truly unique, is not only the socialist-
inspired planning strategy pursued in the Nehruvian era and until liberalisation. Rather 
what strongly distinguished Indian capitalist development was the persistence of a firm 
role played by the state even once market was opened. A robust state which, despite 
its political failures, managed to keep control of the pace of reforms and imposed a 
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gradualist approach, never letting domestic enterprises face foreign competition while 
still unprotected and unprepared, as it happened in several countries where Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) were too swiftly applied. In this sense, and as argued 
earlier, for the first years after liberalisation the Indian state managed to maintain a 
good level of ownership on the whole process, avoiding a harsh impact on the domestic 
productive structure and a premature subjugation to external interests (Monaco, 2014). 
Unfortunately, this is no longer the case.82 What we have observed, particularly in the 
last ten-fifteen years, is a progressive alignment of state-capital interests, which has 
not only impacted the system of industrial relations, but has also affected the overall 
sustainability of the industrial development process, due to the consequent incapacity 
to prevent and manage conflicts.  
 In the next section, deploying the historical evolution of Indian industrial policies as 
our background, we will contextualise the case of the automotive industry, in order to  
provide an assessment of its competitive advantage, weaknesses and potential 
challenges.  
 
3.3 Auto Policies: from Inward orientation to the Globalisation era 
 
Within the study of Indian industrial development and of industrial policy frameworks 
pursued, an analysis of the trajectory followed by the auto sector can be of particular 
interest, for several reasons. This industry has in fact, not only contributed to a 
progressive integration of the country on international markets, but has represented a 
                                                          
82 In the sense that today the Indian State has ‘surrendered’ to capital interests, acting, as we will later 
argue, as an ‘agent of capital’, thus showing no ownership of the development process (from an 
interview with an NTUI rep, March 2012).  
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testing ground in terms of policy, production organisation for the manufacturing sector 
as a whole, and new labour regimes. In relation to industrial policy, the sector has not 
only played a pioneering role during the transition from a protected economy to a 
deregulated open market, but has lured investment and new technologies, while still 
retaining an enormous expansion potential on the huge domestic market, 
notwithstanding negative peaks. Considering its overall performance in the past three 
decades, most commentators rate it amongst India’s success stories, and reveal high 
hopes for its future developments. Khan (2009) quotes the automobile industry as one 
of India’s ‘successful emerging sectors’, pointing at how an adequate understanding 
of the process which allowed this segment to achieve critical capabilities, higher 
growth, and progressive regional diversification can potentially inform policies able 
to enhance competitiveness in other key sectors. Majumdar considers the Indian 
automotive industry as having the potential to become a world-class industrial sector, 
contributing to make India a global manufacturing hub. In the long term, he states, ‘the 
expansion of automotive production will also have considerable welfare 
consequences, in terms of domestic mobility for Indians, in impacting world trade, and 
for the direction of India’s trade balances’ (Majumdar, 2012:298). The sector’s role 
within Indian industrial development, the challenges it faces and its competitive 
advantage are therefore worth exploring.  
Analysing the first thirty years after Independence, it is clear that the Indian automobile 
market was highly protected and regulated: foreign competition was restricted, imports 
were limited and industrial licensing was required. Following the socialist goals of 
promoting the national interest and achieving ‘self-reliance’, progressive 
manufacturing programmes were implemented in order to obtain the indigenisation of 
products, with a necessary 50% of indigenous content required, extended to 80% by 
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1960-61 and to 85% by 1965-66 (Ranawat and Tiwari, 2009). The result of the first 
industrial policy resolutions (IPRs) was a market dominated by a few national 
companies producing a limited number of models. The passenger car segment was 
mainly constituted by the re-adaptation for the Indian market of two old European 
designs, the Ambassador - a local version of the Morris Oxford, manufactured by 
Hindustan Motors - and the Premier Padmini, an old FIAT model then produced by 
Premier Automobiles. Within the motorcycle segment, manufacturing was limited to 
Rajdoot, Escorts, and Enfield (Prakash Pradhan and Singh, 2008). Overall, despite the 
production base being still quite narrow, technologies employed being rather obsolete, 
and the resulting economic performance not being brilliant, during the first post- 
independence decades the foundations of a national automotive industry were set. 
According to Khan (2009), the protected market years allowed to build initial 
‘capabilities’ which were vital for the subsequent growth of the sector. This was true 
not only for auto manufacturers compelled to rely on their own forces, but also for the 
auto-component segment, which developed as a consequence of large manufacturers 
being pushed to employ local inputs rather than assembling imported products, on 
which high tariffs were imposed (Prakash Pradhan and Singh, 2008).  
Following the economic shocks which hit the country in the 1960s and the 1970s 
(China and Pakistan wars, drought, oil shocks), and in order to recover from the 
downturn in manufacturing production which ensued, auto policies from the end of the 
1970s and throughout the 1980s started pursuing a different path. During Indira 
Gandhi’s first government, state intervention was still a dominant feature and even 
stricter regulations constrained the industry, but the populist rhetoric somewhat began 
to divert production patterns from luxury cars to more affordable passenger cars, 
accessible to a wider consumer base, to some extent initiating the process of formation 
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of a broader middle class (D’Costa, 1995; Ranawat and Tiwari, 2009). The proper turn, 
however, occurred in the 1980s under Rajiv Gandhi’s rule, anticipating some trends 
that affected the rest of the economy only in the following decade. In these years, a 
partial relaxation of protectionist measures and a new attention towards foreign 
investors determined in fact some of the changes which shaped the pioneering role the 
auto sector has played on the way to reforming industrial policy, innovating production 
organisation and the labour regime. The sixth FYP (1980-85) and the industrial policy 
resolution issued in 1980 under Indira’s second government but properly enforced by 
Rajiv, marked a first, significant step towards more flexible licensing controls, reduced 
tariffs on imported technological inputs, and a friendlier environment for foreign 
investors. In 1983, the event which completely revolutionised the history of Indian 
automotive industry took place: the first partnership between the state-owned Maruti 
Udyog Ltd and Suzuki Motors was signed, officially enabling the access of Japanese 
capital onto the Indian market.  
The definitely enticing deal agreed with the Japanese company, in the form of a joint 
venture, involved the introduction of three brand-new models, 26% equity stake and 
95% of indigenous content to be achieved by 1988-89. Together with investment and 
convenient manufacturing terms, the collaboration with Suzuki also allowed India to 
import the whole ‘package’ of management principles and manufacturing techniques 
that Japan had already experimented within its ‘lean factories’ back home (see 
Ishigami, 2004).83 Shortly after, Toyota, Mitsubishi, Nissan and Mazda also joined the 
Indian market, while Honda Motors and Piaggio entered the 2-wheelers segment 
(D’Costa, 1995; Ranawat and Tiwari, 2009). Despite this opening the 1980s did not 
constitute a ‘proper’ liberalisation, as conditions imposed on foreign companies and 
                                                          
83 The NCR auto cluster was built around the dominating Maruti- Suzuki plants; in this sense, the region 
represents a crucial site to investigate changing industrial relations and the impact of the lean model. 
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extremely high indigenous content required still represented a significant barrier, what 
happened still informed a radical change. Indeed, the ‘Maruti revolution’ paved the 
way for a substantial restructuring of the Indian automobile industry, according to 
modes and pace that make the whole industrial trajectory followed by the country 
undeniably unique. On one level, as we mentioned above, the entry of Japanese capital 
implied increasing investment, the access to more advanced technology, and an 
attempt to implement management principles proper of a ‘successful’ lean production 
model. On another level, however, the entry of Japanese capital initially occurred 
under the strict supervision and on the basis of the conditions imposed by the Indian 
state. State involvement throughout the first phase of the process was significant. 
Overall, in the first liberalisation phase, even while pursuing the path towards 
increasing industrial deregulation and ‘de-reservation’ of the industrial sectors under 
state monopoly, India never granted foreign private capital unconditional leeway. At 
the same time, domestic private capital was always guaranteed a rather privileged 
treatment. According to Khan (2009:70), the partial liberalisation which occurred in 
the 1980s, combined with heavily protected internal markets, actually ‘created strong 
incentives for foreign technology providers to enter’, in a way that allowed India to 
keep using domestic content regulations on foreign investors who at the same time 
were interested in its domestic market rents. As reported by D’Costa (1995), the 
partnerships established between Japanese companies and Indian firms turned out to 
be a particularly successful factor, as they entailed technology transfers for engines 
and transmissions to local producers that were then enabled to upgrade some of their 
products. In terms of organisation of production, the entry of Suzuki Motors and of the 
other Japanese companies meant the innovation of management principles84 and of 
                                                          
84 According to principles of lean production and JIT system, with the aim of adopting the Advanced 
Manufacturing Technology (ATM) standards. See for example Jha and Chakraborty (2012).  
  101 
spatial location of production activities: processes of market segmentation, increasing 
subcontracting and selective production assigned to India in line with world market 
preferences were initiated in the 1980s. This process reshaped labour organisation 
within the factory realm accordingly. This translated into a proper geographical re-
organisation, whereby traditional industrial areas progressively developed into proper 
clusters, marked by the spatial concentration of auto-component manufacturers around 
main assemblers,85 while new industrial towns like Gurgaon in Haryana, and Pitampur, 
in Madhya Pradesh, were formed (see Okahashi, 2008; Tomozawa, 2008).86 A recent 
configuration of major Indian auto clusters can be observed in the picture on the 
following page. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
85 OEMs, Original Equipment Manufacturers. 
86 For a study of  how industrial development has caused a spatial reconfiguration in China, through 
increasing ‘clusterisation’ and the formation of ‘specialised towns’ see Barbieri, Di Tommaso, Bonnini 
(2012), Bellandi and Di Tommaso (2005) and Di Tommaso and Bazzucchi (2013). On how 
geographical re-organisation can lead to territorial disequilibria, see Di Tommaso, Sarcina, Bonnini 
(2013). 
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Pic. 4. Major Indian Auto Clusters 
 
Source: Ranawat and Tiwari (2009:14). 
 
Finally, the entry of Japanese capital and the competitive advantaged acquired by the 
partnering Indian companies also induced a restructuring of market shares in the Auto 
segment: while Hindustan Motors and Premier Automobiles saw their participations 
declining, MUL-Suzuki progressively assumed the role of ‘national champion’, 
cornering within 8-10 years more than 50% of the passenger car market (D’Costa, 
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1995) – a dominant position which it still holds today. The chart below shows the 
market share held by main companies: 
Chart 3. Market share per sector 
Source: Ranawat and Tiwari (2009: 12). 
 
Coming back to auto policies, although a partial relaxation of automobile market 
regulations occurred already in the 1980s, the full liberalisation of the sector took place 
only after the 1991 reforms. The new industrial policy included in the reform package 
aimed at creating a more competitive environment, at removing barriers to the entry 
of new and foreign firms, and at attracting FDIs through targeted measures, which 
involved the abolition of licenses, FDIs allowed up to 51% of equity stake, the almost 
complete cancellation of the MRTPA, and a progressive disinvestment in public 
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enterprises in favour of the private sector. For what concerns the auto industry, this 
implied substantial changes. Both the vehicle segment (except for passenger cars) and 
the auto-component market were delicensed, the liberalisation of FDIs led to the 
creation of many new JVs and foreign collaborations,87 and by 1994 the phased 
manufacturing programmes (PMPs) requiring the indigenisation of products were 
substantially downsized (Ranawat and Tiwari, 2009).  
In terms of trade-related measures, tariffs of imports addressed to auto manufacturing 
were gradually but drastically reduced throughout the decade. The peak tariff rate set 
at 150% in 1991, was lowered to 110% in 1992, to 85% in 1993, to 65% in 1994 and 
to 50% by 1995 (Kathuria, 1996, in Ranawat and Tiwari, 2009). Vehicle imports 
remained instead under stricter regulation, still aimed at protecting the local 
manufacturing base: vehicle manufacturers were allowed to import units only in 
SKD/CKD form and still subject to signing a MoU with the DGFT88, which implied 
the commitment to manufacture units and not to merely assemble SKD/CKD kits89, to 
enter the market bringing in at least 50 USD million for subsidiary operations, to 
achieve 50% of indigenous content by the third year and 70% by the fifth year from 
the clearance of the first lot of imports, to contain foreign exchange outflows through 
a commitment to a level of exports equivalent to that of imports by the third year 
following the start-up (Ranawat and Tiwari, 2009).  
These requirements, which still constituted a relative protection for Indian 
manufacturing base and for local producers, were further diluted throughout the 
                                                          
87 By mid-1990s, the number of JVs operating on the Indian territory had considerably increased: 
Mercedes-Benz with Telco (1994), General Motors with HML (1994), Peugeot with PAL (1994), 
Honda Motors with Siel Ltd (1995), Ford with M&M (1996), Fiat with Tata Motors (1997), Toyota 
with Kirloskar Group (1997) etc. (Ranawat and Tiwari, 2009). 
88 Directorate General of Foreign Trade. 
89 CKD/SKD, Complete Knock Down/ Semi Knock Down, rather than CBU, Completely Built Up. 
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following decade. By January 2000 the obligation to compensate imports with 
equivalent exports was eliminated, by 2001 the need for foreign companies to obtain 
a license by signing the MoU was abolished, and accordingly the last quantitative 
restrictions on imports (Ranawat and Tiwari, 2009). In the 2000s, auto policies have 
been framed by two following acts, Auto Policy (AP) 2002 and the Automotive Mission 
Plan (AMP) 2006-2016. Auto Policy 2002 has the declared goal of making the Indian 
automotive industry globally competitive and facilitate its integration on international 
markets. It therefore emphasises the investor-friendly character of the previous policy 
resolutions,90 recommends the compliance with WTO prescriptions and with 
international environmental and security standards, targets the modernisation of 
indigenous models and designs,91 and promotes India as international hub for 
manufacturing of small cars (GoI, 2002; Ranawat and Tiwari, 2009). On the same 
lines, the AMP 2006-16 provides recommendations in order to improve the 
competitive position of Indian automotive at global level. It sets targets of USD 145 
billion output accounting for 10% GDP and of 25 million additional jobs to be reached 
by 2016. As for specific areas of intervention, the AMP focuses on investment in 
research and development (R&D) and technology, on skills development and 
education, on benchmarking criteria, infrastructure, new production techniques and 
global quality standards. It also includes specific recommendations in terms of 
environment and safety regulations, to expand domestic demand and encourage 
exports (GoI, 2006). 
Overall, from the traced evolution of the policy settings which have accompanied the 
development of the sector we can draw a few conclusions. First, again, while it has 
                                                          
90 Now allowing foreign equity participation of up to 100% for manufacture of both automobiles and 
auto-components.  
91 Substantial tax reductions are granted to companies investing in India. 
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been argued that the protectionist strategies and the strict regulations which 
characterised the auto segment in the first decades following independence somehow 
hampered or delayed its competitive growth, on the contrary these safeguarded the 
national manufacturing base, allowed crucial capabilities to be built and national 
champions to emerge (Khan, 2009), while preventing the premature diversion of 
national targets towards external interests. Second, even while proceeding towards 
liberalisation and openness to international competition, the gradual pace imposed by 
the constant presence of the state undoubtedly assured overall sustainability to the 
whole process. Today, the massive drive to internationalisation and to global 
integration and the marked attention paid to increasing productivity and 
competitiveness are more and more evident. What also starts emerging, however, is a 
focus on compelling challenges which can no longer be ignored, like the compliance 
with environmental standards and the unsustainability of a competitive advantage too 
long resting on low cost labour. We will come back to these in the concluding section. 
 
3.4 Indian Auto: main trends and factors of competitiveness 
 
Despite an only recent slowdown, partly due to an apparent exhaustion of a phase of 
consumer credit, partly to a late impact of the global financial crisis which had not 
severely affected its market yet, the Indian auto sector in the past few years has 
experienced an extraordinary growth, which has reasonably led to consider its 
potentially leading role within the country’s industrial development (Chandrasekhar, 
2013; Majumdar, 2012; Narayanan and Vashisht, 2012). As reported by the India 
Brand Equity Foundation (IBEF, 2014), besides its recent staggering growth, the 
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sector accounts today for almost 7% of the country’s GDP, and provides direct and 
indirect employment to around 19 million individuals. At a global level, although the 
industry cannot yet be compared to that of other Asian competitors (China, Japan, 
South Korea), India aims at becoming an international hub for the production of small 
passenger cars, and is surely gaining competitive advantage in the manufacture of two-
wheelers. According to estimates provided by the Organisation Internationale des 
Constructeurs d'Automobiles (OICA), India is currently the sixth largest producer of 
motor vehicles in the world, and has also surpassed Brazil.92  By April 2014 the sector 
registered a production of 1,861,849 vehicles, with a recorded growth of 10.35% over 
the same period the previous year, when a decline compared to 2011/12 had been 
observed (SIAM, 2014). In terms of cumulative production, in 2012/13 the industry 
reached 20,626,227 units, with the leading segment being that of two-wheelers, 
followed by passenger cars (SIAM, 2013). See tables 2, 3 and 4 below. 
 
Tab. 2.  Automobile Production (n. of vehicles) 2007-2013 
Automobile Production Trends (Number 
of  
Vehicles) 
Category 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 
Passenger 
Vehicles 
1,777,583 1,838,593 2,357,411 2,982,772 3,146,069 3,233,561 
Commercial 
Vehicles 
549,006 416,870 567,556 760,735 929,136 831,744 
Three 
Wheelers 
500,660 497,020 619,194 799,553 879,289 839,742 
Two Wheelers 8,026,681 8,419,792 10,512,903 13,349,349 15,427,532 15,721,180 
Grand Total 10,853,930 11,172,275 14,057,064  17,892,409  20,382,026  20,626,227 
Source: Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers, SIAM online (2013) 
                                                          
92 See http://www.oica.net/category/production-statistics/.  
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Tab. 3. Automobile Domestic Sales (number or vehicles) 2007-2013 
Automobile Domestic Sales Trends (Number 
of  
Vehicles) 
Category 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 
Passenger 
Vehicles 
1,549,882 
 
1,552,703 
 
1,951,333 2,501,542 
 
2,618,072 
 
2,686,429 
Commercial 
Vehicles 
490,494 384,194 
 
532,721 684,905 809,532 
 
793,150 
Three Wheelers 364,781 
 
349,727 
 
440,392 
 
526,024 
 
513,251 
 
538,291 
Two Wheelers 7,249,278 7,437,619 
 
9,370,951 
 
11,768,910 
 
13,435,769 
 
13,797,748 
Grand Total 9,654,435 
 
9,724,243 
 
12,295,397 
 
 15,481,381 
  
 
 17,376,624  17,815,618 
 
Source: Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers, SIAM online (2013) 
 
Tab. 4: Automobile Exports (number of vehicles) 2007-2013 
 
 
Automobile Exports Trends (Number 
of  
Vehicles) 
Category 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 
Passenger 
Vehicles 
218,401 
 
335,729 
 
446,145 444,326 
 
507,318 
 
554,686 
Commercial 
Vehicles 
58,994 42,625 
 
45,009 74,043 
 
92,663 79,944 
Three Wheelers 141,225 
 
148,066 
 
173,214 
 
269,968 362,876 
 
303,088 
Two Wheelers 819,713 
 
1,004,174 
 
1,140,058 
 
1,531,619 1,947,198 
 
1,960,941 
Grand Total 1,238,333 
 
1,530,594 1,804,426 
 
  2,319,956  2,910,055 
 
  2,898,659 
 
 
Source: Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers, SIAM online (2013) 
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Despite domestic sales and exports experienced a slight downturn in the past two years, 
they grew considerably in the last decade, showing both a progressive penetration of 
the huge internal market and an increasing integration on global markets. Indeed, the 
still low proportion of vehicles to population93 and the fast growing middle class, 
suggest an enormous growth potential of the sector, both in terms of passenger cars 
and of two-wheelers. The expansion of the middle class, together with increasing 
income per capita and relatively easy access to finance have been identified by 
Narayanan and Vashisht (2012) as major factors driving the higher demand for 
vehicles, which has accordingly pushed the Indian government to invest more in 
infrastructure. On the other side, the rising global integration is reflected not only by 
increasing trade flows, but also by several dynamic trends. As reported by SIAM 
(2012a),94 attracted by the widespread expectation that by 2020 BRIC countries might 
raise their contribution to the global Automotive industry expansion up to 40%, a 
growing number of foreign OEMs is investing and opening technology centres in 
India. At the same time, while companies from USA, EU, Japan look at India and 
emerging economies to relocate their production and broaden their markets, companies 
from India and the other BRICs more and more often seek merging operations and 
acquisitions in order to enlarge their share on advanced markets and gain foothold 
abroad.  
Indeed, the Indian auto industry provides some enticing opportunities and shows some 
interesting comparative advantages to potential investors. According to SIAM 
(2012a), foreign investors are attracted by India for the possibilities offered by its wide 
and fast-growing domestic market, for the still low costs of its manufacturing and its 
                                                          
93 8.5/thousand (Narayanan and Vashisht, 2012). 
94 Extracts from the 52nd SIAM Convention on ‘Auto Industry: India in Changing World Order’, 
attended in Delhi, September 2012. 
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manpower, together with the overall qualified labour force endowed with averagely 
good engineering skills and the large auto-component suppliers base connected to 
OEMs in each industrial cluster. From a survey conducted amongst 45 firms (14 
assemblers – OEMs – and 31 component manufacturers), Narayanan and Vashisht 
(2008), conclude that the competitiveness of Indian auto industry lies in the 
sustainability of the price/quality relation: Chinese companies may offer cheaper 
products, but Indian firms are perceived to provide relatively better quality in exchange 
for prices more affordable and sustainable in the long term. In terms of technology and 
quality standards, the firms surveyed by the two authors declare to offer poorer quality 
products compared to Korea, Thailand, USA and EU, but better products than 
countries like China, Malaysia, South Africa, Taiwan and Indonesia. Some of the 
companies express the need to receive longer-lasting government support for R&D 
and capital-subsidies to invest in more advanced technologies. Most of them result 
willing to engage in further technological collaborations. For what concerns costs, the 
composition largely varies across different regions and industrial clusters: in the 
Southern cluster, for example, due to the proximity to the Bangalore IT centre, 
emoluments, power and manufacturing costs tend to be higher. This has been observed 
also for the NCR, the Northern cluster, where industrial land tends to be costlier, 
emoluments tend to be pushed upwards because of the higher cost of living and of the 
larger pool of skilled workforce, production costs rise due to a better infrastructure 
provision and closer access to both retail market and decision-making centres. In their 
study, Narayanan and Vashist (2008) also interrogate firms about employment-related 
aspects: an interesting response pertains to the use of contract workers, which firms 
perceive to be an advantage as they tend to be more efficient than permanent workers. 
On the same question, surveyed firms also advocate labour reforms like raising the cap 
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of permitted number of contract workers, reducing limitations on overtime and 
allowing extra working-hours. Ranawat and Tiwari (2009:10) point to the “low cost 
scientific talent, the diffused IT skills and at the good base for prototyping, testing and 
validating of auto-components” as factors attracting foreign companies willing to 
invest in India for R&D. Comparing India to the emerging Chinese auto industry, 
Noble (2006:8) claims that the country might have better prospects in the long run, 
thanks to “its superiority in software and soft infrastructure, including a democratic 
political system, an independent judiciary, better (if still imperfect) financial system, 
and two aces in the hole: widespread proficiency in English, and better-managed 
companies largely free of political interference and full of experienced project 
managers with extensive international experience”. Looking at the auto-component 
segment, market research conducted by the Indo-Italian Chamber for Commerce and 
Industry (IICCI, 2007), highlights India’s strength in providing affordable products 
and flexibility in small-scale production, plus its widespread competence in the IT field 
in relation to design, research and development. 
 
Concluding remarks: constraints to growth and challenges ahead 
 
Through its different sections, this chapter has sought to call attention to the 
automotive sector in India, to the significance of its policy changes within the 
country’s liberalisation process, and to the leading role it can potentially play along 
the path of future industrial development. The discussion of India’s market reforms 
has also tried to shed light on the crucial role that the state plays during structural 
transformations. In this sense, state interventions and regulations, together with the 
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slow pace of reforms, allowed India to lay its industrial foundations, to build vital 
capabilities and the entrepreneurship culture the country has today. Despite an only 
recent slowdown, which however seems already overcome,95 the automotive sector 
can keep providing an essential contribution to India’s growth, not only leading its 
integration on international markets, but also by generating substantially beneficial 
spillovers in terms of social development.  
However, given the factors of competitiveness underlined above, which can make the 
sector undoubtedly attractive for foreign investors, current constraints and costs 
entailed by the recent growth represent important challenges to address in the coming 
years, and must therefore be considered as well.  
Narayanan and Vashisht (2008) identify a number of weaknesses that still need to be 
overcome. This includes a still low capacity utilisation, precarious contracts between 
OEMs and component suppliers, insufficient infrastructure, high costs for energy 
provision, lack of skilled workforce (in some regions more than others – not in the 
NCR), poor quality of materials, lack of incentives and high taxation (in Maharashtra 
in particular), insufficient availability of land and inadequate environmental 
regulations. The need to solve issues related to poor road infrastructure and traffic 
congestion, together with the necessity to fulfill environmental imperatives, to 
promote low emission technologies and to find alternative energy sources are also 
central in the Auto Policy 2002 (GoI, 2002). Becker-Ritterspach and Becker-
Ritterspach (2008) question both the economic and ecological sustainability of the 
small car path currently followed by the Indian automobile industry. While its 
economic sustainability is related to the capacity of sustaining domestic demand and 
                                                          
95 Trends reported by the Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers (SIAM) for 2015 seem to 
already suggest a recovery, see http://www.siamindia.com/statistics.aspx?mpgid=8&pgidtrail=9.  
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to keep attracting foreign investors who will join Maruti and Tata in the production of 
the Maruti 800 and of the Tata Nano, the ecological sustainability is threatened by 
environmental pollution and unregulated emissions. For what concerns the need to 
stimulate domestic demand, as highlighted by Chandrasekhar (2013) when analysing 
the downturn the industry experienced in the last biennium, an important constraint 
relates to the limitations of the consumer credit granted in the past decade. If the path 
followed has effectively reached its exhaustion, in order to avoid risky imbalances and 
unwanted bubbles, new avenues to incentivise consumption will have to be found.  
Besides the need to overcome infrastructure bottlenecks, to attract investment and to 
promote the compliance with safety and environmental standards, also acknowledged 
by the Government of India in the Automotive Mission Plan 2006-2016 (GoI, 2006), 
there are however more structural and compelling political challenges. Among these, 
there is the need to favour ‘quality’ employment creation and of intervening to counter 
the unsustainability of a development model that has for too long relied on low cost 
labour. These trends should be urgently and substantially addressed by any future 
political intervention. On one side, quality employment creation should be promoted 
to counter the recorded jobless growth in Indian manufacturing (see Kannan and 
Raveendran, 2009; Singh, 2009). This has not actually meant a stagnation in 
employment opportunities, but the lack of quality jobs, with new ones created only in 
unprotected, informal segments. On the other side, and in relation to the previous point, 
the progressive informalisation of the labour force should be addressed at a more 
systemic level (see Deshpande, Karan, Sharma, Sarkar, 2004). As we will discuss in 
chapter 5 and 6 in relation to the NCR, this has involved a disproportionate increase in 
precarious forms of casual and contract labour, a progressive deterioration in labour 
standards and working conditions, and a perpetual circumvention of existing labour 
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laws. These processes have occurred as part of aggressive, profit-seeking strategies 
pursued by capital, tolerated by the Indian State in order to preserve the 
competitiveness of the sector. In this sense, without taking a strong stance to contain 
capital’s detrimental strategies, and without intervening to properly tackle labour 
issues, the Indian State will not be able to guarantee sustainable growth for its ‘shining’ 
Auto industry. Conflicts will keep emerging, and the concealed contradictions of the 
vaunted competitiveness will be inevitably unveiled.  
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Chapter 4 
Fieldwork and Research Methodology:  Workers’ Inquiry as a Tool to 
explore Industrial Conflict 
 
Introduction: the centrality of conflict 
In line with the embraced workerist approach, this thesis is built around the strong 
belief that industrial conflict represents a crucial, and revealing, moment, where 
contradictions emerging within processes of industrial development and the involved 
power relations are powerfully ‘unmasked’. It is with such conviction that time and 
space boundaries of the present research were set. Indeed, it was not only the presence 
of an ongoing industrial conflict that attracted me towards the Delhi region, but the 
perception of the scope and the relevance of such conflicts, happening there, at that 
point in time. In this sense, and as I will further clarify in chapters 5 and 6, the core 
mission of this investigation became that of explaining not only why conflict happened, 
how struggle developed, and what outcomes were eventually achieved, but why it 
occurred there and then. The theoretical perspective adopted, and the way this 
influenced the objectives of the present research, informed the methodology employed 
accordingly, shaping the process of field research. These will be reported in the present 
chapter, before discussing the research findings in the last two sections of the thesis.  
The empirical part of this thesis narrates the story of a conflict. It aims at exploring 
causes, dynamics and impact of an industrial conflict that had started in the years 
before the research was conducted, and marked, intermittently, the region investigated 
for the whole last decade, reaching one of its major peaks exactly while this fieldwork 
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was carried out. In this sense, the possibility of witnessing the most intense phase of 
the conflict, while imposing a few limitations, certainly allowed to follow struggle 
dynamics more closely. Overall, the closer participation in the ongoing conflict, while 
also requiring the consideration of issues related to research ethics and ground politics, 
proved to be a unique opportunity. If on one side it also entailed risks, on the other it 
incredibly enriched the research experience, allowing to gather significant data and 
extremely telling stories.  
By conflict here, I refer to a phase of particularly harsh and tense industrial relations 
that affected the Automotive production segment in Delhi (NCR), India, from 2000 
onward, achieving its acme in 2011- 2012. I could directly observe this last phase, as 
it coincided with the timings of the field research I carried out. Throughout this period, 
in fact, I conducted two separate rounds of fieldwork, one from November 2011 to 
April 2012, and a second one from July to September 2012.  Overall, the intensifying 
industrial dispute and the emergence of a strong, local labour movement, showing a 
new and resolute subjectivity, markedly influenced the course taken by and the 
objectives pursued in the present research. Indeed, while the decision to map labour 
composition in the area had been already inspired by the tradition of a workerist 
inquiry,96 further reflections on working class formation and on the relationship 
between autonomous movements and labour institutions were progressively informed  
by the direct observation of the struggle on the ground. This chapter will discuss 
methodological issues, fieldwork architecture, and some necessary ethical 
considerations which arose while being in the field.   
                                                          
96 See also chapter 1.  
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4.1 ‘Knowledge is tied to Struggle’:97 Workers’ Inquiry as a tool to explore Conflict 
After discussing in chapter 1 how a workerist perspective contributed to shape the 
theoretical approach taken in this research, it is important to illustrate how this 
effectively translated into the methodological tools employed to conduct the proper 
field investigation.  
The workerists themselves, and Tronti in particular (2006; 2009), never talked of a 
‘method’, a jargon that they actually overall refused, but of a 'cultural and political 
experience' which produced a new, and revolutionary 'point of view', based on the 
analysis of the role working class struggle plays in determining the trajectory of 
capitalist development. In this sense, workerists assigned crucial importance to 
struggle, not only in determining a reaction of the capitalist class, aiming at ultimately 
making 'a capitalist use of working class struggle', but also in generating 'workers' 
knowledge', necessary source for the formulation of a revolutionary political praxis 
(Tronti, 2006). Therefore, despite a generalised scepticism towards the definition of a 
systematised methodology, along the view of formalised disciplines as ‘a bourgeois 
science' (Tronti, 2006), within workerist contributions we also find an attempt to 
establish ways to access such knowledge. Ultimately, the aim is that of building a 
collective learning process together with workers, and of channelling the experience 
gained in the direction of specific political goals (see Panzieri, 1994). In this sense, the 
workerist inquiry, as co-research practice, can be seen as anticipating the following 
debate on participatory action research within social science, and on the need for 
critical, engaged, grounded labour studies (see Stewart and Martìnez-Lucio, 2011; 
                                                          
97 In Italian ‘la conoscenza è legata alla lotta’, struggle is a source of knowledge, and the participation 
and the analysis of working class struggles produce knowledge. Tronti (2006:10).  
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Bergold and Thomas, 2012; Brook and Darlington, 2013; Huzzard and Björkman, 
2012). Overall, what distinguishes the early workerist research tool from later 
definitions of research objectives within the study of work, and of the role of the 
organic intellectual within the co-production of knowledge, is a much greater emphasis 
placed on the militant nature of the research itself. This involves, for example, a greater 
sense of collectivity within the intellectual / researchers / activists considered as a 
group, a more defined distance between militant intellectuals and labour institutions, 
informed by the autonomist tradition, and a much stronger orientation towards the 
design of revolutionary actions as end goal of the co-research process. In this sense, 
the workerist militant researcher takes an expressely partisan stance in unison with 
the working class engaged in the struggle, politically embraces the demands of the 
struggle itself, and directly contributes to the political outcome of the actions taken. 
This is more than a commitment of the organic intellectual towards the class he/she 
represents, it is a sort of dissolution of the difference between researcher and 
researched, within a common, class- based, political goal.  
In practice, in the earlier workerist studies, we can also find indications aimed at 
delineating a common method for research. These can be traced in Panzieri's definition 
of a workers' inquiry as a clearly suggested path for political investigation on working 
class struggle. ‘Political’ here expressly refers to the ultimate use that will be made of 
the resulting workers' knowledge for the design of revolutionary actions, whereas the 
inquiry per se also involves a detachment from the struggle and a moment of scientific 
analysis on the grade of consciousness reached by the working class (Panzieri, 1976; 
1994). The actual gathering of information, according to Panzieri, can be based on 
methods proper of a sociological survey, like questionnaires, interviews, direct 
meetings with workers (Panzieri, 1976), besides the collection of all materials 
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produced by the workers themselves (including factory reports, leaflets, speeches), and 
the direct observation of processes happening inside the factory (Tronti, 2009). The 
starting point of the workerist inquiry, and necessary step in the sought link between 
theory and political action, is a phase of 'inchiesta a caldo', a phase of research 
developed during the highest peak of the industrial conflict, where the relationship 
between the working class and the capitalist system emerges more clearly (Panzieri, 
1976). Overall, from Panzieri’s work, it clearly emerges how what distinguishes a 
workerist enquiry from any other sociological survey on labour is the emphasis placed 
on struggles; on the researcher’s involvement in the struggle; and on the political 
objectives of the research experience. In this sense, a militant research, where the 
politics of the struggle and the produced revolutionary knowledge are shared between 
intellectuals and workers, is based on a collective learning process.  This is what 
workerists named co-research, involving collaboration, collective discussion, joint 
political action between the militant researcher and the struggling workers (CRS, 2011; 
Monaco, 2015). In terms of research objectives, data collection must aim at the 
analysis of class composition, in order to understand struggle dynamics, to interpret 
capital’s moves, and to eventually implement successful strategies for the 
advancement of the working class (see Panzieri, 1976; 1994). In line with such goals, 
and within the debate on autonomia, workerist studies carefully focused on the relation 
between spontaneous movements and existing labour institutions, especially trade 
unions. Inspired by all this, my research methodology and objectives took shape.  
In line with the approach and the method illustrated above, my field research 
developed in two phases and around two main objectives, partly determined and 
‘flexibly’ re-adapted while following the evolution of the struggle itself. A first phase 
was built around the aim of mapping labour composition in the NCR, in order to 
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understand the background and the motivations of the workers who engaged in the 
strikes. With such aim, I designed a questionnaire-based survey. Thanks to the help 
provided by unionists and workers with the distribution and the collection of the 
questionnaires prepared, the survey covers a sample of 140 observations from 6 OEMs 
and 13 component suppliers operating both in Gurgaon and Faridabad. The 
questionnaires were composed of four main sections, intended to gather information 
about NCR workers’ personal background, their working and living conditions, and 
their position toward union-related issues.98 An exploration of working conditions 
imposed inside the factory also served the purpose of investigating management 
attitudes and strategies employed to control labour. After this phase of ‘extensive’ 
research, a more in depth investigation of struggle dynamics, of power relations 
between the actors involved in the industrial dispute, and on the politics of the capital-
labour conflict in the area, took place. This involved interviews with workers and other 
key informants, focus groups, and the attendance at official events with both unions 
and workers. Overall, different research methods were deployed, on the basis of a key 
rationale privileging the dimension of struggle.  
 
4.2 Grounded 99 research and qualitative methods 
 
Within an overarching structure inspired by a workers’ inquiry, several methods of 
data collection were employed. Overall, there was the need to flexibly adapt and 
combine different qualitative methods, available to a field researcher, according to the 
                                                          
98 An exact sample description and a thorough discussion of the survey findings can be found in chapter 
5. 
99 Term used by Glaser and Strauss (2008).  
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information required and to the circumstances in which the investigation took place. 
Within social science research, it is frequent to mix diverse techniques depending on 
the purpose of the study, data needed, time and resources available; the exact 
combination will nonetheless be influenced by the researcher's personal approach and 
objectives, identified as 'optimal', within a range of possibilities dictated by the context 
(Mikkelsen, 2005). Highlighting how research plans based on pre-defined guidelines 
can substantially differ from actual field data collection, Brydon (2006:x) points at 
how 'research on the ground is a much finer-grained complex of quick thinking and 
responsiveness and, in some cases, the abandoning of the rules'. The need for 
flexibility in field research methods, while on one side may be seen as a disadvantage,  
as inevitably raising ethical and scientific considerations (Breman, 1985), on the other 
can also effectively function to interestingly combine materials of a diverse nature, 
and to compensate strengths and weaknesses of each technique (Mayoux, 2006).  
For the purpose and scope of the present research, pondering not only time and 
financial constraints, but also the peculiarities of the investigation site and the 
circumstances that emerged, a mix of qualitative methods for data collection was 
adopted. Whereas quantitative data were incorporated into the questions, 100 these did 
not aim at providing simple statistical evidence regarding the observed phenomena, 
but at actually supplying a material base for a better understanding of qualitative 
aspects related to working and living conditions within the industrial sector analysed. 
Overall, as mentioned above, the survey served as a basis to interpret workers’ 
demands emerging through the struggle, and to grasp the effective practices of 
                                                          
100 Questions addressing wage levels or living expenses were included both in interviews and in the 
survey questionnaires. 
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managerial control taking place within the factory. I will get back to this later on in 
this chapter. 
Initially, a set of 'open' interviews was held with scholars studying the Indian labour 
market and manufacturing sector. These allowed an exploration of the field, to map 
the research site, to recognise the key actors involved and the scope of the targeted 
processes. Specifically, these led to the identification of the main OEMs operating in 
the NCR cluster, of the most active Trade Unions in the area, and to a first 
conceptualisation of issues surrounding the Maruti case and the Indian system of 
Industrial Relations. Subsequently, when dealing with Trade Unions and workers, 
'semi-structured' interviews were employed. These allowed, on one side, to discuss 
with the interviewee some points and issues of interest, previously fixed in a check-
list (see appendix C), but at the same time to grant sufficient flexibility to let the 
‘subjectivity’ of the interlocutor emerge. In general, this sort of method is particularly 
advised when dealing with politically sensitive issues, as it helps putting the informant 
at ease (on characteristics, potentialities and limitations of different types of 
interviews, see Brockington and Sullivan, 2003; Devereux and Hoddinott, 1992; 
Willis, 2006). Contacts of interviewees were generally obtained by 'snow-balling' (see 
Mezzadri, 2009; Willis, 2006), or by personal networking when attending official 
events. The samples analysed, as in the case of the questionnaires, were also 
determined by the available access to informants, in some cases partly different from 
the hoped or predicted extension.101 
                                                          
101 As experienced by Miyamura (2010:169), who reports how during his field research on Labour 
Market Institutions in the Indian Industry, his sample “significantly depended on the politics of access 
or ‘gate keeping’, and especially when dealing with the corporate world, it was strongly “dictated by 
feasibility and atmosphere of mutual distrust between the management and union members”. 
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Different sets of interview checklists were deployed to obtain information from 
scholars and trade unionists (this can be observed in appendix C).102 At the same time, 
different methods were adopted when dealing with workers. Besides questionnaires 
and a limited number of one-to-one interviews, whenever possible, focus groups were 
arranged. These presented some disadvantages, like overlapping of information, or 
more difficulties in translation and transcription, but generally helped by creating a 
more 'comfortable' atmosphere where workers felt safer and therefore ready to 
converse. For example, focus groups proved to be the best method to obtain reports 
from the strikes. 
Two issues arise here, which also emerged when working with questionnaires and that 
will be considered again in relation to research ethics and politics. One concerns the 
language, the other the question of 'mediation'. Regarding the language, I did not 
experience particular issues when talking to managers, officers, the majority of trade 
unionists and skilled workers, who although obviously speaking English at different 
levels of articulation and abstraction, were always able to engage in interviews and to 
properly address asked questions. In other cases though, sometimes with less skilled 
or simply older workers who preferred discussing in Hindi, translation was needed, as 
my Hindi for beginners did not allow the proficiency required to hold interviews.103 
This issue, while it was relatively overcome when working with questionnaires, 
through the help of both English – Hindi and Hindi – English translators,104 was 
                                                          
102 I had also prepared a checklist to interview managers and employers, but I never managed to 
integrally use it (see appendix B). Chances to meet managers and corporate offices were in fact limited, 
and happened in circumstances not allowing to follow a rigid scheme. 
103 I attended a Hindi course, but only during the field, and it unfortunately only enabled me to grasp 
basic language for daily needs.  
104 The Questionnaires were written in English, translated into Hindi by an assistant, delivered to 
workers in both languages. The answers received were partly in English, partly in Hindi. Those in Hindi 
were translated again into English by another professional translator, hired in the second part of the 
field. 
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sometimes harder to address during interviews or focus groups. Generally, when a 
meeting could be arranged in advance, either the same trade unions offered help, or an 
external assistant was found for the occasion. In a few cases where meetings were 
improvised or circumstances not well clarified beforehand, though, communication 
inevitably encountered some obstacles, and information gathered is therefore slightly 
more limited. Fortunately, such problem represented an actual impediment only in two 
or three cases. 
The assistance provided by trade unions, leads to the question of 'mediation'. Support 
was given, in fact, not only by helping with translations when needed, but also by 
practically facilitating the arrangement of meetings with workers, the access to official 
events and to useful contacts, and by providing a sort of 'protection' in risky 
circumstances, even if only limited to the availability of a 'safe place' (like a trade 
union office) where to meet workers without over-exposition. Although this may have 
led to a sometimes unwanted level of mediation, it was nonetheless inevitable and 
often the only possible solution, especially in the most acute phases of the industrial 
conflict. Indeed, in several circumstances, without intermediaries further informants 
would not have been accessed and even the participation in open events would have 
been riskier. Of course, being aware of such a level of political mediation, all answers 
provided by workers were always carefully screened and ‘skimmed’ of all possible 
institutional biases. In this sense, even the information obtained through 
questionnaires, the other method employed to gather workers' voices, may have been 
influenced by union mediation in the sample selection. Unions helped in fact with 
delivering, distributing and re-collecting questionnaires, or at least with contacting one 
or few workers who might act as a channel to perform such delicate task. Indeed, where 
due to tense industrial relations, company plants could not be directly accessed for 
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research activities, only trade unions’ mediation made a similar investigation possible. 
Eventually, such facilitation allowed to meet a much higher number of workers and to 
access more companies than I could have hoped. All these issues are further discussed 
in chapter 5. 
Overall, even when employing the same techniques or adopting a similar approach 
towards informants, the two phases on the field were characterised by a very diverse 
scope and different objectives. As mentioned, the first phase represented a sort of 
'exploration', an extensive attempt to map the site, to engage with relevant actors 
operating in the sector, to understand relationships among them and main dynamics of 
industrial relations in the NCR. Eventually, such exploration allowed for a broader 
understanding of social relations shaping the industrial conflict, together with an 
extensive picture of the local labour composition. The second round of fieldwork, 
whose boundaries were set by the acute explosion of the Maruti conflict, was fully 
dedicated to the understanding of struggle dynamics and power relations between the 
Maruti movement and existing labour institutions.  
4.3 Background  
The field research planned and then conducted in India, in the Delhi region, in 2011-
12, initially benefitted from two background experiences, which were also used to gain 
direct access to the investigation site.  One was a first field experience in India in the 
spring of 2009. This began with an internship in the State of Tamil Nadu, but then 
continued with a first research in Delhi, focused on labour and industrial restructuring 
within the Indian Auto sector. Conducted for my Master's dissertation, this not only 
developed into the present PhD research, but also provided helpful contacts that 
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functioned as a starting 'gateway' at the beginning of the fieldwork. A second 
experience,105 which also determined the original decision to specifically focus on the 
Automotive sector, was the collaboration, in 2008/09, with a research group (CRS 
Gruppo Lavoro) working on the effects of ‘lean restructuring’ on labour within a FIAT 
industrial plant in Italy (see CRS, 2011; Monaco, 2015).106 The exposure to such 
research work was beneficial for several reasons. First, since this group experimented 
methods characteristics of a workers’ inquiry and of co-research, initial 
methodological considerations were developed back then. Second, this working group 
was related to the Italian Centro per la Riforma dello Stato (CRS),107 chaired by Mario 
Tronti, the ‘founding father’ of the Italian Operaismo. The contact with such group 
thus resulted in the opportunity to meet Tronti himself, in October 2011. During an 
extremely inspiring meeting, I had the chance to discuss with Tronti my original 
research project, and he provided incredibly valuable advice.108 Third, the research 
produced by that working group allowed to gain familiarity with FIAT’s industrial 
history, with knowledge regarding lean management and manufacturing practices, and 
about working conditions within Auto manufacturing plants. Indeed, this proved to be 
an interesting ‘exchange material’ when discussing with my informants in India.  
4.4 Fieldwork: developments, challenges and limitations 
Within the period ranging from November 2011 to September 2012, I had the 
opportunity to spend around seven months in the field, in two rounds. The months 
                                                          
105 I am still very thankful to M. Cerimele, researcher from the University of Naples ‘L’Orientale’ and 
co-researcher in the above-mentioned project, for facilitating this opportunity. 
106 In Pomigliano, near Naples, Campania, Italy. 
107 Centre for State Reform. See chapter 1 and 2. 
108 He actually asked questions, more than giving answers. I will never forget that exciting, challenging, 
inspiring conversation. He eventually left me saying ‘…and if you find class struggle in India, then let 
me know’ (Rome, 18/10/2011). 
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spent outside the country, in between the two periods, while on one side allowed me 
to elaborate and reflect on a first set of collected data, on the other also imposed a 
slightly unfortunate halt on some ongoing activities and relations, and maybe 
determined the relatively 'wrong' timing of the second part of the research. The second 
fieldwork coincided in fact with a particularly violent turn in the NCR labour protests, 
which resulted in repression, strict controls, tense industrial relations. On one side, this 
coincidence partially affected the feasibility of some pre-planned research activities. 
On the other side, it certainly proved to be a unique and valuable opportunity to witness 
the industrial conflict much more closely, informing the most exciting and interesting 
phase of the envisaged workers’ inquiry.  
I will return to this point. What is important to note here is that the two phases, beyond 
responding to different research objectives, also assumed a rather diverse character in 
terms of research conditions, and entailed different kinds of limitations. It is therefore 
worth differentiating the research work into two different steps, each raising different 
issues.  
When I reached Delhi for the first time, in November 2011, the situation was relatively 
peaceful. Besides common, daily difficulties related to living in a tough city like Delhi, 
working conditions were manageable. Although a sort of preliminary study on the 
Indian Automotive sector had been undertaken before, I spent a first period on 
contextualising the argument, in order to exactly map the area of investigation and 
better focus both my case study and the research questions I had in mind. In this phase, 
going more or less from mid-November to Christmas 2011, I attempted to re-connect 
with contacts established during my first visit to Delhi in 2009, mainly from Jawaharlal 
Nehru University (JNU), from the International Development Economics Associates 
(IDEAs) Network, and from the Indian Society of Labour Economics (ISLE). Here, I 
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was glad to realise that most of the scholars and researchers I had met still remembered 
me since 2009, and thus claimed to be ready to help. At ISLE – IHD (Institute for 
Human Development), key figure was Alakh N. Sharma, an interesting meeting was 
held with Dev Nathan and logistical support was offered by Preet Rustagi. Precious 
help and assistance was also given, throughout the whole time spent in India, by the 
IDEAs colleagues and friends Smitha Francis and Murali Kallummal. Through these 
initial contacts, I was also invited to attend some official events, which served as 
opportunities for networking and exchange of ideas: a WTO/ UNCTAD Workshop at 
Indian Institute for Foreign Trade (IIFT) on 'Twenty Years of India's Liberalisation: 
Sharing of Experiences', the inauguration of the Centre for Studies on Informal 
Economy (CSIE) at JNU, and the ISLE Annual Conference, held in Udaipur, 
Rajasthan, from 17th to 19th December 2011.  
During this preliminary phase, meetings with other scholars and researchers working 
on the Automotive sector or on Manufacturing and Labour (from JNU, from Sidney 
University, from the Indian Council for Research on International Economic 
Relations, ICRIER) were also organised. At the same time, I also followed another 
path. I followed up on contacts established while performing an internship at UNIDO 
– ITPO Italy (United Nations Industrial Development Organisation – Investment and 
Technology Promotion Office) in 2010, which gave the opportunity to work on India 
– Italy industrial cooperation exactly within the Auto Industry. I used such contacts to 
find a connection with UNIDO  India, in order to access materials that might help 
tracing the productive structure of the sector, and ultimately also find a channel in 
direction of Business Associations and then Auto Companies. This route was explored 
during the months of January and part of February 2012.   
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What this first period in the field actually enabled to do, was not only securing a first 
set of informants and potential 'helpers' who might serve as a 'gateway' to a following 
level of actors, but also understanding the enjeu, the issues at stake, on which to 
revolve the proper case study. If, for example, I had initially considered the hypothesis 
of comparing corporate strategies and labour practices adopted in Auto Companies 
based in different industrial clusters,109 by the end of the first month in Delhi the 
perception of the importance of the events occurring in the NCR led me to 
acknowledge that this cluster deserved my full attention and time.  At the same time, 
I traced a map of all relevant first-level informants, and I considered the positionality 
to take towards different informants and its ethical implications. By the end of this 
period, perceiving its crucial relevance, I had already decided to investigate the Maruti 
case in full depth. The initial idea was that of proceeding along two parallel lines, 
starting from contacts already held and then trying to move on by 'snow-balling' 
(Willis, 2006).  
On the corporate side, this would mean departing from UNIDO Italy, connecting to 
UNIDO India, trying to approach Business Associations (CII, Confederation of Indian 
Industries, and SIAM, in particular – Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers) 
and then hopefully access Auto Companies, with the ultimate goal of taking interviews 
focused on productive organisation and corporate strategies.110 On the labour side, 
another path was envisaged, starting from National Union Federations (National 
Centres), passing through local and plant-based Unions, and to ultimately reach factory 
workers. This aimed at investigating labour composition, understanding the structure 
                                                          
109I would have initially liked to confront Companies from the Northern, NCR cluster, with at least 
TATA and FIAT, operating within the Pune Auto cluster, Maharashtra. 
110A checklist prepared for this kind of interviews is attached in appendix B. 
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and role of local labour institutions, and at unveiling dynamics of the recent labour 
struggles.  
The first contacts with UNIDO worked quite well; through Dino Fortunato, from 
UNIDO Italy, I could reach James Daniel Paul, working for UNIDO India. He 
provided a description of UNIDO India activities, notes about the NCR cluster and 
further contacts from UNIDO Delhi. Communication with UNIDO Delhi was harder, 
since the Office is now understaffed, mainly dealing with diplomatic relations or 
regional coordination, and some of the projects I was most interested in, once run to 
their end, were not re-financed. Following many and persistent contacts, only in 
February, through Shipra Biswas (UNIDO Delhi), I could visit the UNIDO 
Subregional Office in Delhi. There, I met Sanjay Mudgal, a former UNIDO officer 
who had been in charge for the ten years 'Auto Component Partnership Programme'. 
In that circumstance, although Sanjay Mudgal’s help was crucial to collect meaningful 
materials and gather important information, the outcome was quite disappointing. I 
knew UNIDO had mainly operated within the Auto-component sector, but I hoped 
there could be more connections with large assembling companies – Original 
Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), somehow enabling me to climb up the production 
chain and eventually access large factory plants. This was not possible. In practice, the 
conclusion of their Partnership Programme with Auto Companies and the consequent 
replacement of the involved staff, made me realise that UNIDO could not be the 
significant channel towards the corporate world I had hoped. Besides UNIDO Delhi, 
however, the contact with James Daniel Paul turned out to be definitely helpful. For 
example, out of three entire days at the 'Delhi Auto Expo 2012', one of the largest and 
most important Asian showcases for the Automotive Industry, I spent a full day with 
James D. Paul, who also introduced me to Carol Holden from NW Automotive 
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Alliance (UK). Being in their company allowed me to access stands and approach 
Managers or Sales / Market Officers from several Auto Companies. At the Auto Expo, 
I could not only observe Auto Companies’ marketing strategies, but could also collect 
key materials and contacts. For example, following the event, I managed to arrange 
interviews at the Auto Components Manufacturers Associations (ACMA) with Anil 
Kumar Unni, at the Society of Indian Auto Manufacturers (SIAM) with Vishnu Matur 
and at the Confederations of Indian Industries (CII), Gurgaon with Sarita Nagpal.  
Although willing to grant quite extensive interviews, and promising to provide further 
help, representatives from Business Associations never concretely facilitated a liaison 
with Auto Companies, even after repeated contacts. In my view, this sort of ‘lack of 
collaboration’ was also linked to a general reluctance towards 'investigations' in a 
period of high labour unrest, whereby Auto-Companies at that time were particularly 
in the public eye. Reiterated and constant attempts to independently approach OEMs 
managers without the mediation of Business Associations, did not produce satisfying 
results either. Despite attempts to introduce the research in the least 'alarming' way, 
stressing the mere interest in better comprehending productive organisation and 
market strategies followed by their Company, no officer or manager in this phase was 
practically ready to give an interview.111 Apart from causing an inevitable waste of 
time, this unforeseen obstacle required a necessary reformulation of the entire research 
schedule and partly of research objectives. The initial intention of complementing the 
labour inquiry with an investigation of capital strategies also explored through the 
corporate world, and the idea of accessing the factory plants by directly contacting the 
companies, had to be completely reconsidered. In this sense, I could visit factory 
                                                          
111 This impression was confirmed by at least three other researchers attempting the same endeavour. 
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premises only when helped by plant union representatives, and the number of direct 
accounts I collected from the managerial side is limited. 
On the contrary, on the labour side many doors easily opened up. As soon as I found 
a 'key gateway' within the International Metalworkers' Federation (IMF), namely 
Sudharshan Rao Sarde, Head of the South Asia Office based in Delhi, I immediately 
accessed a whole new world. Being an umbrella organisation, in fact, IMF not only 
embodies several National Centres and Industrial Federations (National and Sectoral 
Unions), but also coordinates a significant number of smaller unions at local level. 
Therefore, since the first, long meeting had at IMF with Rao Sarde and his team, where 
I had the chance to freely describe my research, to ask questions about the Indian trade 
union structure, about the Maruti dispute, the forthcoming General Strike etc, finally 
a proper 'snow-balling' started. The period between mid-February and mid-April was 
thus very intense and busy. The simple participation in an International IMF Workshop 
on 'Climate Change and Green Jobs' allowed me to meet Surya Dev Tyagi, President 
of the SMEFI (Steel Metal Engineering Workers Federation of India), affiliated to the 
Hind Mazdoor Sabha (HMS), P.J. Raju, Secretary of the Indian National Trade Union 
Congress (INTUC), Ashwani Rana,  of the Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (BMS, BJP 
Affiliate), Suzanna Miller, from IMF Geneva, Helmut Leiise, Automotive 
Department, IMF, Suzanne Adely, from the United Auto Workers (UAW, US) Global 
Organizing Institute. In this way, in the following few weeks, I could easily arrange 
interviews with representatives of several trade unions. Meetings were held with 
representatives of INTUC Delhi; AEEU-HMS Faridabad; of the Centre of Indian 
Trade Unions (CITU) Delhi, CITU Gurgaon, and the New Trade Union Initiative 
(NTUI), Delhi. CITU Gurgaon and AEEU- HMS Faridabad were particularly helpful 
contacts, and helped with the organisation of several other meetings, including focus 
  133 
groups with Suzuki, Maruti and Honda Workers; meetings with union representatives 
from Honda Motorcycle & Scooter Employees Union, and from Escorts and JCB 
Faridabad. In Faridabad, where the overall situation of Industrial Relations was 
tendentially quiet, I could also visit Escorts and JCB plants, and have meetings inside 
the factory premises, facilitated by AEEU-HMS representatives. 
Overall, I quickly realised how building a relationship of trust with informants 
belonging to trade unions was much easier, thanks to both the nature of my research 
and my personal background. On their side, I could always perceive an extreme 
willingness to share their stories, their political claims, the reasons of their struggles. 
Beyond overall sympathy towards my research project, they generally showed also a 
sort of protective attitude that was undeniably comforting, considering the hardship of 
working alone in industrial areas, and in politically tense situations. Within the ‘trust-
building’ process, as I mentioned earlier, I could soon appreciate how my interest and 
knowledge about the Italian FIAT, FIAT workers' movements, and the Italian 
historical, political culture in relation to factory struggles, could be an excellent 
exchange material. Such background revealed to be very fascinating to most of my 
informants, and massively helped me in capturing their attention. In this way, thanks 
to the collaboration of trade unions, I had the chance to meet workers and also to 
distribute and re-collect the survey questionnaires I had prepared on 'Working 
Conditions and Labour Practices in the Automotive Sector - NCR'.112  As I stated 
above, without mediation, these operations would not have been possible. Preparing, 
delivering, collecting questionnaires required time and several travels to the industrial 
areas, whereas due to the importance of the material I generally preferred to personally 
manage and supervise the situation. When dealing with questionnaires, I always had 
                                                          
112 These are discussed in detail in chapter 5. 
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to act with particular caution, as I was aware that this was an evidently research-related 
activity, within a highly politicised environment, and that my helpers were politically 
exposed actors. For this reason, for example, I decided to second the advice of never 
personally distributing questionnaires in close proximity to industrial plants, and I 
generally had to give them to a worker or a plant leader met inside a trade union office. 
In Faridabad, where the industrial area is particularly distant from any transport 
connection, I could only move around by a hired car with a driver, or with someone 
accompanying me. Nevertheless, even being constantly careful, in several 
circumstances I felt overly exposed, and I realised the level of protection I could be 
provided by the trade union leaders who were assisting me might not be sufficient. 
This occurred, for example, when I attended a Gurgaon trade unions meeting that 
turned out to take place outdoors, and when I joined one of my trade union informants 
outside the Haryana Court, where Honda workers were attending their trial. In both 
cases, although I had been assured the situation would be quiet, I realised it was instead 
very tense and fully controlled by the police. In all these situations, of course, being a 
young white woman in a completely male-dominated environment did not help at all, 
as I was immediately visible and therefore automatically exposed, so much that in a 
few cases I had to face people directly asking 'who is she and what is she doing here?'.  
For the same reason, while I generally travelled alone in the oldest part of Gurgaon, I 
preferred visiting the Manesar Industrial Township (MIT), the whole area nearby the 
Maruti plant and the village where Maruti workers live, only together with other 
outsiders: an Indian, a British and two French activists, all interested in the Maruti 
dispute and the local labour movement.113 The fortunate meeting with this group, 
occurred through friends from JNU in early April, allowed to finally reach the Maruti 
                                                          
113 From, or linked to, the Gurgaon Workers News activist group. 
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gates, to observe workers changing shifts, to perceive the tense atmosphere within an 
almost 'militarised' area,114 to follow workers in their housing community, and 
therefore effectively picture their living conditions. The interviews in that 
circumstance were mainly taken in Hindi and only partly translated simultaneously. 
However, these visits certainly represented a crucial moment along the research path 
followed in the first phase.  
As mentioned above, though, while other interesting meetings could be scheduled and 
activities of questionnaires distribution / collection were still on-going, the field had 
to be forcedly abandoned. When I reached the area for the second time, the scenario 
had suddenly changed: the second research plan had thus to be adapted to changed 
circumstances. 
The second period in the field, which had purposely been planned to complete some 
of the activities interrupted in April and integrate first data collected, abounded with 
unfortunate obstacles and unexpected circumstances, to be added to overall living and 
working conditions which were undoubtedly not the most favourable.115 Harder living 
conditions were nevertheless a minor issue compared to the shape the industrial 
conflict took in the same weeks.  
Exactly one week prior to the second arrival in Delhi, in fact, on July 18th, a serious 
accident had occurred at the Manesar Maruti plant. While this event made the whole 
                                                          
114 At the time we explored the area, on April 12th, also due an awaited visit from Government Officials 
on the following day, the whole zone surrounding the Maruti industrial plant was under complete police 
surveillance – and due to curfew regulations, for any small group gathering there were guards coming 
and supervising the situation. 
115 An extremely hot and humid climate in the Monsoon season, experienced while living in an area that 
following heavy rains became particularly impassable, was made worse by continuous and 
unprecedented black-outs that struck Delhi and a large part of India between the end of July and August 
2012, letting commentators talk of one of the most severe power crisis of the past decades. Prolonged 
and repeated power cuts, of course, not only hit electrical appliances, affected transportation, but tended 
to damage those technological devices which are essential in the field… 
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investigation of the industrial conflict undoubtedly more challenging, it also affected 
the feasibility of several research activities. Following an argument between a worker 
and a contractor, which turned quite violent on both sides, clashes broke out inside the 
factory, culminating into a fire where a HR Manager died.116 This specific event 
resulted in more than one hundred workers being arrested, the remaining Maruti 
employees leaving the industrial area for fear of retaliation and further repercussions, 
the factory plant being locked out, carpet investigations, curfew,117 phones under 
surveillance, and of course, very limited leeway for any labour organisations, 
especially smaller and less protected ones.  
Undoubtedly, the Manesar accident produced important effects, impacting the overall 
system of industrial relations in the area, the direction taken by the emerging labour 
movement, and the relationship between labour movement and institutions. Therefore, 
for the purposes of the present research, it represented an incredibly important 
development and a unique opportunity to observe the ‘core’ of the industrial conflict. 
However, it also hindered some of the planned research activities. This was due to the 
fierce repression and the carpet retaliations that followed the event. Indeed, the climate 
of fear and tension that ensued, made all the research activities requiring the exposure 
of targeted workers too risky, at least for the first weeks after the accident. I had to 
thus reconsider my intention to keep distributing questionnaires, and I had to meet 
unionists and workers far from the factory premises. Overall, despite increasing 
difficulties in meeting my informants, the ‘highest peak of conflict’ also allowed me 
to get into the most inspiring and challenging part of my research, and to properly 
                                                          
116 For a detailed analysis of these events see chapter 6. 
117 According to Section 144 of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code, when a condition of unlawful 
assembly is invoked, more than 4-5 people gathering in a surveilled area (in this particular case, the 
article was imposed all over Manesar), can incur into Police intervention, stopping, holding, and even 
arrest. 
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make sense of my engagement in a workers’ inquiry. It was exactly in the month of 
August that the enlightening words Tronti had told me during our meeting in Rome, 
resounded more clearly…’go where the struggle leads you’. Despite research 
limitations, I felt I was at the right place, at the right time. 
With my objectives clear in mind, I decided that my second period in the field had to 
become the most comprehensive attempt to understand what had actually happened at 
Maruti, how different actors related to the struggle, and a first opportunity to assess its 
possible impact on the long run. What I first thought to do, when the post-accident 
atmosphere was still extremely tense, was to contact those informants and informed 
friends I had trusted more during the first field visit, and ask them to describe the latest 
events and advise on how to move. It took me some time to arrange the first meetings. 
In those days, larger trade unions were engaged in a heated situation of agitation, while 
smaller activists were practically stuck, limited in their leeway by the political turmoil, 
the strict police surveillance and the blurred legal boundaries of the whole situation. 
In the first half of August, I managed to meet my previous informants from CITU 
Gurgaon and CITU Haryana, from JNU, from AEEU and JCB in Faridabad. All of 
them had previously helped me. They all confirmed that the situation was 
exceptionally tense and politically hot. They warned me that it would have been 
extremely risky to meet workers, especially from Maruti, at least until the factory 
reopened and the fullest unrest blew over. They also suggested to be absolutely careful 
in case of group gatherings and demonstrations, that phones might be under control, 
that I had to avoid any kind of over-exposure, like desisting from taking pictures or 
distributing questionnaires in 'sensitive' areas or dangerous circumstances. I therefore 
realised that I had to rethink my initial intentions. I also informed my SOAS Referees, 
reporting the situation, and I was further warned. In that precise moment, I could have 
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also given up and maybe postponed my research, but on one side, considering my 
limited resources of almost totally self-funded PhD student, and the next academic 
commitments I was afraid I could have no other chance to come back. On the other 
hand, I also felt the too strong need of investigating more, nearly a sort of 
'responsibility' a witness can have. Hence, I decided to stay in loco and try to collect 
as much information as possible, even within a constrained freedom of action. I 
realised I had no other chance than, at least temporarily, laying aside the idea of 
directly meeting workers, while the best and safest option could be targeting the most 
'authoritative' informants, those still 'free to move', that in case of emergency could 
provide protection as well.  
Thus, in the following days, through my informant from HMS, I managed to visit the 
Maruti Gurgaon plant and interviewed the plant union president, met a few Maruti 
Manesar workers (whose contracts had just been terminated for the involvement in the 
July accident), and workers and plant leaders from Lumex (an ancillary Company) and 
Eastern Medikit Ltd (not Auto - related, but another interesting case in the area). Then, 
I managed to interview Mahadevan, from AITUC, whom I had not been able to 
interview earlier. Re-connecting with Sudarshen Rao Sarde, from IMF, I eventually 
interviewed Mathew Abraham, first historical leader of the 2000 Maruti struggle. 
Through my CITU Gurgaon informant, I also had the opportunity to interview 
Anuradha Lamba, Deputy Labour Commissioner in Gurgaon. In addition, I decided to 
attend official events, which could have been relevant and not dangerous. I participated 
in a discussion roundtable on 'Issues arising out of Manesar - July Incidents in the 
Maruti Plant', attended by all National Trade Unions, at the Centre for Social 
Development (CSD), Delhi; I went, through Mahadevan (AITUC), to the 'All Workers 
National Convention' at the Talkatora Indoor Stadium, and, still in the attempt to 
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deepen my knowledge on corporate strategies and finally approach managers, I 
attended the CII event on 'Innovation and Flexibility in the Auto Supply Chain' and 
the 52nd  SIAM Annual Convention, on 'Auto Industry: India in a Changing World 
Order'. During this last event, I finally managed to interview one of the Maruti 
managers. That was on one of my last days in the field.  
 
 4.5 Ethics and Politics of Research: fieldwork in contexts of acute social conflict 
 
Both the context experienced in the field and the theoretical perspective chosen, 
require some necessary clarifications in terms of ethics and politics of research. On 
both sides, dilemmas can be raised for the same focus on a conflict, which per se is 
neither a neutral nor an easy-to-manage terrain.  
For what concerns ethical issues, these mainly emerged in relation to the treatment of 
informants and data collected through them, and to the positionality of the researcher, 
which is also linked to research politics. With regard to informants, a first distinction 
was made between more or less protected informants, i.e. those belonging to an 
organisation or a trade union, used to be publicly visible, experienced activists, etc. on 
one hand. Younger, isolated, less experienced or precarious workers, individuals 
involved in legal cases, activists belonging to unofficial or smaller organisations etc., 
on the other. For all the less protected informants, whose exposure could be riskier, 
numerous precautions were adopted in the field and ethical issues were also considered 
during the writing-up phase. These were generally met in safe environments, possibly 
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indoors, interviews were not recorded if they asked,118and all the information provided, 
either through interviews or questionnaires, have been kept anonymous or reported 
under fictitious names.119 
In terms of positionality, ethical considerations were necessary when I had to decide 
how to introduce myself and my research work. Regarding a personal presentation, all 
details were analysed before meeting different informants, ranging from political, to 
cultural and even to aesthetic aspects.120 This relates to the discourse on positionality 
as 'representation of the self' (Brown, 2009) often varying according to the type of 
informant, the purposes of the research, and the information needed in every single 
circumstance: although no single recipe or code of conduct can be prescribed, 
transparency over means and ends of research and full respect towards the informant 
should prevail (Mikkelsen, 2005). 
For what concerns the way the research work was presented, this might have been 
more difficult to ponder and require some light omissions about politically-loaded 
factors when facing informants belonging to the corporate world. (Un)fortunately, this 
sort of problem was encountered only in a limited number of cases, due the previously 
mentioned difficulties in gaining access. Generally, contents and objectives of the 
research work were clearly explained before starting all interviews and focus groups; 
                                                          
118 Before any meeting and interview I always asked the informant whether he/she could allow me to 
record the session or not, specifying that in case I did it, the recording would have been kept strictly 
confidential, and it would have only served the purpose of facilitating my transcription activities. 
119 Answers received through interviews or focus groups have been kept anonymous. Questionnaires 
were collected in anonymous form since the beginning. Since the survey findings report sensitive 
contents, also the companies workers belong to have been mentioned using code letters. On 
Confidentiality and Anonymity, see Mikkelsen, 2005; Scheyvens, Nowak and Scheyvens, 2003; 
Wilson, 1992. 
120 Even the outfit had to be differently planned when meeting for example business people or old trade 
unionists, in the city centre or in the inner parts of industrial areas. It could be more 'western-style' in 
the first case, preferably traditionally Indian in the second. At least to avoid ‘over-exposure’ and allow 
a smoother development of research activities.  
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for the questionnaires, an introductory paragraph was included at the beginning, 
written both in English and in Hindi. 
The question of positionality is strongly connected to the politics of research, which in 
this case specifically concerns the role of the researcher within a context of conflict. 
Social science research and data collection through fieldwork are per se 'constantly 
subjected to ethical and political questions' (Miyamura, 2010:157). They are 
implicated in power relations and presuppose values (Hammersley, 1995), 'forcing the 
researcher to engage with and contextualise their ethics in particular political and 
social conditions' (Miyamura, 2010:157). However, a situation of social conflict and 
political sensitiveness raises even more dilemmas. Therefore, starting from 
recognising data collection as a 'social and political process, rather than an 
impersonal and neutral process of collecting “facts”' (Lockwood, 1993, in Miyamura, 
2010:156), a few points must be considered. Firstly, in a situation of acute social 
conflict, the positionality of the researcher is often dictated or at least strongly 
influenced by the feasibility of research activities and the possibility of concretely 
gaining access. Secondly, on the same line, it is frequently hindered by the need to 
minimise risks and preserve personal safety. According to Bøås, Jennings, and Shaw, 
within conflict and emergency situations, proper 'coping strategies' must be deployed 
in order to reduce risk exposure (2006). In our case, for example, this might be reported 
to the need of accepting an even 'biased' mediation,121 as it happened with trade unions. 
A similar 'compromise' does not necessarily mean taking a specific stance or diverting 
political objectives, but certainly implies a further effort to skim and triangulate 
information gathered. Finally, re-connecting the discourse on a workerist point of view 
                                                          
121 In the sense that I would have generally preferred to avoid intermediate institutional layers, and meet 
workers without third parties. 
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to the issue of research politics, two further points must be clarified. One relates to 
writing, the second to research ends, both again linked to the role of the researcher  
within social conflict. For what concerns the writing-up phase, although we have 
advocated the direct involvement in the struggle, we still agree with Panzieri (1976) 
that a following 'disengagement' is necessary, made of observations formulated from 
the outside (Wilson, 1992). This allows a much clearer understanding of all the power 
relations involved in the industrial conflict, and of the role of the actors who previously 
acted as informants. Finally, the application of a workers’ inquiry, as form of militant 
research, also calls into question the theoretical and political ends of the conducted 
research, recalling a link between theory and praxis. In the 1960s and in the 1970s, the 
workerists engaged in the struggles outside Italian factories, could probably more 
easily influence the revolutionary strategies of the growing Italian working class. Here, 
due to the differences in research settings and conditions, and the distance from the 
investigated field, producing a direct impact seems a bit harder. However, we do hope 
that even this type of workers’ inquiry, with all its limitations, may contribute to a 
serious political debate over class struggle and labour organising in India, or possibly 
even outside India. Indeed, this inquiry has been developed with this scope in mind. 
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Chapter 5 
Working and Living Conditions in the Auto Sector: an analysis of 
Labour composition in the NCR 
 
Drawing on a survey conducted in the NCR Auto cluster in the spring of 2012, this 
chapter aims at ‘mapping’ the working and living conditions of a sample of workers 
from both Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) - large assembling factories, 
and ancillary units manufacturing auto-components – vendors. The reported findings 
are based on the analysis of 140 questionnaires (see also chapter 4) distributed to 
production workers as well as to a limited number of non-production workers122 from 
6 OEMs and 13 component suppliers, operating across the areas of Gurgaon and 
Faridabad, within the auto cluster surrounding Delhi (NCR). Due to the political 
economy of conducting fieldwork in the area, explained in chapter 4, the selection of 
respondents was mainly facilitated by the presence of trade unions, who acted as ‘gate-
keepers’, and it was determined by the specific possibilities to gain access to factory 
plants.  
In practice, the distribution of questionnaires was possible only amongst workers from 
companies under the purview of ‘collaborative’ unions and reachable through personal 
contacts. In particular, workers from vending companies were accessed via other 
workers who acted as ‘mediators’ and helped with the distribution and re-collection of 
questionnaires. Overall, the selected sample does not include all categories of workers 
in equal proportion, but does include workers from a wide range of companies, and in 
                                                          
122 Service workers, engineers, supervisors employed in the surveyed auto-factories. 
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this sense, it provides a sector-based (as opposed to single company-based) picture of 
working and living conditions. At the end of the survey, the emerging trends were 
further confirmed with what reported by the key informants interviewed. In fact, the 
material collected through interviews is used to complement and support the findings 
of the survey. Indeed, the findings presented here provide a clear indication of why 
labour unrest exploded in the area, and specifically in Gurgaon – Manesar. They 
illustrate the distinctive features of the ‘working-class-in-the-making’ characterising 
the NCR and its key differences vis-à-vis the workforce of other industrial clusters in 
India. Finally, findings also illustrate the most common demands raised by workers 
through protests, an issue which is particularly relevant in the context of the guiding 
categories of analysis deployed in this thesis.  
The chapter is structured as follows. The first section presents the survey and places 
the case investigated here into the wider context of the complexities of the Indian 
labour market. The second section discusses the sample and provides a description of 
the companies targeted in this study, focusing particularly on the overall composition 
of their workforce. Where possible, a distinction between the composition of workers 
from the Gurgaon area, compared to those employed in the Faridabad companies, is 
drawn. The third section presents the working and living conditions of the surveyed 
workers, on the basis of the different key areas of enquiry that characterise the 
questionnaires distributed. In order, this section is further composed of three sub-
sections: 1) working conditions (general working conditions, working hours/ shift, 
facilities provided on the workplace, safety of the working environment, recruitment/ 
contract, salary); 2) living conditions (general living conditions, social benefits); 3) 
labour rights/ organisation. Finally, the concluding section builds on the collected 
findings to present and analyse overall trends. These will be further discussed in the 
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light of the case study analysed in chapter 6. The questionnaire at the basis of this 
survey exercise is presented in Appendix A at the end. 
 
5.1 The background: an overview of the Indian labour market 
The Indian labour market is hardly comparable to any other – not only for its size, but 
also for its great fragmentation and social segmentation, and complex employment 
categories. The country’s huge labour force, which has now reached 500 million 
(Papola, 2013), can be in fact differentiated according to multiple criteria. These may 
focus on different productive sectors, social groups and layers, or on the employment 
status of individual workers. Overall, the heterogeneity of this labour market cannot 
be stressed enough, and can hardly be captured in the context of a single analysis. For 
this reason, while outlining some of the main employment trends at work in India, this 
chapter mainly focuses on a number of key aspects and categories that are more 
relevant for the case analysed.  
 
As reported by Papola (2013), out of the estimated 500 million individuals composing 
the Indian labour force, 95% (about 475 million) are officially employed, while only 
a meagre 5% is supposed to be unemployed, that is barely 25 million individuals. 
Indeed, such figures severely overlook the issue of unemployment in India. This can 
be related to both measurement difficulties and conceptual misinterpretations. Besides 
the unavailability of accurate data, in fact, wrongful quantifications can also be 
explained by a substantial underestimation of the nature of the phenomenon per se, 
that from having a predominantly seasonal character is progressively assuming a 
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structural connotation, linked to a mismatch between supply and demand.123 However, 
the main reason why a definition of unemployment based on official data (e.g. the five 
years surveys of the National Sample Survey Organisation, NSSO) may prove to be 
largely inadequate is the failure to acknowledge all the different ways in which 
underemployment – or disguised unemployment can manifest itself in the 
Subcontinent. In fact, the majority of the Indian working poor rely on multiple sources 
of ‘partial’ employment, which, while excluding people from complete 
unemployment, hardly guarantee full means of subsistence (TISS, 2009; Papola, 
2013).124 Estimates on unemployment based on current daily status (CDS) of the whole 
working population are reported in table n.5 below. 
 
 
Tab. 5 Unemployment rates per CDS 
 
 
Source: Shaw (2013), based on NSSO, various rounds. 
 
   
In terms of occupation across productive sectors, agriculture in India still accounts for 
more than 50% of total employment, despite a declining share in both GDP and 
employment contribution. Overall, both the industry and service sectors have 
                                                          
123 Especially in the fast-expanding service sector, due to the lack of an adequately skilled workforce. 
124 An attempt to grasp different levels of employment/ underemployment lies in the use of statistical 
measures like usual principal status (UPS), usual status (UPSS), current weekly status (CWS), current 
daily status (CDS) of the employed population (see Bhalla, 2008; Shaw, 2013). 
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experienced increases in the share of GDP and workforce employed, although they 
have followed different patterns. Growth in the industrial sector has occurred mainly 
in construction and low value-added segments, rather than in capital-intensive 
manufacturing. This suggests an expansion of low quality jobs rather than a rise in 
good-quality employment opportunities, which in fact seem to have shrunk also across 
skilled sectors (Kundu and Sarangi, 2009). Within the service sector, growth has been 
impressive, but rather unbalanced: here employment growth has only slowly followed 
the rapid increase in GDP, signalling a relatively weak structural transformation with 
regard to workforce skills. Once more, these trends clearly emerge from the estimates 
of the Central Statistical Organisation (CSO) and the National Accounts Statistics 
(NAS) data, which are reported in table 6 below.  
 
 
Tab. 6: Structural change in Growth and Employment 
 
Sector                                                                                                    Share in 
 
                                                                                  GDP                                                   Employement 
 1972-73 1983 1993-94 2009-10 1972-73 1983 1993-94 2009-10 
Agriculture 40,92 37,15 30,01 16,23 73,92 68,59 63,98 51,36 
Industry  23,32 24,30 25,15 25,93 11,30 13,98 14,96 22,02 
of which: 
Manufacturing 
13,43 14,52 14,46 15,41 8,87 10,66 10,63 11,50 
Service 35,76 38,56 44,84 57,84 14,78 17,63 21,07 26,67 
All 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Source: Papola (2013:5), based on NSSO.  
 
 
Besides a basic distribution of the workforce across productive sectors, probably the 
differentiation raising the highest concerns is that between formal and informal. Since 
a mere distinction between formal and informal sector would lead us to include an 
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abysmal 92-93% of the workforce within the latter (NCEUS, 2009; TISS, 2009),125 
thus missing substantive segmentations that more subtly categorise Indian workers, 
further specifications are needed. Indeed, a definition of what actually constitutes the 
formal or organised sector in India is of no simple solution. First, it is important to 
clarify that talking about a formal or organised sector in India is not equivalent to 
referring to a unionised labour force, which still corresponds to no more than half of 
the organised segment, i.e. barely 3-4 % of the total working population (Bhalla, 2008; 
NCEUS, 2009; NSC, 2012). In an attempt to set ‘boundaries’, Tendulkar (2003:2) 
refers to the organised sector as composed by all ‘those workers having regular, 
contractual hired employment’, who represent a very small and privileged part of the 
Indian labour market. For ‘organised sector labour’, Harriss-White and Gooptu 
(2001:89) intend those ‘workers on regular wages or salaries, in registered firms and 
with access to the state social security system and its framework of labour law’. In 
accordance with the estimates provided by the Indian Directorate General of 
Employment and Training (DGET), Government of India, in 2006 the organised sector 
counted only about 26.6 million workers, of which 65-70% still employed in the public 
sector (public administration and services), the rest in private firms and in tertiary 
activities (Jha, 2008). Based on the last available Census from 2004-5, the National 
Statistics Commission (NSC) (2012) also attributes not more than 7% of the total 
working population to the organised sector, with over 450 million individuals 
employed in the informal or unorganised segment. The NSC also breaks down the 
contribution of the unorganised sector per productive activity, as reported in table 7. 
 
 
                                                          
125 According to such estimates, at least 450-60 million individuals should be classified as belonging to 
the informal sector, while less than 40 million should constitute the formal sector. 
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Tab. 7: Share of Unorganised Sector per Economic Activity (%) 
 
Tabulation category/Description 2004-05 
Share of Unorganised Sector 
A: Agriculture and Forestry 99,9 
B: Fishing 98,7 
C: Mining 64,4 
D: Manufacturing 87,7 
E: Electricity, Gas, Water supply 12,4 
F: Construction 92,4 
G: Wholesale and Retail Trade 98,3 
H: Hotel and Restaurants 96,7 
I: Transport, Storage & Communication 82,2 
J: Financial Intermediation 32,4 
K: Real estate, Renting and Business activities 81,4 
L: Public Administration and Defence, etc. 2,6 
M: Education 37,9 
N: Health and Social work 55,1 
O: Other Community, Social and Personal 
Services 
92,5 
P: Private Households With Employed Persons 100 
Q: Extra Territorial Organizations And Bodies 87,8 
Grand Total 93 
 
Source: NSC (2012), p. 26-27. 
 
For what concerns the unorganised or informal sector, definitions are even more 
problematic, and boundaries between multiple employment categories even more 
blurred. The National Commission for the Enterprises in the Unorganised Sector 
(NCEUS) (2009:12) provides one of the most widely accepted definitions of 
unorganised sector in India, considered as consisting of ‘all unincorporated private 
enterprises owned by individuals or households engaged in the sale and production of 
goods and services operated on a proprietary or partnership basis and with less than 
ten total workers’. Within its scope, the NCEUS also includes most of the agricultural 
activities, except the plantation sector and some types of organised agriculture. What 
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effectively falls into the broad category of informal/unorganised sector, how in many 
instances this is due to multiple institutional/legal constraints or strategies to 
circumvent labour regulations, is the object of a long and complex debate. 
Notwithstanding the difference in positions within this debate (e.g. Breman versus 
Sanyal, see Breman, 2013), scholars focusing on Indian informal economy agree on 
the limited purchase of conceptualisations that separate sharply the ‘organised’ and 
unorganised sectors. In fact, dual approaches to economic activities and employment, 
opposing organised and unorganised sectors, are quite unhelpful to grasp what 
informality actually means and how it manifests (Breman, 2013). Labour 
informalisation is in fact a process that has undoubtedly affected both ‘sectors’. For 
instance, informalised/casual labour is increasingly incorporated into the organised 
segment as well (see, for example, Harriss-White and Gooptu, 2001; Mitra, 2008; 
NCEUS, 2009).126 In this sense, an attempt to classify workers as per their employment 
status may prove to be much more relevant. The same NCEUS (2009:12), for example, 
also distinguishes between formal or organised and informal or unorganised 
employment, the latter being characterised as: ‘unorganised workers consist of those 
working in the unorganised enterprises or households, excluding regular workers with 
social security benefits, and the workers in the formal sector without any employment/ 
social security benefits provided by the employers’. The relative growth of 
informalised labour within the organised sector (data updated to 2004-5) is clearly 
pictured in table 8 below. 
 
 
                                                          
126 As it will be argued shortly, in relation to our case study. 
  151 
Tab. 8: Relationship between Sector and Type of Employment (UPSS) – All workers 1999/2000 
and 2004/05 
 
Source: NCEUS (2009), p.13, based on NSSO, 55th and 61st Round. 
 
For what concerns the employment status of single workers, Tendulkar (2003) 
classifies the Indian labour force into four categories, according to their ‘activity 
status’. He distinguishes between self-employed, wage and salary earning, casual and 
unemployed individuals, where self-employed and casual labourers are the largest 
groups, prevalent among rural and female labour, while regularly waged workers 
constitute less than one sixth of the total working population and unemployed represent 
only a tiny minority. The NSSO also makes a distinction between self-employed, wage 
employed and unemployed, where wage workers can be further differentiated between 
regularly salaried and casual workers (see Bino Paul, 2010). For the purposes of the 
present research, in relation to the manufacturing segment and to the auto sector (one 
of the traditionally most ‘formal and protected’ ones), the difference between regularly 
waged employment and the increasing proportion of casual workers is of particular 
relevance. From what emerges from the TISS Indian Labour Market Report 2008 
(2009:34), regularly waged/salaried labour only accounts for a scant 16-17%, just 
about one sixth of the total workforce. With reference to this group of workers, the 
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NSSO highlights the less precarious position they enjoy, characterising them as ‘those, 
who work in others’ farm or non-farm enterprises (both household and non-
household) and, in return, receive salary or wages on a regular basis’ (NSSO 62nd 
round, in TISS, 2009: 43). Still according to TISS, only half of the Indian regular 
employment is supposed to be in the organised sector, while the other half is likely to 
belong to the unorganised segment. In this sense, only regularly waged workers 
employed in the organised segment are supposed to have access to social security and 
labour rights. For what concerns economic activities, regular employment is mainly 
concentrated in public administration, manufacturing and education (TISS, 2009).   
Out of the overall labour force, following the largest group composed by around 52-
53% of self-employed individuals, the second widest category is that of casual 
workers, who make up about one third of the total, i.e. around 32-33% (TISS, 
2009:34). These are broadly identified with those workers without a regular contract, 
who do not benefit from social security schemes and are usually employed on 
temporary or occasional basis. The NSSO officially defines a casual worker as‘a 
person who is casually engaged in others’ farm or non-farm enterprises (both 
household and non-household) and, in return, receives wages according to the terms 
of the daily or periodic work contract’ (TISS, 2009:65). Within this group, one could 
also include the rising number of contract workers, hired through a contractor, 
generally on fixed term/ temporary basis, easier to dismiss and usually not entitled to 
security benefits (Neethi, 2008).127 Due to the frequently irregular availability of 
employment, their relatively lower wage level and the denied access to social 
protection, Sengupta, Kannan and Raveendran (2008), estimate that almost 90% of 
casual workers in India is poor and vulnerable. Many are involved in processes of 
                                                          
127 This category of workers will be widely discussed in chapter 6. 
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circular migration (see Srivastava, 2012). The increasing casualisation of the labour 
force across the manufacturing sectors is of particular relevance for the present 
research, as these trends also affect the auto sector.  
Employment status and occupation is not the only way in which segmentation occurs. 
Indeed, the extreme fragmentation of the labour market as a whole is highly dependent 
on multiple socio-cultural patterns affecting both the distribution of the workforce and 
its access to social protection and labour rights. For example, Harriss-White and 
Gooptu (2001) describe how existing ‘social institutions’, namely caste, class, age, 
gender, religion, not only segment the labour market but are also related to more or 
less evident discrimination. In their study of the unorganised sector, they explain how 
caste as a social structure has all but disappeared since the onset of liberalisation. It  
still influences occupation, access to political power, and social identity, especially 
within the lower strata. However, the relevance of social institutions in segmenting the 
workforce is highly sector-dependent. For instance, it has not proven to be a key 
variable for the understanding of labour composition in the auto sector. Moreover, as 
it will be discussed below and in the next chapter, in the auto industry social 
segmentation has also not prevented labour from developing a common identity.  
Besides focusing on caste, social differentiation and labour market discrimination can 
also be based on gender and religion. For instance, briefly analysing the processes of 
feminisation of employment at work in India one can conclude that Indian women still 
generally cover disadvantaged positions, and that the quality of their employment is 
still a matter of high concern. TISS (2009) reports that women are not only primarily 
deployed as workers in the informal economy, but they also tend to be concentrated in 
low-end, low-skilled jobs and/or in agriculture-related activities. They are always paid 
less than their male counterparts (see RoyChowdhury, 2015). With reference to the 
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unorganised segment, Harriss-White and Gooptu (2001:97) underline how gender 
discrimination is particularly evident and pronounced, whereby women ‘still own and 
control so remarkably less assets than men, are so much poorer and so significantly 
less educated’. Finally, religion and age also keep emerging (especially in the 
unorganised sector and in rural areas) as means to perpetuate long-term discrimination 
and exclusion from labour markets, thus reproducing a vast reserve army of labour. 
Within religious minorities, Muslims generally bear the brunt of unjust employment 
practices, and are concentrated only in low-skill sectors and in more insecure, low-end 
forms of employment, earnings lower salaries than other groups (TISS, 2009). In terms 
of age differentiation, together with the still alarming phenomenon of child labour, 
another worrisome trend is the frequent lack of a ‘retirement age’, especially in the 
informal sector, where incapacitated old people are yet employed but often paid along 
‘differential piece-rates’ (Harriss-White and Gooptu, 2001).  
Focussing on the industrial sector, a survey conducted by Vijayalakshmi, Dhaliwal 
and Gupta (2006) reveals how discriminatory practices based on gender, region of 
origin, education, marital status, age and caste differences are still very common 
among Indian companies. These factors, according to the three authors, can affect 
several processes, including recruitment, job allocation, transfers, promotions and job 
terminations. For what concerns the manufacturing sector, Papola’s work (2013) 
addresses crucial issues that are of particular relevance for the present research. He 
highlights how, besides a structural segmentation determined by existing social 
institutions, geographical location and rural-urban settings, the Indian labour market 
is further fragmented by labour institutions and regulations themselves. For instance, 
uneven access to union membership and welfare schemes (for casual/contract workers, 
for example) or labour laws with differential application according to firm size, tend 
  155 
to widen rather than reduce market segmentation, contributing to the unequal provision 
of social security (see also Anant, 2009). In this sense, ironically, and despite the 
current rhetoric of the Modi government, the current ‘inflexibility’ of Indian labour 
regulations and social institutions seems to be a severe obstacle against the protection 
of the most vulnerable workers, rather than an actual impediment to corporate 
strategies. 
 
5.2 Surveying the NCR auto cluster: firms and workers under investigation 
 
The National Capital Region (NCR) auto cluster includes the industrial areas 
surrounding the Delhi metropolitan conglomerate, mainly falling across the cities of 
Gurgaon and Faridabad, in the State of Haryana, but also encompassing some 
industrial units operating in Noida (Uttar Pradesh) and at the border with Rajasthan. 
More specifically, it generally indicates the ‘triangle’ between the three hubs of Delhi, 
Gurgaon and Faridabad. 
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Pic. 5 – The Delhi – Gurgaon – Faridabad industrial ‘triangle’ 
 
Source: google maps 
 
The cluster developed around Maruti as a regional leader: during the 1980s, the 
company entered what used to be a ‘greenfield’ area, and then drove its expansion and 
consolidation as a leading manufacturing hub. The organisational needs determined by 
the Japanese model of production management, introduced through Maruti’s 
partnership with Suzuki,128 and the already existing network of local component 
producers, have shaped the cluster as we see it today (see Okada, Siddharthan, 2007). 
Maruti – Suzuki India Limited (MSIL) is still the biggest player in the area, owning 
two large car manufacturing plants, one in Gurgaon and one in the Manesar Industrial 
Model Town (IMT), opened in 2006. In addition to MSIL, whose ownership today is 
                                                          
128 The first joint-venture was signed in 1983. 
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composed by 100% Japanese capital,129 Suzuki also owns another plant manufacturing 
motorcycles – Suzuki Motorcycles India Pvt Ltd. In the Gurgaon area, the other OEMs 
currently operating are Hero MotoCorp Ltd (former Hero – Honda, world’s largest 
two-wheelers manufacturer), and Honda (Honda Motorcycle & Scooter India Pvt Ltd, 
HMSI). Honda also manufactures cars, in the Honda Siel India Lts, Noida plant.130 In 
Faridabad, major OEMs are Yamaha (India Yamaha Motor Pvt Ltd, 100% subsidiary 
of Yamaha Motor Japan, motorcycles manufacturer), Escorts (agri-machinery, 
construction equipment, railway equipment and auto-component manufacturer) and 
JCB India (construction equipment).131 In terms of component suppliers, in 2012 the 
Automotive Component Manufacturers Association of India (ACMA), reported 
around 265 firms registered in the Northern cluster (ACMA, 2012).  
The suppliers network is structured upon many layers, from Tier 1 to Tier 4 firms, 
where Tier 4 is composed by what UNIDO defines as ‘micro-enterprises’. Productive 
units are classified on turnover basis, where 10 USD million is the threshold separating 
micro from SMEs, and 100 USD million marks the difference between SMEs and big 
firms.132 The relationship between OEMs and component manufacturers expressly 
follows sub-contracting lines, built upon a hierarchical structure where Tier 1 firms 
directly supply the assembling factory and are supplied by Tier 2 and 3 firms. Overall, 
while most SMEs operating as Tier 1, 2 and 3 suppliers are registered in the Small 
Scale Industries (SSI) record of the Government of India (GoI), often Tier 4 micro-
                                                          
129 Interview to Vishnu Matur, Director of the Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers (SIAM), 
5/3/2012. 
130 For company profiles see SIAM, 2012. 
131 Agri-machinery and construction equipment are generally sectors associated with the automotive 
industry, but not strictly part of it (the broader group being ‘Automotive and Heavy Equipment 
Industry). In fact, these industries usually belong to separate industrial associations (in India, for 
example, JCB and Escorts are not SIAM members). However, since these companies operate in the 
same industrial cluster, rely on the same network of component suppliers, and share a common ‘labour 
history’ with the other OEMs operating in the same territory – they have been considered together.  
132 Interview to Sanjay Mudgal, former UNIDO officer working on the UNIDO – ACMA Partnership 
Programme (see UNIDO – ACMA, 2010). 
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enterprises are not. Tracing them can be hard even for the Government.133 In terms of 
employment, cluster statistics are scarcely available. Overall, we know that the Indian 
auto sector currently provides direct and indirect employment to around 19 million 
workers (Economic Times, 2014). Out of the total size of the sector, the unorganised 
segment is estimated to contribute to 30% of employment, although with a much lower 
productivity (producing barely 1.5% of the total output in the industry; 
Teknikföretagen, 2008). 
Within this scenario, the survey conducted in March-April 2012 aimed at mapping 
working and living conditions of a sample of 140 workers from 6 OEMs and 13 
component suppliers (vendors). The OEMs are operating both in Gurgaon and in 
Faridabad, while all vendors are based in the Gurgaon-Manesar area. When describing 
the survey findings, OEMs will be indicated with the letter O and progressive numbers 
(O1, O2, O3 etc.), while vendors will be identified by the letter V and progressive 
numbers (V1, V2, V3 and so on). However, while due to the higher number of 
responses obtained from OEMs, and the relative difference in working conditions from 
company to company, OEMs will also be mentioned individually, while suppliers will 
be mostly grouped together as vendors (V group). Within OEMs, a differentiation 
between companies operating in Gurgaon – Manesar (O1 to O4) and companies 
operating in Faridabad (O5 and O6) will prove to be meaningful in certain 
circumstances. For what concerns surveyed workers, the number of respondents per 
company and per job performed are reported in table 9 below. The composition of the 
workforce in terms of gender, age gap and area of origin is represented in charts 4, 5 
and 6 on the following pages.  
                                                          
133 Interview to Sanjay Mudgal, former UNIDO officer working on the UNIDO – ACMA Partnership 
Programme (see UNIDO – ACMA, 2010). 
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Tab. 9: Number of respondents per area, company and job performed 
 
Source: author’s own field survey, march- april 2012.  
 
For what concerns the gender composition of the workforce, out of the total number 
of valid responses (139/140), we can note that the sample is composed by 90% of male 
workers and 9% of female workers. Of the 12 female workers whose responses were 
Area Company N. Resp. Job performed 
   Administration Engineering Production  Supervision N/A 
Gurgaon O1 24 3 
 
/ 20 / 1 
Gurgaon O2 22 22 / / / / 
Gurgaon O3 1 / / 1 / / 
Gurgaon O4 7 / / / / 7 
Faridabad O5 25 10 / 5 9 1 
Faridabad O6 29 2 / 26 / 1 
Gurgaon V1 8 1 / 7 / / 
Gurgaon V2 7 2 1 4 / / 
Gurgaon V3 1 / / 1 / / 
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  160 
recorded, 6 work for vendors; 7 for OEMs; 4 perform administrative tasks; 4 work in 
production; 1 work in the HR department; 2 work as engineers. The heterogeneity of 
the sample and the limited employment of women’s workers in the sector do not allow 
to derive trends on women’s working conditions in the production segment.  
Chart 4: Gender composition of workers 
 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012. 
 
When we look at labour composition in relation to workers’ age, we can observe that 
over 60% of the workforce is less than 30 years old, while only 13% is above the age 
of 40. The classification of workers per age gap is reported in chart 5 below. Not 
surprisingly, the average age of workers is higher in Faridabad than in Gurgaon / 
Manesar, where industrial plants have opened more recently. This can be noted also 
cross-checking workers’ age with the length of employment of workers per company, 
in the next section. The average age of workers in O5 and O6 operating in Faridabad, 
for example, is around 32 and 36 years old, while in O2 and O4, the OEMs from 
Gurgaon / Manesar, this is around 27 and 25 respectively. The average age of workers 
in component suppliers (about 28 years old) is less indicative, as the group comprises 
13 different companies. These are reported in table n. 10 on the next page. 
 
 
Male  90% 
Female  9% 
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Chart 5: Composition of workers by overall age gap 
 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012. 
 
Table n. 10: Average age of workers per company 
Company Age of workers (average) 
O1 (Gurgaon) 32.26 
O2 (Gurgaon / Manesar) 26.68 
O3 (Gurgaon) 31 (1) 
O4 (Gurgaon / Manesar) 25.14 
O5 (Faridabad) 31.68 
O6 (Faridabad) 36.10 
V   (Gurgaon / Manesar) 27.51 
 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/ april 2012 
 
As we will later discuss, both the young age of the workers in the Gurgaon / Manesar 
area and the marked fragmentation of the workforce are interesting factors to consider 
when trying to explain why labour unrest exploded in the region. Arguably, these 
factors also partially explain why managerial strategies aimed at preventing unrest did 
not work. Fragmentation is particularly evident when we group workers according to 
their State of origin, The workers in the sample come from 15 different Indian States. 
The distribution can be observed below in graph 6. It must be noted that although 
almost half of the workforce comes from the State of Haryana, 48% of workers comes 
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from different parts of the subcontinent. A substantial proportion of the workforce is 
thus composed of migrant labour.                                    
Chart 6: State of origin 
If on one side the different 
origins of labour may play a 
limited role in fragmenting the 
workforce coming from the 
‘Hindi Belt’, who speak the 
same language and are slightly 
more homogeneous in terms 
of cultural background, they 
could play a more substantial 
fragmenting role for workers 
from Kerala, West Bengal, 
Odisha, or Maharashtra.  
     Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012. 
If we look at workers’ origin in companies O5 and O6 (charts 7 and 8), located in 
Faridabad, we can notice that the percentage of those coming from Delhi and Haryana 
goes up, while the number of states overall decreases. Although this does not entirely 
emerge from our sample,134 such composition is indeed related to a wider use of 
migrant labour in the industrial plants of more recent formation. 
 
 
                                                          
134 But it did emerge from interviews, and it is a trend confirmed by local activists as well (see for 
example, https://gurgaonworkersnews.wordpress.com/) 
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Charts 7 and 8: State of origin in companies O5 and O6 (Faridabad) 
 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/ april 2012 
 
The map of workers according to the language spoken is reported in graph 7. It is worth 
noting how, however, 90% of the workforce speaks Hindi as a first or second language. 
Almost 30% speaks a language other than Hindi or English as mother tongue, and only 
half of the workers declared that they spoke English.    
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Chart 9: Language spoken 
 
Source: authot’s own field survey, march/april 2012. 
 
Finally, in order to understand the main social characteristics of the workforce under 
investigation, workers were asked to specify their family status and to indicate their 
education level. For what concerns their status, it emerges that 70% of workers are 
married, and 66% have children (1 to 4 per nucleus). Family status greatly affects the 
financial sustainability of workers’ income, as the majority of the workers declares 
that no other family member receives a regular salary (this issue is discussed in the 
next section).  
Chart 10: Marital status 
 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012 
 
 
  165 
Chart 11: Family composition 
 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012 
 
The level of education of workers is a particularly meaningful factor to understand the 
explosion of labour unrest in the area. On the one hand, it sets a distinctive feature of 
the auto sector, where workers are on average highly skilled and educated compared 
to other sectors. On the other hand, the relatively higher educational qualification of 
the workforce is also linked to geographical factors, as it is also due to the high number 
of technical colleges and universities present in the National Capital Region. Finally, 
and especially in the Gurgaon-Manesar area, high levels of education seem to also 
mark a generational divide. Here, the life-style aspirations of a young, educated 
workforce appear to be one of the possible motivations behind labour unrest. These 
aspirations are very likely to have clashed with the increasing levels of casualisation 
of employment, making the poor working and living conditions offered by the sector 
particularly unbearable.   
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Chart 12: Education level 
In  our overall 
sample, as we 
can observe in 
the pie chart 12 
here, only 16% 
of workers 
reports to be 
educated up to 
10th/12th standard, while a striking majority is in possession of further qualifications.     
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012. 
Of these, 40% obtained a degree from Industrial Training Institutes. These are 
government-run vocational schools providing 1 to 3 years training in a wide range of 
technical specialisation for the manufacturing sector (electrician, fitter, plumber, 
welder, etc.). Even more impressively, a significant 41% of the workers surveyed 
pursued post-secondary courses, corresponding to undergraduate degrees, such as 
BA/BSc/ Bcom or an equivalent Mechanical Diplomas (see chart 12 above). As can 
be noted, a small 1% also obtained post-graduate qualifications (dark blue slice). In 
the Gurgaon / Manesar area, together with the young age of the workers, the clash 
between educational attainment and expected living standards seemed to be one of the 
key features of this working class-in-the-making, which manifested particular malaise 
against the increasingly casualised working and living conditions offered by the sector. 
It is to these working and living conditions that the analysis now turns.  
 
6%
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5.3 Working and living conditions: emerging findings 
5.3.1 Working conditions 
In order to investigate and understand working conditions satisfactorily, the survey 
addressed six main fields. First, it aimed at mapping the general composition of 
workers, on the basis of the company they worked for, of task performed, and of 
duration of employment within the same company. Together with an explanation of 
their task, workers were also asked to specify how long it takes to perform the required 
operation, and how many times per day they perform it. Then, they were asked to 
describe their workstation, as this is also crucial to understand their working conditions 
and constraints. The responses collected thus give an overall idea of the intensity of 
their job, of their working rhythms, and of the physical space where they operate. A 
second set of questions asked workers to report about their working hours/ shift. Here, 
an indication of working hours combined with the frequency of overtime, breaks and 
number of days off, further illustrates the rhythms and pressure workers are subject to. 
A third set of questions concerned their working environment; namely, the facilities 
provided in the analysed plants. A fourth set of questions focused on health and safety 
on the workplace; risks connected to the specific workstation, experience of accidents 
and the provision of safety equipment are here included. The fifth set of questions 
deals with recruitment and contract: here we find an overall description of the kind of 
hiring procedures, of the existence (or lack of existence) of written agreements and of 
the sort of contracts workers possess. Finally, the last set of questions outlines salary 
conditions; namely the regularity of wage transfers and who is involved in the 
transaction. If and how salary levels are recorded is an issue that is also relevant for 
living conditions (discussed in the next section), in relation to average living expenses 
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           Chart 13: Employment duration 
 
1) With regard to the overall composition 
of the sample, the distribution of the 
workers per company is reported in 
table 9 above. When asked to specify 
the company they work for, however, 
respondents were also questioned 
about the duration of their 
employment. Although this variable does not say much about the potentially 
casual nature of working relationships, it does add further information on the 
social profile, which indicates that the auto industry is characterised by a 
relatively young  workforce. In this sense, while the overall composition of 
workers per duration of employment (chart 13) can just give an idea of the 
proportion of workers/ total sample that has been employed for the same 
company for less than 10 years (aggregate 72%), the breakdown per company 
can add further insights. This is reported in table n. 11 below. Here, OEMs are 
considered individually, while workers in vendors’ units are considered as a 
group. What is more significant, is the difference between O5 and O6, OEMs 
operating in Faridabad, and O1-O4, companies from the Gurgaon-Manesar 
area. The earlier start of the employment in O5-O6 can be explained by the fact 
that Faridabad is a fairly older industrial area. As we shall argue, the longer 
history of manufacturing activity in the region also means a more experienced 
workforce and a rooted tradition of trade unionism. In Gurgaon, and in the 
Industrial Model Township (IMT) in Manesar instead, OEM plants opened 
28%
37%
11%
21%
3%
Duration of Employment
10+ years 5-10 years 3-5 years
1-3 years 0-6 months
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more recently and all hired a young workforce, most of whom were at their 
first working (and organising) experience. 
 
Tab. 11: Min and max duration of employment per company (per starting year) 
Company Max  Min 
O1 2001 2005 
O2 2006 2009 
O3 2006 2006 
O4 2003 2010 
O5 1977 2012 
O6 1987 2011 
Vendors 1998 2012 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012. 
 
In terms of jobs they perform, workers were classified in four different groups, namely 
administration/ service, supervision, production and engineering.  
Chart 14: Jobs performed 
As we can see from 
chart n.14, out of 
130/140 valid 
responses, which make 
up 93% of the total 
sample, 66% of the 
workers carry out  
Source: author’s own survey, march/april 2012. 
 
 
 
14% 5%
66%
8%
7%
Job performed
Administration
Engineering
Production
Supervision
Not Recorded
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production activities. These include painting, welding, pressing, assembling, cutting, 
operating specialised machines (such as lathe machine). 14% of the jobs involves 
administrative tasks (in the office, like purchasing, data feeding, dispatching 
operations) or duties performed on the assembly line but that can be considered as 
belonging to the service segment, like maintenance or quality checks. The 8% of 
supervisory roles includes different tasks, from teams supervision on the line to the 
role of shop clerk (similar) or the supervision of materials distribution (including 
arrivals from component suppliers): overall these can all be considered managerial 
roles and are therefore better paid. Finally, a 5% of jobs pertaining to the engineering 
sector was also recorded: these include quality advisors and design engineers.  
For what concerns production workers, the survey also allowed for the collection of 
an interesting set of responses that can help provide a description of the intensity and 
the rhythm of the job they perform. For example, when asked to indicate the time 
required to execute their operation, 52.6% of the respondents reported that it takes 
them between 10 seconds and 1.5 minute to complete their task, while a further 12.2% 
spends less than 10 minutes on it.135 Grouped together, this means that 64.8% of the 
respondents repeat the same operation from a minimum of 85 to a maximum of 2560 
times per shift, with a range of 350 to 2560 times for the workers who spend 1.5 minute 
or less performing each task.136 Indeed, the great pressure such rhythms entail and the 
alienation this may lead to, clearly emerge from findings. In addition to excessive 
speed and repetitiveness of tasks, 43% of the total sample of workers also report that 
the position required to perform their operations is not comfortable. This can be 
observed in chart 15 below. 
                                                          
135 On a number of valid responses corresponding to 61.95% of the total sample of production workers 
interviewed.  
136 Author’s own calculations from field survey, march/april 2012. 
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Chart 15: Is the position you are required to assume in order to perform your tasks comfortable? 
 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012. 
 
The explanations provided by those who report to work in uncomfortable conditions 
are varied. These include prolonged standing positions, hot and humid environment 
(for those working in casting departments),137 lack of space surrounding the machine 
that makes the workplace too crowded and congested, and a general discomfort 
expressed by all those who complain operation time is too short and work too hard. 
Finally, 50% of the respondents also declare that they have to move to different 
workstations during the same shift (chart 16). 
Chart 16: Are you ever asked to move to different workstations during your shift? 
 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012. 
 
2) In the second section focusing on working conditions, the investigation 
concerns shifts and working hours, in order to further analyse the kind of 
workload workers bear, and the time they have outside the factory. With regard 
to the official shift, most workers declare to work between 8 and 8.5 hours plus 
breaks, on 6 days per week. The only exceptions are company O6 in Faridabad, 
                                                          
137 Casting of metals requires particularly elevated temperatures. The presence of liquid metals also  
makes the working environment very humid. 
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where workers report to work 9 hours per day but on 5 working days, and fairly 
isolated cases of 10-12 hours shifts in companies O1, O4, V4, V8, V12 (which 
cannot be considered trends and might include overtime). In relation to night 
shifts and overtime, responses can be observed in charts 17 and 18 below.  
 
Chart 17: Night shifts 
 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012 
 
Chart 18: Extra time 
 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012 
 
As far as overtime is concerned, it is worth highlighting the following aspects. First, 
while the frequency of extra time performed is overall rather moderate, a peak can be 
noted for company O1 in Gurgaon, where respondents report to work extra hours up 
to 120, 150, even 300 times a year. Second, it is interesting to point that, while 81% of 
the workers declare that extra time is remunerated (at either single or double rate, 
compared to the normal hourly rate), 60% of the respondents claim to work overtime 
upon management’s request. The percentage of workers seconding management’s 
decision, as opposed to that of workers engaging in overtime voluntarily, is reported 
in chart 19.  
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Chart 19: Decision on overtime 
The high percentage of workers 
denouncing management’s 
imposition of extra working hours 
reveals an arbitrary determination of 
workloads. At the same time, when 
overtime rates are higher workers 
may choose to do it. Hence overtime  
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012 
can either be a coercive or an incentive-based mechanism to increasing productivity 
by stretching the working day. 
More than the official shift duration or the enforcement of compulsory overtime, 
however, one of the reasons of major complaint is the absence of adequate breaks 
during the shift. Actually, the insufficiency of resting time and the impossibility of 
satisfying even basic needs during the available breaks seem to have been key factors 
in raising Gurgaon workers’ awareness of exploitative conditions. Even during 
interviews and focus groups, in fact, these constantly emerged as indicators of 
excessive pressure and unbearable working rhythms. Within the analysed sample, 
while the situation appears more acceptable in O6 (Faridabad) and in some of the 
vendors’ units (V6, V8, V9, V12, V13), where workers report to have two 15 minutes 
tea breaks and 30 minutes lunch break (1h total), it becomes gradually worse across 
the other companies. In companies O1, O4, V2, V5 breaks amount to 50 minutes in 
total (two 10-minutes tea breaks and one lunch break of half an hour). In turn, while 
all workers from company O2 consider their overall 45 minutes break (same as in 
60%
24%
16%
Decision on overtime
Management
Own
Not Recorded
  174 
company V11, they have 7 and 8 minutes for two tea breaks + 30 minutes for lunch) 
insufficient, companies such as O3, V1, V4 seem to allow an even shorter time, with 
40 minutes in total (either 5-5-30 or just 10-30 minutes). For what concerns company 
O1, it also emerges how supervisors enjoy a different treatment compared to 
production workers, with the former reporting a total of 60 minutes break, and 
production workers (specifically, helpers on the line) overall 40 minutes. Besides 
indicating whether the allowed breaks are sufficient to satisfy their needs, workers are 
also asked to specify the reason of their dissatisfaction. From the 28% of responses 
expressing discontent, it emerges that a) the time available is inadequate to physically 
rest after a prolonged effort; b) due to the significant distance of canteens or tea-stalls 
from facilities tea breaks are not even enough to reach them; c) the canteen gets too 
crowded (and thus workers have to queue), therefore 30 minutes are barely sufficient 
to get lunch. Some of the responses obtained include, for example, ‘this time not 
enough to take lunch and tea because too much rush in canteen that time due to lack 
of space’, ‘because a person reaches the rest area from the workplace in 10 minutes’, 
‘since there is no sufficient space in the canteen, it becomes crowded; and we have to 
stand in a Q for 10-15 minutes’ (O1), ‘work area and canteen are at a considerable 
distance’, ‘because tea, snack and toilet can’t be done during this time’ (O2), ‘5 
minutes tea time is very short time’, ‘in that break time, I am neither able to eat 
tea/snacks nor to go to the bathroom’ (V1), ‘no, time is very short and work is very 
hard’ (V4) (author’s own survey, march/april 2012). 
The responses provided with regard to the insufficiency of resting time relate to two 
further issues. First, the lack of proper breaks during the shift also corresponds to a 
very limited number of days off during the year. Second, breaks do not allow for the 
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satisfaction of basic needs also due to the inadequacy of existing facilities inside the 
plants.  
As far as time off is concerned, despite 93% of the surveyed workers report to have 
days off, in the majority of cases this only refers to Sundays. If this may not be a 
problems for workers in company O6, who usually operate on a five days weekly 
schedule, it does denote excessive pressure for those in the other plants (O1). In 
company O2, V12, V13 workers declare to have 14 or 16 days off in a year – this could 
correspond to a reasonable number of leave days. However, the rest of the answers 
provided is too heterogeneous to properly assess whether this is a trend; i.e. if this 
allowance is conceded in other plants as well.  
When questioned about the facilities present inside their own plant, the majority of 
workers declare not to be happy. The exact proportion out of the sample of valid 
answers collected can be observed in chart 20 below. More detailed answers focusing 
on washrooms and canteen services follow. 
 
Chart 20: Do you think there are adequate facilities inside your plant? 
 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012. 
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Chart 21: Is there an adequate number of washrooms? 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012. 
 
Chart 22: Are they sufficiently close to your workstation? 
 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012. 
 
Chart 23: Is a canteen provided in your plant? 
 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012 
 
Chart 24: If yes, do you make use of it? 
 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012. 
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Chart 25: If no, do you think one would be needed? 
 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/ april 2012. 
 
3) Following this first investigation of working conditions through an analysis of 
working time and rhythms, the survey also aims at capturing aspects related to 
safety and security of the workplace. To start with, when asked whether they 
consider their workstation as potentially risky, 34% of the workers answered 
yes. This is evident from chart 26 below.  
 
Chart 26: Do you consider your workstation as potentially risky? 
 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012. 
 
Breaking the respondents down by company, the majority of workers worried about 
the level of risk connected to their workstation seems to belong to companies O1, V1 
and V2. While some of them raise concerns related to the actual nature of the task they 
perform (i.e. hot & humid environment in the casting and welding departments, loud 
noises on the press shop, dangers deriving from proximity to high voltage etc.), 
workers from company O1 expressly denounce the lack of EH&S measures, the poor 
maintenance of workstations, the absence of exit doors. Interestingly, workers from 
company O6 complain about the lack of space around the workstation, about a 
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congested workplace and a ‘not good working method’. Respondents from V1 and V2 
also report that their machines do not comply with safety measures. Even more 
worrisome, despite the 92% of respondents claiming that the employer supplies safety 
equipment (see charts 27 and 28), is the number of reported accidents.  
 
Chart 27: Is safety equipment arranged by your employer? 
 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012 
 
Chart 28: If yes, which of the following items are provided by your employer? 
 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012. 
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Indeed, considering the relatively limited population under investigation, the number 
of respondents who declare to have experienced an accident on their workstation 
appears particularly high. This can be noted in chart 29.  
 
Chart 29: have you ever had any accident on your workstation? 
 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012. 
 
Company-wise, the incidence of injuries and accidents on the workplace proves to be 
higher in companies O1, O6, V1 and V2. In company O1, while the majority of 
accidents is attributed to the risk connected to the machine or the job performed (i.e. 
lifting heavy loads), workers also relate their causes to the lack of safety in the plant 
and the excessive pressure put by supervisors to finish tasks in order to comply with 
targets. Respondents point to the lack of safety measures, at the absence of proper 
guidelines that allow supervisors on the line to impose an overly fast pace, and at the 
potentially wrong disposition of machines on the line.138 The issue of accidents being 
caused by the extreme speed required on the line is raised also in company O2. With 
regard to the kind of incident reported, most injuries involve cuts and fractures to hands 
and fingers (especially in welding departments and in the press shop), hand and chest 
burns (in the casting department). In terms of damage caused, 26% of the respondents 
described it as serious or permanent. 
                                                          
138 For example, due to fans being placed at a low height, a worker reports it is easy to hit them and 
incur hand accidents. 
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Chart 30: Did it cause any permanent/serious damage? 
 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012. 
 
The exploration of working conditions within our sample continues through an 
analysis of recruitment and contractual conditions of the workers. Here, an 
introductory clarification may be important. The process of sampling was mediated by 
trade unionists and unionised workers who acted as ‘gatekeepers’. Hence, the sample 
is effectively biased towards including a significant percentage of unionised workers. 
This means also that the sample includes a majority of workers on a permanent 
contract, as by law contract/ casual workers are still denied union membership. In this 
sense, the proportion of casual labour out of the total sample analysed does not 
correspond to the broader picture, neither at plant level, nor at regional/cluster level, 
with reference to the NCR. While this could be identified as a limitation of this analysis 
(see also chapter 4), it is also its strength. In fact, the analysis shows the many 
processes of casualisation and work intensification that are also at work against the so-
called ‘labour aristocracy’ of the sector. Moreover, data related to the percentage of 
contract workers and the increasing casualisation that has affected certain plants are 
extracted from interviews, in order to complement the survey findings. Attention to 
both permanent and casual work is particularly relevant when examining recruitment 
processes, contractual relations, and firing, suspension or dismissal procedures. These 
are analysed below.  
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For what concerns modes of recruitment, the majority of workers claimed that they 
had been hired through formal application and interview. Indeed, this is likely to affect 
young workers in particular, whereby auto companies often build strong connections 
with I.T.Is and technical schools, where they recruit fresh graduates through regular 
calls and interviews. Also, this is more likely to occur in OEMs, while small suppliers 
more often rely on informal hiring procedures. However, with reference to our sample, 
we cannot distinguish different recruitment processes in OEMs and vendors, as the 
answers given are overly heterogeneous (see chart 31). 
 
Chart 31: How were recruited for your current position? 
As we can observe in 
chart 31, despite a 
majority of 
respondents reporting 
formal (application-
based) recruitment 
procedures or the 
presence of official 
employment agencies, 
there is almost one  
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012. 
 
third of workers who declare they were hired via more ‘informal’ means, such as phone 
calls, personal   acquaintances, or contractors. Amongst these, 11% are in fact contract 
workers.  
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However, when data describing the recruitment process are cross-checked with the 
questions where workers were asked to indicate their employer and the kind of contract 
they have, the picture obtained looks highly varied. For example, when asked to 
identify their employer, only 6% of the respondents refer to a contractor, while for 
24% the employer figure is neither the contractor nor a manager.  
 
Chart 32: Which of the following best describes your employer? 
 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
The proliferation and the overlapping of managerial/supervisory roles on the shop 
floor is such that workers themselves do not know exactly who their boss is and who 
is responsible for their work.139 A worker, for example, answered, ‘there is lots of 
                                                          
139 Especially with the adoption of Japanese management and lean production techniques, the required 
division in teams and units has been accompanied by a multiplication of team leaders and supervisors 
the workers need to refer to.  
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managers. I don’t know who is boss. Our boss is P..’ (and provides an individual name) 
(author’s own survey, march/april 2012). This would be confirmed by the long list of 
‘other’ employers, reported by 24% of the workers. Other employers may include 
supervisors, shift in-charge, area in-charge, heads of department, those indicated as 
‘foremen’, engineers, etc.  
In relation to the type of contract these workers have, while the majority of permanent 
workers may reflect the induced bias discussed in relation to union’s mediation, the 
composition is nonetheless mixed. 
 
Chart 33: What kind of contract do you currently have? 
 
As we can observe in chart 33 to the 
right, besides a 66% of workers on 
permanent contracts, there are also a 
13% of casual /temporary workers 
and a 12% of apprentices/ trainees. 
Overall, both casual workers 
(including contract workers) and 
trainees perceive lower salaries,  
     Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012. 
enjoy less job security and benefits, and cannot be union members. However, while 
the majority of permanent workers might suggest a considerable percentage of stable, 
secure contracts, the actual situation in terms of written contracts is somewhat 
puzzling. When asked whether they signed an employment contract, in fact, a large 
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majority of workers, even many of those claiming to enjoy a permanent position, 
respond negatively (chart 34).   
Chart 34: Did you sign an employment contract for your current position? 
 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012. 
 
In this sense, where workers claim to benefit from a permanent contract but have 
signed no written agreement, it seems likely that they received only verbal 
communication regarding their position, but possess no formal guarantee. Unions and 
interviewees also confirmed that this process is largely common. The uncertainty 
related to contractual conditions also emerges when addressing the specification of 
terms and tasks implied in the contract. For example, 45% of the respondents claimed 
that terms and conditions of the signed contract (or of the verbal arrangement, a larger 
sub-sample in fact) were not clear when they started the job, and 30% declared that 
they were performing tasks different from those specified in the contract. These can 
be observed in charts 35 and 36 below. 
 
Chart 35: Were terms and conditions of the contract clear when you signed it? 
 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012. 
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Chart 36: Are you currently performing exactly the tasks stated in the above contract? 
 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012. 
 
In relation to chart 36, responses collected from those who affirm they are carrying out 
different tasks, are particularly interesting. Amongst these, a few respondents declare 
they are doing ‘all kinds of work’. One says: ‘I do not know anything about it. I got 
into this work through my contacts, I work under the contractor’, another declares that 
he ‘was appointed for electrician’s job and then they made me Diesel operator, that 
too without departing any training. Training was given after 6 years’ (author’s own 
survey, marc/april 2012). Beyond the uncertainty associated with vague employment 
conditions and the mis-specification of tasks, what these answers suggest is rather 
critical. First, they indicate the flexibility required from the worker, who is appointed 
for a specific task, but then asked to perform many different ones. Second, the answers 
also highlight the risks of demanding flexibility without providing adequate training. 
In this scenario, workers do not only risk to poorly execute the job they were not meant 
to do, but they are also exposed to higher health and safety risks leading to accidents 
and injuries.140 Third, the casual nature of contracts suggests that workers are trained 
for specific tasks only long after the start of the employment relationship. Fourth, 
contract workers, who refer to a separate employer, are in fact treated as a ‘detached’ 
workforce within the same company. 
                                                          
140 Well explained in the FIAT’s case. See CRS, 2011; Monaco, 2015. 
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In order to further assess the regularity of the workers’ position within the factory and 
their relationship with the employer (or the supervisor they refer to), the following 
factors were also considered: a) whether their name is listed on the attendance register; 
b) who keeps a record of their attendance; c) who takes responsibility in case issues or 
accidents occur in the workplace. Overall, these questions aimed at grasping the 
presence of unregistered workers, and the sort of relationship between the worker and 
their bosses. In fact, contractors may hire workers, pay them, but not always take any 
responsibility for either their conduct or working conditions or welfare. Responses are 
reported in charts 37, 38 and 39 below. 
 
Chart 37: Is your name listed on the company/plant’s attendance register? 
 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012. 
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Chart 38: Who keeps a record of your attendance/ working hours? 
 
 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012. 
 
Chart 39: Who takes the responsibility in case any issue/ dispute / accident occurs on your 
workplace? 
 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012. 
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The data reported above also confirm the picture obtained when analysing the type of 
contract in relation to the identified employer. In effect, if on one side a large majority 
of the respondents claim their name is listed on the attendance register (chart 37), 
answers differ significantly with regard to who takes workers’ attendance. Even more, 
if we focus on that 34% of workers indicating that someone ‘other’ than company and 
plant managers, contractors or themselves keeps the records, we learn that there can 
be several ways to check workers’ presence. It can happen via HR managers, 
supervisors, time officers…and even through finger-punching machines. The same 
goes for the request of specifying employers. Also in this case some workers report 
confusion due to the high number of supervisors/ managers on the shop floor. 
Likewise, when asked to indicate who is responsible for issues occurring on the 
workplace, despite a majority pointing at managers, and only a low 5% of the sample 
referring to contractors, a significant 17% mention other roles.141 As far as contractors 
are concerned, the low figure does not necessarily imply their relative absence. It may 
also indicate that contractors may  hire workers, take their attendance and remunerate 
them, without taking any other responsibility over shop floor issues, accidents and 
working conditions. On this matter, a few workers either answer ‘no one takes 
responsibility’, or ‘everybody is responsible’, signalling an overall dispersal of liability 
(author’s own survey, march/april 2012). 
A last important point to conclude the analysis of contractual arrangements and power 
relations at the workplace, concerns firing or dismissal procedures. Only a small 
percentage of workers answered that they had been fired, suspended or dismissed in 
the past (chart 40), and the responses given are not fully reliable. However, some 
                                                          
141 These include supervisors, HR department, unit managers etc.  
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provide interesting insights. Notably, labour issues and union formation are explicitly 
reported as causes of suspension/ dismissal. 
Chart 40: Have you ever been fired/dismissed/ suspended? 
 
 
 
 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012. 
 
4) In the last set of questions, the survey focused on  modalities and regularity of 
wage payments. These questions do not only shed light on who pays the salary, 
but also clarify the relationship between workers and those they recognise as 
their bosses. As already mentioned, a more detailed discussion of salary levels 
is included in the section on living conditions. 
Firstly, workers are asked whether they are regularly paid a salary. Here, the 
absolute majority answers positively (chart 41 below). 
Chart 41: Are you regularly paid a salary? 
 
 Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012. 
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However, regularity in payments is not extremely telling if not cross-checked with the 
source of the transfer. For such reason, workers are also required to indicate who pays 
their salary. The map of the responses provided can be observed in chart 42. 
Chart 42: Who pays your salary? 
 
Here, as we can see, 
the percentage of 
respondents who 
refer to contractors 
is higher. Finally, 
workers are also 
asked how their 
salary is calculated 
and whether they ever experienced issues or delays with payments. Responses are 
reported in charts 43 and 44. 
Chart 43: How is your salary calculated? 
 
The percentage of workers 
declaring  monthly 
payments is very 
significant, set at 77%. 
This seems to suggest 
payments regularity and 
stability. However, this  
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012. 
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picture may change when one considers amounts, which are discussed in relation to 
overall salary levels in the following section. 
Chart 44: Has it ever happened that your salary was 
not paid or delayed? 
A significant proportion of 
workers report irregularities 
and delays in salary 
payments, (21%). Some 
workers expressly report that 
delays and  
     Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012. 
suspensions occurred during strike periods. Others report that salary cuts were 
arbitrarily implemented by the company during holidays, or that unjust deductions may 
depend on complaints made by Heads of Department.  
5.3.2 Living Conditions 
In order to gain a broader understanding of the social setting in which the working 
conditions analysed above are experienced, and of how they affect the life of the 
workers involved, the survey also attempted to map living conditions in the NCR. In 
particular, this section considers where workers live (distance and commuting time), 
salary levels in relation to family composition and average living expenses, and spare 
time activities. In addition, it also includes a focus on social benefits. 
In the first place, workers’ residence is examined. In this regard, the vast majority of 
respondents declares to live far from the workplace. See chart 45. 
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Chart 45: Do you live nearby the plant? 
 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012. 
 
On average, workers live at a 19.5 km distance from the plant, and take around 42 
minutes to commute. Considering the extremes, there are workers living up to 90 km 
far from their workplace, and spending up to 120 minutes to travel to the factory. 
Needless to say, added to long shifts (made even longer in case of overtime) and 
exhausting workloads, long commuting times imply extra stress and fatigue, as well 
as more time deducted from the private sphere. In addition, whereas the company does 
not cover transport costs (according to what respondents report, casual workers are not 
entitled to corporate conveyance), longer commuting also means a further financial 
burden. 
Within the investigation of living conditions, comparing salary levels in the light of 
family composition and living costs is crucial to understand workers’ ability to satisfy 
their reproductive needs. For what concerns family composition, it has already been 
mentioned that the majority of respondents are married and with children (respectively, 
70% and 66%, see charts 10 and 11 above). On average, families have 2-3 children 
(2.5 being the exact average). However, when respondents are asked to indicate the 
overall number of their family members, the average goes up to 6. This probably 
represents the frequent inclusion of members other than spouses and children within 
the nuclear family (often the elderly). When asked whether any other member of the 
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family earns a regular salary, the majority of the respondents answers negatively (chart 
46 below). 
Chart 46: Is any other member in your family perceiving a regular salary? 
 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012. 
 
With regard to salary levels, due to the extreme heterogeneity of responses and because 
of the large variations between groups, the data collected are broken down according 
to the following criteria: a) company category (OEMs / vendors considered together); 
b) single company; c) job performed (administration/service, supervision, production, 
engineering); d) gender; e) contract (permanent, casual, trainee/ apprentice). For 
groups a-d, maximum and minimum values are extracted, so as to highlight the 
variation, for group e instead, averages are drawn. 
 
Tab. 12 Min and max salary per group of companies (in INR per month) 
Group Min salary Max salary 
OEMs 4000 60000 
Vendors 7000 28000 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012.  
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Tab. 13 Min and max salary per single company (in INR per month) 
Company Min salary Max salary 
O1 7500 
 
29167 
 O2 8000 18083 
 O3 13000 13000 
O4 8000 
 
12000 
 O5 4000 
 
60000 
 O6 8300 
 
58334 
 V1 7800 
 
18000 
 V2 11000 
 
15000 
 V3 7000 7000 
V4 7200 12000 
V5 8500 8500 
V6 9200 9200 
V7 12000 12000 
V8 20000 20000 
V9 9000 28000 
V10 12300 12500 
V11 10800 18000 
V12 18000 18000 
V13 10000 10000 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012. 
 
From a first examination focusing on a single company as well as a group of 
companies, some initial observations can be derived. First, there is a huge disparity 
between minimum and maximum salaries. The gap is much wider in OEMs compared 
to vendors. Within these gaps, we range from salaries corresponding to about one 
fourth of the minimum wage set by the State of Haryana (15,000 INR) to four times 
the minimum wage. In pounds, recorded wages range from a minimum of 43 £ (4,000 
INR) to a maximum of around 644 £ (60,000 INR). Second, however, we can note that 
the range is enormously widened by the maximum salaries registered in companies O5 
and O6 (Faridabad), where the highest salaries are more than double than the 
equivalent in all other companies. This could be explained by several factors, like 
seniority accrued to workers in companies that have operated for a much longer period, 
or the more deeply rooted unionism in the area. The same is valid if we break values 
down according to job performed (tables 14 and 15). In order to show the ‘upward 
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distortion’ caused by the much higher salaries paid in Faridabad, we have first 
calculated extremes considering all companies together, and then excluded companies 
O5 and O6. 
Tab. 14: Min and max salary per job performed (in INR per month, all companies) 
Job   Min salary Max salary 
Administration/ service 4800 58333 
Supervision 4500 60000 
Production 4000 50000 
Engineering 7000 18000 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012. 
 
Tab. 15: Min and max salary per job performed (in INR per month, excluding O5 and O6) 
Job Min salary Max salary 
Administration/ service 9200 20000 
Supervision 9000 28000 
Production 7200 29167 
Engineering 7000 18000 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012. 
 
Hence, we can observe the following trends. First, we observe that again, excluding 
top salaries from Faridabad companies, even highest wages are almost halved. Second, 
that by excluding O5 and O6 the overall gap slightly reduces, whereby lowest salaries 
in all the other companies are not as low as in the OEMs we removed. As far as 
production jobs are concerned, this is due to a specific reason emerging from field 
visits and interviewes. In this case, the cause cannot be attributed to the type of 
employer or to stronger unions able to negotiate fairer deals. In fact, the lowest wages 
in O5 and O6 represent the remuneration of ‘helpers’ on the production line, a category 
of poorly paid ‘production assistants’ which is not reflected in the sample collected 
from the other factories. With regard to engineering jobs, which should generally 
benefit from higher remuneration compared to production or administrative tasks, the 
relatively low figures here represent entry-level positions (respondents are all very 
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young). Tellingly, the length of these arrangements can also be considerable. Finally, 
analysing salaries on the basis of gender and type of contract, other trends emerge, 
albeit figures are distorted due to the small size of observations focusing on women 
workers. For instance, a clear gender disparity in the highest wage category may be 
noted (table 16).  
Tab. 16: Min and max salaries per gender (in INR per month) 
Gender Min salary Max salary 
Female 7200 48000 
Male 4000 60000 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012. 
 
As for the substantial gap that can be observed between minimum and maximum 
salaries, it is due to jobs of a different nature. For what concerns female respondents, 
for example, the lowest wage represents the remuneration for a production job in a 
vending company, while the highest value is the wage compensated for an 
administrative job in an OEM in Faridabad. Regarding male respondents, the lowest 
level is associated with one of the ‘helper’ roles mentioned before, while the highest 
salary is associated with the role of supervisor. Overall, it would be interesting to 
understand whether the better paid supervisory positions are predominantly assigned 
to men. Unfortunately, within this sample, where the percentage of female respondents 
is limited (although this confirms an overall composition, as the whole sector is largely 
male-dominated), such trend cannot be analysed (only one of the female respondents 
works as a supervisor, the other mainly in administration and service). Lastly, salaries 
are broken down per type of contract: permanent, casual, and as a trainee/ apprentice. 
In this case, averages were calculated, in order to highlight the relative advantage/ 
disadvantage of a group compared to the others. It emerges that on average, permanent 
workers receive 21,281 INR/month, casual workers 6,083 INR/month, 
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trainees/apprentices 11,050 INR/ month. Interestingly, four ‘outliers’ were spotted, 
namely supervisors declaring to work on casual terms. As these do not seem to share 
any other condition with the rest of casual workers, their average salary was calculated 
separately: this amounts to 38,750 INR/month. Overall, while trainees and apprentices 
are generally contracted for short term positions but should theoretically access a better 
paid post once their probation term is over, casual workers (this group included 
contract workers) often perform the same tasks as their permanent counterparts but 
receive much lower salaries, are not entitled to the same social benefits and cannot be 
union members.  
With regard to the average wage disparity between permanent and casual workers 
(21,281/ 6,083), this properly reflects overall trends recorded in the NCR. While auto 
workers on permanent contracts are averagely better paid than factory workers in other 
industrial sectors, the relative disadvantage of casual workers is dramatic. They keep 
earning salaries way below the required minimum wage, they still have no political 
representation, and are bound by a ‘social divide’ that separates them from colleagues 
on permanent position as far as most social benefits are concerned (conveyance, 
insurances, pensions etc).  
Once analysed salary levels, we can also get an idea of workers’ purchasing power, 
and the extent to which wages allow for the satisfaction of their reproductive needs by  
cross-checking salary data with average living expenses and social benefits. In terms 
of living expenses, we asked workers how much they spend on average on a monthly 
basis on housing (rent or building), food, medical care, transportation, education, and 
extras, if needed. The monthly averages are reported in table 17. 
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Tab. 17: Average monthly expenses (in INR) 
Expenses Monthly average 
Housing 7211.34 
Food 5266.67 
Medical care 1310.00 
Transportation 1590.21 
Education 3647.37 
Extra 3049.21 
Tot. 22074.8 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012 
 
Although the amounts reported in table 17 represent averages, they are sufficiently 
explanatory and can lead to the immediate conclusion that the salary levels of 
casual/contract workers are absolutely inadequate, while those of trainees/apprentices 
are still well below the average living costs in the area. Of course, averages do not 
express the real gaps and the actual disparities in living standards that characterise the 
Gurgaon region. While old Gurgaon is still a village with poor housing, bad roads and 
transport and poor facilities, the newly built part of Gurgaon is connected to ‘shining 
India’ through the brand new Delhi metro. Malls and office buildings mushroom all 
around, and living costs skyrocket accordingly. For the same reason, the average 
housing expenses reported by workers vary massively, ranging from 1,000 to 47,000 
INR, where 1,000 could be the cost of a room shared with 2, 3, 4 other workers in one 
of the villages close to the factory plants,142 and 47,000 indicate the rent for a whole 
family house, either in Faridabad or closer to the Delhi centre.  
                                                          
142 I had the chance to visit the Aliyar workers’ village in Manesar in April 2012. I had the good fortune 
to go together with some of the people writing for the excellent blog Gurgaon Workers News 
(https://gurgaonworkersnews.wordpress.com/). We visited workers’ houses, took interviews, and 
received a warm and friendly welcome. Overall, the main advantage of living in these villages is the 
proximity to the factory, which allows workers to save on commuting times and costs. Rents are 
obviously cheaper than in Delhi – a room (to share) can be around 3,000-4,000 INR per month. 
However, houses end up being overcrowded, with contract workers sharing the same room with 2-3 
others to reduce costs. Water and electricity provision is also worse than outside and the drainage system 
is almost non-existent (I also lived in a nearby village for a while, and a poor drainage system means 
that when it rains or during the Monsoon season the area gets completely flooded and all garbage 
surfaces).  
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For what concerns transportation, it must be noted that it makes a big difference 
whether the company provides conveyance or not: it is frequent in fact that workers 
demand a transport subsidy amongst urgent needs.  
Following an analysis of salary levels and living costs, our investigation of living 
conditions also explores the distribution of social benefits, including Gratuity, 
PF/ESIC scheme (the two most common benefits provided to industrial workers), and 
insurance funds. Gratuity is a benefit plan that only full time employees can enjoy 
(working at least 240 days in a year); it is a contribution paid by the employer that can 
be accumulated as a retirement fund, or received as a severance package upon leaving 
a job. Provident Fund (PF) and Employee’s State Insurance (ESIC scheme) are further 
contributions that can be either deducted from a salary143 (if above 6,500 INR/pm) or 
should be paid extra from the employer to all employees receiving 15,000 INR or less 
per month. These cover health insurance and medical care. With regard to our sample, 
the coverage of workers under these schemes can be observed in charts 47 and 48. 
 
Chart 47: Are you entitled to any Gratuity? 
 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
143 The ESIC scheme should consist of a 6.5% deduction, of which 1.75 charged to the worker and 4.75 
paid by the employer. The PF corresponds to 12% of the gross salary.  
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Chart 48: Do you have access to PF/ESIC schemes? 
 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012. 
 
 
Chart 49: Do you benefit of any other social scheme? 
 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012. 
 
 
Chart 50: Do you have any insurance? 
 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012. 
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As we can see, the coverage by PF/ESIC schemes is much wider than the Gratuity 
distribution. However, this does not necessarily mean that the employer is contributing 
to such fund, whereas all those receiving a salary lower than 6,500144 are supposed to 
be entitled to Government subsidy. With regard to the Gratuity scheme, the vast 
portion of workers excluded from such benefit seems to indicate a very poor coverage 
of retirement/ pension funds. Finally, for what concerns insurance benefits, an 
interesting factor is that a quite significant percentage of those responding positively 
also report to be covered by a private insurance package (like LIC life insurance, or 
Bharti AXA, amongst others).  
The last question addressed to workers in order to understand their ‘quality of life’, is 
whether they had spare time and what they liked to do once out of the factory gates. 
Responses are reported below, in chart 51. 
 
Chart 51: Do you generally have spare time? 
A majority claims to 
have little or almost no 
spare time. However, 
it is interesting to read 
through responses 
regarding preferred 
activities.  
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012. 
                                                          
144 The threshold should have now been increased to 7500, but only for larger companies. Updates have 
not been confirmed yet. 
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Apart from many answers related to spending time with family and children, and a 
number of complaints regarding ‘having no free time at all’, the remaining basically 
include ‘relax’, ‘rest’, ‘sleep’ and the like – indicating an evident physical exhaustion. 
5.3.3 Labour rights and organisation 
After mapping working and living conditions of the selected sample of workers, the 
third objective of the survey was to explore their level of organisation and unionisation, 
in order to ultimately test their awareness toward their own working situation, and to 
broadly grasp what they would consider as a priority to improve it. As we mentioned 
earlier, the modalities of sample selection may have determined the percentage of 
unionisation within the sample itself, since main facilitators were union leaders and 
union members. This percentage, overall, does not correspond to the degree of 
unionisation inside single plants or within the NCR. In addition, this is the section 
where the number of valid answers was relatively lower, probably because union-
related questions may have been considered of a more sensitive nature, thus restricting 
workers’ propensity to engage.  
Respondents were first asked whether they know a union exists in their plant, whether 
this is affiliated to a National Centre (CTUOs, Central Trade Union Organisations) 
and, in case of negative answer, whether they thought a union was needed. Answers 
are reported on the next page (charts 52, 53 and 54). 
Chart 52: As far as you’re aware, is there any labour union inside your plant? 
 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012. 
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Chart 53: If yes, is this affiliated to any National Centre? 
 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012. 
 
 
Chart 54: If no, do you think one would be needed? 
 
Source: author’s own field survey, march/april 2012. 
 
Observing the charts above, we can draw some remarks. First, while a majority of 
workers acknowledge the existence of a union, there is also almost a fifth of the sample 
who is either unaware of it, or claims there is no union in their plant. The latter option 
is in fact possible, as few of the recent struggles occurred in the NCR have exactly 
revolved around the demand to establish a union where none was there. Second, we 
can note that only half of the respondents acknowledge the affiliation of the existing 
union to a National Centre. This could either be a signal of relative independence, in 
the aftermath of the debate on union independence and the critiques addressed to 
National Centres,145 or else a negative sign. In fact, the proliferation of detached, plant-
based unions has also been one of the causes behind the process of weakening of 
collective bargaining. Third, it is interesting to mention the explanations provided by 
those who report no union in their plants, in relation to if they thought a union was 
                                                          
145 This point will be expanded in the next chapter.  
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needed (chart 54). Those claiming a union should be formed, for example, assert that 
‘they will fight for our rights’, ‘because after this, workers will not be exploited. No 
worker who is honestly working will be victim of exploitation’, and ‘if union is there, 
our rights will not be taken away. Company can not impose anything on us forcefully’ 
(author’s own survey, 2012). Also, some openly state that current union leaders should 
be replaced because of inexperience, and that a union exists but should be replaced as 
it is a ‘pocket union’. By this, they indicate those unions either directly chosen and 
appointed by management, or in collusion with management. On the other side, some 
of those who declare a union is not needed mention that the ‘company doesn’t want 
one’, and that ‘it’s bad for company’s growth’. The latter set of responses show that 
anti-union narratives can also be embraced by workers themselves. 
As a second step, workers were asked whether they were personally members of a 
union, and whether they tend to refer to union leaders. Alternatively, they could 
indicate other key figures they rely on in case of disputes or accidents. Responses can 
be observed in charts 55 and 56.  
 
Chart 55: Are you personally member of a union? 
 
Source: author’s own field survey, march /april 2012. 
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Chart 56: In both cases, do you ever refer to union leaders in case issues/disputes/ accidents occur 
in your plant? 
 
Source: author’s own field survey, march /april 2012. 
 
As we can see from chart 54, the degree of unionisation within the analysed sample is 
substantially high. We have already discussed the possible bias that might have 
influenced such value. With regard to whether workers refer to union leaders, the 
majority of positive answers may reflect two factors. First, a relation of trust toward 
existing leaders. In Faridabad, meetings held with both unionists and workers inside 
both factory plants and union offices suggest high levels of trust. Second, there is also 
a significant portion of casual workers and trainees who, by definition, cannot 
subscribe to a union, but may need support or guidance in case of workplace issues. 
Those workers who do not refer to union leaders may contact contractors, HR officers, 
shift-in-charge (supervisors), managers, department personal managers. Two workers 
report that they ‘don’t refer this type of condition’ (i.e. they don’t report labour issues 
in case they happen) or that they ‘can’t tell it to anyone otherwise they will be thrown 
away from the company’, expressly emphasising a climate of fear and imposed silence 
(author’s own survey, 2012). 
Questions on disputes or protests allow us to understand workers’ priorities in relation 
to their working and living conditions. In terms of labour disputes, approximately 20% 
of the workers reported there had been one at their workplace (chart 57). 
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Chart 57: Have there recently been disputes at your workplace? 
 
Source: author’s own field survey, marc/april 2012. 
 
As for the reasons leading to disputes, these can be many, such as, for instance, the use 
of facilities (toilets and bathrooms); the lack of a company transport service; excessive 
workloads; management’s rigidity and authoritarian behaviour; or shift changes.  
In order to test workers’ exposure to broader labour issues, and to nation-wide 
demands, respondents were also asked their views on the General Strike that had 
recently taken place on 28th February 2012. This strike had wide resonance, as it was 
‘the first joint strike since Indian independence’, gathering all major union federations 
and over a million workers across the country.146 On that occasion, for the first time in 
years, different unions gathered on a common platform, and put forward core demands. 
These included curbing inflation and an increased minimum wage; the extension of 
social security schemes, the abolition of contract labour and regular registration 
procedures for trade unions.147 Within our sample, a vast majority of the respondents 
                                                          
146 In the words of CITU Delhi union officer, interviewed on Feb 29th 2012. Although other General 
Strikes were organised before, that seems to have been the first one where even centre and right-wing 
unions adhered to the agreed demands.  
147 The General Strike on 28th February 2012 was supported by all major national trade unions, 
including AITUC, BMS, INTUC, HMS, CITU, AIUTUC, AICCTU, UTUC, TUCC, LPF, SEWA. The 
common platform was based on the following ten demands: 1) contain price rise; 2) concrete measures 
for creation of employment; strict enforcement of all basic labour laws; 4) universal social security 
cover for unorganised sector workers; 5) stoppage of disinvestment in socially strategic PSUs (Public 
Sector Undertakings); 6) regularisation of contract workers; 7) fixation of statutory minimum wage at 
no less than 10,000 INR (for Haryana, due to higher living costs, this was set at 15,000); 8) removal of 
all ceilings for the payment of bonuses, provident fund, gratuity; 9) assured pension for all; 10) 
compulsory registration of all unions within a period of 45 days and immediate ratification of ILO 
conventions n. 87 and 98. See AITUC (2012). General Strike demands were also discussed during 
interviews with Ms Sindhu, CITU Delhi (29/2/2012), Mr Mody, NTUI (1/3/2012), Mr Raju, INTUC 
Secretary (14/3/2012), Mr Mahadevan, AITUC Secretary (24/8/2012). 
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claimed to have read about the General Strike and to agree with its demands (see chart 
58 below). 
Chart 58: Have you read about the last General Strike at national level? 
 
Source: author’s own field survey, marc/april 2012. 
 
Out of the total number of responses, only 3.6% disagrees with the General Strike, 
while an impressive 96.4% is in accordance with the demands advanced. Within this 
96.4%, workers share solidarity with most of the core demands, and particularly 
underline those related to minimum wage and control of inflation. For example, some 
of the answers include, ‘minimum wage should be Rs 15,000. Those working on 
contract should be made regular’, ‘Inflation should be reduced, salary should be 
increased’, ‘Wages should increase in proportion with inflation’, ‘Yes. There is so 
much inflation, income is stagnated at Rs.4000 since 3-4 years, there are funds and 
tax too’. And also ‘I agree, because workers are harassed a lot’, ‘Yes, because workers 
are troubled too much by management’, ‘Yes, because it’s right of the workers to form 
the union’ (author’s own survey, 2012). 
To conclude the survey, workers were asked to describe the most urgent and serious 
issues affecting their company/plant, and what they would consider as a priority in 
order to improve their working and living conditions. Answers were numerous and 
varied. On the first point, among pressing problems, they listed low salaries, excessive 
use of contract labour, lack of safety in the workplace, poor facilities, lack of housing 
and transport provision, lack of proper managerial skills and authoritarian attitudes 
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from management. On this last issue, for example, answers recorded that ‘the most 
serious issue or problem in the company is that no senior officer behaves properly 
with subordinates, nor talk gently’, ‘management lacks ability to make workers work 
properly, therefore tussles happen’. ‘it’s company’s dictatorship’ (author’s own 
survey, 2012). Along the same lines, respondents also expressed what their priorities 
would be in order to achieve better working and living conditions. Here, they voiced 
the need of being provided housing and transport, additional safety equipment, the 
need to increase minimum wages and to end the contract labour system, and the need 
for ‘training’ management to handle workers… ‘the day company management takes 
up our problems with all sincerity and seriousness, solutions will be there 
automatically’, a worker interviewed concluded (author’s own survey, 2012).  
 
5.4 Issues at stake 
 
Trying to extract main issues at stake from the wide and complex picture the conducted 
survey yielded, is not an easy task. As we described at the beginning, the Indian labour 
market per se embodies such numerous segmentations and differences that identifying 
core problems or deriving political or normative guidelines to ameliorate the overall 
working conditions of the workforce in its totality may be an extremely arduous 
endeavour. However, the present survey aimed to highlight some key features that may 
contribute to both a political and theoretical understanding of the workforce, of its 
needs and demands. In addition, the scope of the analysis was also to show the 
methodological relevance of a labour-centred investigation mapping labour 
  209 
composition within a broader analysis of capital-labour relations in a specific socio-
political context.  
With respect to the overall findings of this study, the most significant aspects, 
particularly in relation to an understanding of struggle dynamics, are the following. 
First, the survey indicates the similarities in workloads and rhythms between the Indian 
auto industry and the rest of the global auto industry,148 within an overall subjugation 
to global capital strategies informed by the needs of the lean production system. In this 
sense, the excessive speed, the stretched working shifts, the physical burden Indian 
workers witness and report, is experienced on a world scale, it is a clear manifestation 
of global capital imperatives to increase profits while controlling labour. However, 
second, the survey also aimed to shed some light on the peculiarities making the Indian 
NCR case somewhat unique – both in terms of labour standards and in terms of living 
conditions. Looking in this direction, the widespread use of contract labour, the 
enormous wage disparities, the hardships experienced in the workers’ daily life, are 
dramatic and compelling. Third, the analysis reveals the relevance of the particular 
composition of the workforce in explaining struggles. Especially in the Gurgaon area 
we found a generation of young, educated, skilled workers, mostly with no experience 
of unionism and struggle, however with clear aspirations to a better life compared to 
earlier generations of workers. Such aspirations clash with the pressures imposed by 
the lean production system. In fact, how labour reacts to this scenario, and how 
institutions deal with working class demands, is subject of the next chapter.  
 
 
                                                          
148 See for example the study on the Pomigliano FIAT plant (CRS, 2011; Monaco, 2015). 
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Chapter 6 
Labour struggles in the NCR 
 
Introduction  
Within the present research, the decision to focus on the National Capital Region, and 
on the Capital-Labour relations that have shaped its industrial development, was not 
at all accidental. The scope and the relevance of the industrial conflicts that have 
shaken the region in the last ten-fifteen years, inscribed into its growth trajectory, make 
it in fact a paradigmatic case epitomising the inner contradictions of both the lean 
manufacturing system and the Indian capitalist model. In this respect, while the 
industrial hub built around the National Capital Region has come to represent one of 
the ‘gems’ of the fast-growing, ‘shining’ Asian giant, it has also recently shown the 
weaknesses of a model erected on dangerously shaky grounds. In particular, the labour 
composition investigated in the previous chapter, and the political strategies aimed at 
keeping labour fragmented, have proven to be recipes that cannot guarantee indefinite 
success. This chapter tries to make it clear, analysing how labour reacted and 
developed an independent political subjectivity nevertheless. Indeed, if ‘knowledge is 
tied to struggle’ (Tronti, 2006), as we believe and have claimed throughout this work, 
then the struggles occurred in the NCR are incredibly revealing – and therefore worth 
exploring. Their investigation may certainly help disclosing capital strategies, whereby 
the Japanese model based on lean manufacturing and management is not infallible, 
and Capital attempts to control Labour may fail. Secondly, an analysis of struggles 
may shed light on processes of working class formation, on modes of labour 
organising, and on the role, and power, of labour institutions. In this sense, the way 
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existing trade unions have dealt with ‘conflict management’ in the NCR distinctly 
unveils weaknesses and limitations of the Indian union movement. Finally, the 
interventions enacted to suppress the conflict, with the involvement of specific 
modalities of repression and retaliation, uncover the relationship between State and 
Capital, laying bare issues related to institutional responsibility, violence, and rights 
violation. All this will be told in the following sections. After briefly touching upon 
the most salient traits of past and present struggles that hit the NCR, the focus will be 
concentrated on the dispute that affected Maruti-Suzuki since 2011. Indeed, the 
demands raised through the Maruti protest, the dynamics of struggle and repression 
that marked the case, set a major milestone in the history of Indian labour and industrial 
relations.  
 
6.1 Struggles in the NCR and the Maruti – Suzuki dispute: core issues and 
demands 
 
As we mentioned while analysing working and living conditions in the NCR, this area 
is composed by two main industrial conglomerates surrounding the cities of Gurgaon 
and Faridabad, in the state of Haryana, bordering Delhi. Faridabad is a city of older 
industrial formation, dominated by the large Yamaha, Escorts and JCB plants, 
characterised by an older and more experienced workforce enjoying relatively better 
working conditions, and by peaceful industrial relations, supervised by the 
collaborative HMS (Hind Mazdoor Sabha) - affiliated unions.149 Overall, no major 
                                                          
149 The HMS is the third largest union federation in India, counting more than 3 million members across 
the country. It is politically affiliated to the Socialist Party. In Faridabad, the strongest union is the 
HMS-affiliated All Escorts Employees’ Union (AEEU), which gathers members from all Escorts plants, 
JCB, India Fortis Hospital, Yamaha. Several interviews were taken in Faridabad with Mr Surya Dev 
Tyagi, AEEU President and long-term figure of the NCR labour movement. 
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disruption nor industrial dispute occurred in the past decade, and local unions maintain 
a rather strong hold of the territory. Gurgaon experienced instead definitely turbulent 
years, reaching the highest peak of industrial conflict in 2011-12, when intense and 
prolonged unrest shook the Maruti-Suzuki plant in Manesar. Given the features of 
Gurgaon’s industrial structure, and considered the particular labour composition we 
highlighted in the previous chapter, understanding causes and dynamics of struggle in 
this area is of crucial importance. Certainly, the scope and the magnitude of the most 
recent labour protests came as a surprise. Gurgaon is in fact an only recently 
industrialised area, where large OEMs opened their manufacturing plants only in the 
last 10-15 years, generally hiring a young workforce - at their first employment and 
with no memory or experience of previous struggles, and where unions are not 
historically rooted. Counting all the ingredients of a perfect greenfield location, 
companies investing in the area seemed attracted by the possibility of combining a 
potentially docile workforce with scarce unionisation – what better recipe for success. 
 
Unfortunately, capital, and foreign investors’, expectations were not met. Capital 
strategies in the area faced opposition already in 2000, when a first, powerful agitation 
struck the former Maruti Udyog Limited (MUL) plant in Gurgaon. A massive protest 
at Honda followed shortly after, in 2005. Another broke out at the RICO vending 
company in 2009. And then the industrial conflict reached its acme in 2011-12, with 
the unprecedented strikes that shook the Maruti (now Maruti Suzuki India Limited, 
MSIL) Manesar plant.150 Overall, important lessons can be learnt from these struggles, 
and both theoretical and political conclusions can be drawn if we consider the 
composition of the protesters, forms of organising and main claims forwarded. While 
                                                          
150 From an interview with a representative from NTUI Haryana, 22/03/2012. 
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the first two will be discussed throughout the next sections, here is it worth dwelling 
upon core issues and demands emerged from the Gurgaon strikes. As we are going to 
argue, these help challenging, on one side, the universal applicability of the lean 
paradigm and the efficacy of the rhetorical apparatus that accompanies it; on the other, 
the sustainability of a local labour regime nested on certain political and institutional 
settings and a certain system of industrial relations.  
Indeed, while the whole Gurgaon cluster developed around the myth of the ‘Maruti 
revolution’ (see Ishigami, 2004), alluding to the way the partnership with Suzuki 
channelled the introduction of the Japanese management and manufacturing model, its 
tenets were rapidly debunked. Today, Maruti still proudly founds its management and 
production strategies on the principles of Total Quality Management, of the kaizen 
methodology aiming at achieving continuous improvements through the involvement 
of all workers, on team work and a just-in-time structure. 151 However, already in 2000, 
Maruti workers denounced harsh working conditions on the line, harassment on behalf 
of managers and supervisors, punishments and retaliations following the strike months 
(PUDR, 2001; 2007), laying bare the actual meaning of the managerial changes 
implemented and the reality concealed behind them.  
Beginning with a protest against an incentive wage scheme arbitrarily introduced by 
the management,152 the Maruti strike in 2000 already highlighted a regime based on 
strict labour controls, on the forced depoliticisation of the workforce and on 
management-State connivance in the modalities of repression.153 Indeed, a system far 
                                                          
151 From an interview with a Maruti Suzuki India Ltd manager, 6/09/2012. For an interesting reading 
about the ‘Maruti formula – lean manufacturing’, see FMS, 2011. 
152 The previous scheme linking incentive wages to workers’ productivity was withdrawn in favour of 
a new one depending on company’s sales. 
153 In order to be re-allowed into the factory premises after the strikes, workers were obliged to sign a 
good conduct undertaking (GCU) and were issued chargesheets (one of the most notorious charges was 
imposed on Mathew Abraham, leader of the protest and General Secretary of the workers’ union, also 
interviewed in Delhi on 26/08/2012). In addition, striking workers were punished with the full deduction 
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from the harmonious workplace relations supposed to reign within the lean factory. In 
2005, another Japanese champion operating in Gurgaon – Honda - found itself in the 
public eye.154 Back then, the company was hit by intense labour unrest, which lasted 
from December 2004155 to the end of July 2005, going through different phases. The 
2005 dispute brought to the light some major issues that exploded even more 
vehemently during the most recent Maruti case. Firstly, together with claims related to 
poor working conditions and low salary levels,156 whereby the 2000 Maruti strike had 
not led to any substantial improvement, Honda workers demanded a union. For the 
first time in the region, the young, still mostly unorganised, workforce from Gurgaon 
asked for political representation. Secondly, severe labour rights violations emerged, 
ranging from the attempts to hamper or delay the union registration process, to a two 
months lock-out presented as a strike,157 for which workers were deducted full pay, to 
unjustified suspensions and terminations.158 Thirdly, repression of the 2005 Honda 
strike resolved in a brutal use of violence, remembered on July 25th every year, day in 
which a rally organised by Honda workers was fiercely charged by the police. In that 
case, the use of ‘private’ violence was also denounced – as it recently happened at 
                                                          
of salaries for almost half a year, with arbitrary dismissals, suspensions and transfers, and with 
intensified workloads and higher production targets in the aftermath of the protest (see PUDR, 2001).  
154 On this case, information is mainly reported on the basis of a long interview held with the General 
Secretary of the Honda Motorcycle & Scooter India Employees’ Union, on 20/03/2012, of a focus group 
with 5 Honda workers held on 31/03/2012, and a ‘life history’ from another Honda worker, collected 
on 1/04/2012. On that occasion, I had the interesting chance to spend the whole day at his family place 
in old Gurgaon.  
155 The Honda Employees’ Union was registered only on 30th May 2005, while different forms of 
protest (boycotts inside the factory, tool-down actions, dharna (non-violent sit in that may include 
fasting in sign of protest), rallies outside the plant), had started since December 2004.  
156 Honda workers who were working for the company at the time the strike broke out, report that 
working conditions were extremely tough: they worked ‘for long shifts, with very short breaks, under 
pressure from supervisors and they were hardly allowed to talk to each other. No mobile phone was 
permitted on the line, and there was an only landline for emergencies in the whole plant. Harassment 
was frequent, and they were severely punished even if they were a little late (ex. with an extension of 
the probation period)’. Information reported from the focus group held on 31/03/2012. 
157 From June 27th to July 25th 2005, then again from July 31st. Details provided by the General 
Secretary of the Honda Motorcycle & Scooter India Employees’ Union, interviewed on 20/03/2012, 
and from Honda workers met for a focus group on 31/03/2012. 
158 Initially, 50 workers were suspended and 4 terminated. From the same interview and focus group. 
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Maruti, the company made extensive use of local ‘bouncers’ and ‘musclemen’159 to 
suppress workers’ agitation. While the strike was overall successful, as Honda workers 
eventually managed to get their union registered, the issues here highlighted – lack of 
political representation, labour rights violation, disproportionate use of police 
violence160 – have persisted, and equally emerged during the following Maruti 
struggle. Peaks of violence were also reached during the strikes that affected several 
Tier 1 component suppliers in 2009, particularly RICO Auto and Sunbeam Casting. In 
October 2009, RICO workers engaged in a long strike to protest against unacceptable 
working conditions:161 even in this case, management imposed a lock-out, suspended 
workers with no official charge,162 hired private police to prevent any form of action 
within the factory premises. Within a shocking escalation of violence, it happened that 
police opened fire upon workers: a worker died, and at least other 40 were injured. 
Most strikingly, two workers were arrested for the murder, while the private police 
guards promptly disappeared (libcom, 2010; ICC, 2009). Indeed, what was particularly 
striking in the RICO case, was on one side, the extreme leeway capital enjoyed in the 
use of violence to repress the protest, and the blatant non-interventionist attitude from 
                                                          
159 Reported by all union representatives interviewed in Gurgaon. 
160 G., Honda worker who participated in the 2005 strike, tells that ‘on the day they organised the mass 
rally, July 25th 2005, out of about 5000 workers present, almost 3000 were stopped by the police, to 
intimidate the others. Police freed most of them on the same day, but after beating and harassing them. 
The majority of them got injured: they had hands, legs broken, head injuries. 75 workers were arrested, 
and 62 of them kept in jail for up to 21 days, charged with article 307 (attempt to murder, according to 
the Indian penal law)’. G. told me his story on 1/04/2012. When I was in Delhi, in 2012, the Honda 
legal case was still open: I had the chance to meet this group of workers and hold a focus group / group 
interview exactly because on that day (31/03/2012) they had just gathered at the Haryana Court, in 
Gurgaon, for a judicial hearing regarding the 2005 events.  
161 In this regard, the report from a RICO worker, translated for libcom (see libcom, 2010), is excellent: 
‘Work has to be performed standing and after 8 1/2 hours duty, they force you to keep working. Even 
on weekly rest day, shift workers have compulsory duty. Payment of overtime is at single rate. They 
keep increasing the production target and for not completing the production target, they harass us. 
Wages are said to be 5,500 but really 4,200 are given. Basic wages are low and there are various 
allowances. Leave Travel Allowance (LAA) money is cut from the wages each month and given at the 
end of the year when LAA is supposed to be provided by the company. In the canteen, bad food for more 
money. No arrangement for transport.’  
162 During the early stages of the protest, while no direct confrontation had occurred yet, 16 workers 
were suspended for having ‘incited the other workers to slow down, thus hampering the achievement 
of production targets’.  
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state-institutions. On the other side, the violent peak reached during the RICO dispute 
triggered spontaneous and widespread forms of solidarity, whereby the protest soon 
extended to Sona Koyo Steering Systems, Lumax Industries, and several other vending 
companies in the Gurgaon area (libcom, 2010; ICC, 2009). In this sense, the 2009 
events already testified both a diffused intolerance towards working conditions 
perceived as unjust and exploitative, and an increasing awareness of a common status 
on behalf of an emerging working class. In addition, the rapidity in the propagation of 
the protest, and the involvement of a number of component suppliers whose strikes 
affected OEMs’ production trends, also highlighted the interconnections existing 
along the supply chain, and the effective possibilities for disruption within the cluster 
setting.163  
All the distinctive features that characterised the struggles affecting Gurgaon between 
2000 and 2010 also emerged throughout the Maruti – Suzuki Manesar dispute in 2011-
12. However, the scope, the intensity, the legal implications of these Maruti strikes 
were unprecedented, making it a unique case and a milestone both in the history of 
industrial relations in the area, and in the formation of a more defined working class 
in a recently industrialised region. Struggle dynamics will be discussed in more detail 
in the next section. Here, it is important to point at the key issues that were raised by 
the Maruti protest, and to the elements that remarkably distinguish it from all previous 
struggles. These pertain to the composition of the striking workforce, to the demands 
forwarded, to the modalities of struggle, and to the reactions that followed, in terms of 
both management’s repression and institutional intervention.  
 
                                                          
163 Especially in a producer-driven chain like the auto one, the agency of workers in potentially 
disrupting interconnected nodes can be interestingly explored. 
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One of the most astonishing features of the Maruti Manesar strike was undoubtedly 
the composition of the workers who took action. These were not only very young, but 
also largely employed on contract-basis. The plant where the strike broke out is in fact 
the Maruti – Suzuki A plant in IMT Manesar, inaugurated only in 2006. When it 
opened, the company recruited the majority of workers directly from ITIs and technical 
colleges, thus securing a pool of young, skilled, and ‘committed’ workers. A 
generation of workers who has become the symbol of the modernising ‘shining India’, 
striving for growth, progress, personal achievement. A generation of workers that was 
also supposed to be easy to control, as not politicised yet. A generation of workers who 
soon experienced, though, the alienation of backbreaking work on the line, and saw 
rosy aspirations clashing with the reality of rampant casualisation and the brutality of 
an oppressive management.164 In this sense, the tough working conditions and the 
relentless rhythms imposed by the Maruti lean factory seem to have proven particularly 
unbearable.  
As numerous sources now report, and our findings back up, life on the Maruti line 
involved extremely fast speed, continuous and repetitive operations, control and 
harassment on behalf of contractors and supervisors (see 
gurgaonworkersnews.wordpress.com; PUDR, 2013; ICLR, 2013; FMS, 2011).165 
Direct accounts by Maruti workers testify of 7 minutes only breaks, of compulsory 
                                                          
164 On the profile of Maruti’s protesters, read The Indian Express (16/10/2011), ‘Face of Maruti Suzuki 
strike is a 24-year-old’. 
165 On Maruti events, we also rely on the following direct accounts: interviews held with representatives 
from CITU Gurgaon (12/03/2012), AEEU - HMS Faridabad (15/03/2012), a focus group with Suzuki 
Motorcycle workers (15/03/2012), a focus group with Maruti Manesar workers (20/03/2012), an 
interview with a labour activist from the Faridabad Majdoor Samachar (FMS, 10/04/2012), an 
interview to Maruti Manesar workers taken in the Manesar workers’ village together with activists from 
the Gurgaon Workers News group (12/04/2012), an interview with a representative of CITU Haryana 
(07/08/2012), an interview with a labour activist from JNU (14/08/2012), a second interview with a 
representative from CITU Gurgaon (15/08/2012), a second interview held at AEEU – HMS in Faridabad 
(16/08/2012), a focus group with Maruti Gurgaon workers (20/08/2012), a roundtable discussion on 
Maruti at the Council for Social Development (CSD), Delhi (23/08/2012), an interview to the AITUC 
General Secretary (24/08/2012), an interview with Mr Mathew Abraham, at the International 
Metalworkers’ Federation (IMF, 26/08/2012).  
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overtime of up to two hours per day, of punishments and salary deductions for every 
minute of delay, of forbidden communication among workers on the line and frequent 
harassment from contractors and supervisors.166 Reporting factory conditions in 
excellent detail, the People’s Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR, 2013) describes a 
proper ‘dehumanisation’ of the workforce, compelled to meet the target of one car in 
every 42 seconds, even if this means insufficient time to rest within and between shifts, 
physically draining rhythms, no paid overtime nor leave. Regarding contract/casual 
workers, in addition to extreme work pressure, their condition is aggravated by the 
lack of medical benefits and the ineligibility for transport facilities.  
The conditions of contract workers bring us back to the second, important feature 
characterising the Maruti protesters. Not only these are young, supposedly 
unexperienced and – in theory - scarcely politicised. They also belong to both 
permanent and casual workforce. This ruins all management’s expectations, and 
overtly clashes with capital plans.  
Despite the higher vulnerability of their positions and the precariousness of their 
employment relations in fact, contract workers do not hesitate in taking action, and 
bravely do so. Furthermore, the hoped fragmentation between workers on different 
statuses does not prevent permanent and casual workers from striking together, within 
an incredibly inspiring manifestation of unity and solidarity, hardly observed before.167  
In this sense, if the already lower salaries and the greater exposure to dismissals and 
termination could have acted as a deterrent, discouraging precarious workers from 
personal involvement in a strike, Maruti events rather follow a different direction. 
Likewise, if the employment of workers on different conditions and the concession of 
                                                          
166 Focus groups with Maruti Manesar workers were held on 20/3/2012 and 12/04/2012, one with Maruti 
Gurgaon workers was held on 20/08/2012. 
167 Emerged from interviews with all unions.  
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separate treatments might have led to imagine different needs and aspirations, rivalries, 
distinct demands and different willingness to fight, Maruti’s ground reality also proves 
to contrast the initial expectations. Indeed, as we will later conclude, the common class 
identity developed in a context of generalised exploitation and widespread oppression, 
appears to overcome all other forms of workforce segmentation that may have 
encumbered labour organising.  
 
The composition of the striking workers also explains the demands raised through the 
Maruti protest.168 These revolved around two main claims: the recognition of an 
independent union, and the regularisation of contract workers. The request to form a 
union is connected, per se, to several issues. First, the autonomous initiative to form 
an independent union, in early 2011, and the long struggle until this was finally 
registered, on 1st March 2012, showed that the young, unexperienced, Maruti workers 
had gained collective awareness of their own conditions and matured a common 
subjectivity. This entailed the acknowledgement of diffused exploitation, unjust 
employment relations and uneven power balances, up to the determination to act 
unitedly for a change, to affirm collective rights. Albeit at an early stage, as we will 
argue in the next section, this signals the development of class consciousness where it 
was previously absent. Second, the need to establish a union was felt both as a response 
to the perceived lack of political representation, and as ultimate solution to address 
unbearable working condition. Indeed, denunciations regarding the ‘dehumanising’ 
conditions experienced on the line vehemently emerged throughout the whole strike, 
and the formation of a union came forth in the hope to let finally surface what had long 
been silenced (see again, PUDR, 2013). Third, it is important to note that the demand 
                                                          
168 Opinions and impressions regarding Maruti workers’ demands, as expressed in this section, largely 
draw on direct accounts collected through interviews and focus groups held personally. 
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for an independent union did not happen in a vacuum, but came as a reaction to the 
long-lasting imposition of a ‘company-union’, a pre-existing management-friendly 
union whose leaders were repeatedly selected by the company itself, with no 
involvement of workers. In this sense, the request to recognise the Maruti Suzuki 
Employees’ Union (MSEU), as opposed to the previous Maruti Udyog Kamgar Union 
(MUKU), disclosed a situation of utter political control and absolute lack of 
democratic consultation, whereby not only union leaders were directly chosen by the 
management, but no election was ever held. Interestingly enough, when the 
independent MSEU was finally registered on 1st March 2012, the company imposed 
another sort of ‘independence’, obstructing the affiliation to National Union 
Federations (CTUOs), with the idea of minimising the external influence of ‘too 
ideologised’ organisations.169 Finally, the initial absence of a workers’ union, the 
protracted attempts to invalidate its registration, plus the following retaliations 
targeting those recognised as leaders, can all be inscribed into a generalised hostility 
towards labour organisations, particularly accentuated within multinational companies 
championing the Japanese model of ‘collaborative industrial relations’.170  
 
For what concerns the second, core demand expressed by the Maruti strike, namely 
the regularisation of contract workers, framing the context may help grasping its 
relevance and scope. The issue of contract labour has powerfully emerged in the last 
few years, finally appearing on the agenda of national General Strikes organised by 
                                                          
169 From interviews with representatives from CITU Gurgaon and CITU Haryana (7/08/2012) and 
AITUC Delhi (24/08/2012). This discussion on independent unions and the relation between 
‘spontaneously formed’ groups and existing institutions will be further explored in the next sections.  
170 A trend clearly emerged already in the Honda case. The long-lasting hostility of Japanese 
management was clearly reported during discussions had with INTUC representatives (14/03/2012), 
FMS activits (10 and 12/04/2012), HMS/ Maruti Gurgaon workers (20/08/2012), NTUI representatives 
at the CSD roundtable (23/08/2012), AITUC representatives (24/08/2012), and Mathew Abraham at 
IMF (26/08/2012).  
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major union federations, and even prompting casual workers to bravely fight on the 
forefront – as in the Maruti case. The nature of the problem distinctly surfaces if we 
consider the extent of the contractualisation process within Indian manufacturing, the 
use (and abuse) of contract labour in relation to the existing law, and the working 
conditions contract workers endure. The increasing share of informal, ‘more flexible’ 
labour within Indian organised manufacturing has been widely documented by 
extensive studies: Deshpande, Karan, Sharma and Sarkar (2004), for example, report 
how the use of non-permanent workers has particularly intensified within large firms 
employing 500 or more workers. Convincingly overcoming the conceptualisation of a 
dualism between an organised and an unorganised segment, the authors illustrate how 
a process of casualisation has progressively permeated the formal sector, through an 
overt substitution of permanent workers with temporary, casual, contract labour. As 
we will also assert in relation to the NCR case, such process not only helps the 
employer to increase profits by lowering costs, but allows to ‘manage industrial 
relations in an orderly manner’ (p.85). This is due, on one side, to the rooted practice 
to remunerate casual workers with wages much lower than those compensated to their 
permanent counterparts. On the other, employers tend to prefer hiring casual workers 
as they are easier to dismiss and, according to the existing law, not entitled to union 
membership.  
Considering the NCR, a process of ‘casualisation by substitution’ has clearly 
manifested following all major labour struggles: Mathew Abraham, for example, 
reports how, after the 2000 Maruti Gurgaon strikes, the company terminated more than 
2000 employees,171 to then replace them with contract workers.172 Chandrasekhar and 
                                                          
171 2300-2400 employess, both permanent and trainees who were about to become permanent, were 
terminated within one year from the strike. Of these, around 1100 were immediately sacked, while the 
others were induced to leave through the actual imposition of a Voluntary Retirement Scheme. 
172 From a long interview held at IMF on 26/08/2012. 
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Ghosh (2014) also highlight how the use of informal contracts perfectly services the 
requirements of the formal sectors. Within an overall process of informalisation of the 
organised manufacturing segments, they show how the rising employment of contract 
workers has been particularly prominent. This can be observed in charts 59 and 60 
below. Together with non-permanent/ temporary workers, contract workers can be 
classified as a specific category of casual/ non- regular employment (see again 
Deshpande, Karan, Sharma, Sarkar, 2004). As with all casual workers, they tend to 
receive lower wages, more restricted social benefits, and cannot subscribe to union 
organisations, thus still being excluded from political representation. However, what 
distinguishes contract workers from the other forms of casual labour, is their ‘indirect’ 
nature, whereby they are hired by a third party and they are not directly connected to 
the main company in terms of employment relationship and methods of wage payment 
(AIOE, 2013). Normally, they should be hired, supervised and remunerated by a 
contractor, who then in turn is generally compensated by the ‘mother-company’ (ib.). 
 
 
Chart 59: Contract workers in Indian organised manufacturing 
 
 
Source: Chandrasekhar and Ghosh, 2014:2. 
 
  223 
 
Chart 60: Percentage of contract workers per productive sector 
 
 
Source: Chandrasekhar and Ghosh, 2014:3. 
 
The reason why the contract labour system has recently become a matter of high 
contention and generated widespread protest has to deal with its over-use and abuse, 
in overt violation of the existing Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act 1970. 
Firstly, the increasing and extensive employment of contract workers has occurred 
regardless of the legal limitations forbidding its use within ‘core activities’ and on 
works of ‘perennial nature’ (Papola, 2013). In addition, the system has channelled the 
creation of a separate category of workers, employed at cheaper rates and excluded 
from social security schemes, despite the Contract Labour Act’s requirement to 
provide contract workers with regular salaries and at least minimum social benefits 
(Papola, 2013). Thus, in spite of supposed restrictions, the use of contract labour within 
organised manufacturing has considerably grown, increasing from about 20% in 2000-
1 to 33% in 2009-10 (Papola, 2013:22; Chandrasekhar and Ghosh, 2014). Within the 
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whole auto industry, 1/3 of the workers seem to be currently employed on a contract 
basis.173  
At company level, especially inside large firms, the share of contract workers has 
sometimes – illegally - outnumbered that of permanent workers. For what concerns 
the NCR auto factories, union representatives report of 60% of contract workers at 
Honda, over 90% at Hero – Honda Haridwar,174 while PUDR (2013) states that Maruti 
overall employs at least 40% of contract workers, exceeding 60% at the Manesar plant. 
Beyond the impressive number of non-regular employees, the system itself rests on all 
sort of violations. For example, although after 240 days of continuous employment a 
worker should be made permanent, contracts are often rolled over for years.175 In 
addition, contract workers are usually paid extremely lower salaries compared to 
permanent colleagues - often being compensated amounts well below the statutory 
minimum wage – albeit they perform exactly the same tasks. Against such violation, 
one of the core demands National Federations keep voicing lies on the principle ‘equal 
work, equal pay’, whereby the differences created represent a purely arbitrary 
imposition.176 In terms of payment, PUDR (2013) reports that contract workers are 
generally remunerated on daily wage basis, i.e. they get paid only 25-26 days in a 
month, excluding Sundays. This also implies that they are not entitled to any paid 
leave. Plus, they are often denied PF and ESIC bonuses, not benefitting of any 
insurance, medical assistance, nor pension scheme.177 Finally, at the time they are 
                                                          
173 While another third is employed as trainee/ apprentice, and another third on a permanent basis. This 
was reported by Dev Nathan, interviewed at the Indian Society for Labour Economics on 28/11/2011. 
174 CITU representatives, interviewed on 12/03/2012, and Honda Employees’ Union representative, 
interviewed on 20/03/2012.  
175 INTUC representative, interviewed on 14/03/2012, mentioned cases of workers kept on contract 
basis up to 18-20 years.  
176 According to S.D.Tyagi (AEEU – HMS, 15/03/2012), contract workers averagely get 5000/6000 
INRs per month, while permanent workers performing the same role may be paid up to 30000. Honda 
Employees’ Union Secretary reports that contract workers in their company may also perceive only 
4000 -5000 INRs, while the established Minimum Wage should be 10000 (20/03/2012). 
177 Trend confirmed by all CITU, INTUC, HMS, AITUC representatives. 
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hired, contract workers are usually only verbally informed about their appointment: in 
the absence of any written agreement, whether slowdowns in production or political 
turmoil require it, employers can easily dismiss them (see PUDR, 2013).178 All these 
trends, including wage gaps, lack of social protection scheme, informality of 
employment agreements, also confirm findings emerged from our survey (see chapter 
5). 
Given the background scenario, and having explained the core issues that have 
animated recent labour protests in the NCR, the relevance and the scope of the Maruti 
struggle, whose dynamics are reported in the next section, shall now appear clearer.  
 
6.2 Maruti workers on strike: struggle dynamics 
 
Although the claims raised by the Maruti protest can be inscribed in an overarching 
set of issues already emerged throughout the previous decade, the strike that affected 
the Maruti Manesar plant in 2011-12 was unprecedented in its intensity, duration and 
impact. As we have discussed earlier, the composition of the workforce who took 
action – young, with no previous struggle experience, largely employed on contract 
basis – together with the request for an independent union within a completely hostile 
terrain, make the case unique. However, also in terms of dynamics, organising and 
reactions it attracted, it was definitely beyond parallel.179  
                                                          
178 On contract labour in India, read also: The Economic Times, ‘Contract labour pay parity plan caught 
up in bureaucratic triangle’, ‘Rise in contract labour causing unrest: Centre’, ‘Contract labour: a ticking 
bomb amid auto industry’s labour force’, ‘Contract labour law: convincing workers, employers key’; 
World Socialist Web Site, ‘India: Striking NLC contract workers must expand struggle industrially and 
politically’ and ‘India: Strike challenges NLC’s decades-long use of contract labour’. All links to the 
online articles are provided in the bibliography.  
179 For a detailed reconstruction of the timeline of the whole strike, I am indebted to PUDR and the 
Gurgaon Workers News (GWN) collective, who provide an extremely accurate account of every step 
taken in the struggle. In particular, the documentary material and the analyses collected by GWN are of 
exceptional quality,  
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Overall, the strike at the Maruti plant in Manesar lasted from early June 2011 to the 
‘accident’ that occurred on 18th July 2012. It went through different phases of labour 
and management offensive, until it was brutally suppressed by the wave of repression 
which followed in the summer of 2012. Nonetheless, its impact went beyond the 
immediate retaliations, and while the involved labour movement was somewhat 
eroded, it undeniably set a milestone within Indian industrial relations, and is still 
remembered as example of brave antagonism.180  
Agitation started on 3rd June 2011, when workers submitted an application to register 
their own, independent union. A ‘yellow’ union, the Maruti Udyog Kamgar Union 
(MUKU) had existed at Maruti since 2000. This was completely controlled by 
management, no election had been held for 10 years, and membership was also 
collected according to a sort of ‘compulsory co-option’ practices. Permanent workers 
who were MUKU members had accumulated dissatisfaction towards the lack of 
democratic representation and the impossibility of voicing their own concerns. When 
the initiative to form an independent organisation became known, management started 
exercising pressure and forcedly seeking workers’ signatures to an undertaking where 
they declared to be part of the old union (PUDR, 2013). Only 10% of the workers 
signed, while the others responded with a sit-in strike inside the plant. This marked the 
beginning of a first occupation, which lasted for 13 days, with around 2000 workers 
sitting inside the factory.181 During this first strike period, workers already expressed 
their demands very clearly: registration of their own union, regularisation of contract 
                                                          
180 Despite the wave of repression, other struggles followed after 2012, with workers openly declaring 
to have been ‘inspired by Maruti’. See for example, Workers’ Solidarity Centre (2014) on the Munjal 
Kiriu’s case.  
181 Permanent, casual and trainees together. They resisted almost two weeks, despite management’s 
deployment of police inside and outside the factory premises, ‘bouncers’ introduced into the plant, 
restriction of water, electricity and toiled facilities, and no food provision. Solidarity groups, composed 
of unions, workers from other companies, families etc. immediately gathered outside. Tool-down strikes 
were also organised in other 60-65 neighbouring factories. Communication with media was instead 
continuously obstructed (read gurgaonworkersnews n. 41).  
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workers, improvement of unacceptable working conditions. On June 17th, management 
and workers reached a first agreement: the company promised to proceed with the 
union registration and to reinstate 11 workers who had been terminated in the 
meantime.182 In the month of July, while negotiations were officially underway, 
management again terminated 4 workers and suspended 6: workers reacted with a tool-
down protest. In the meanwhile, the situation inside the factory was still tense: rhythms 
and workloads continued to be excessive and abuses were still reported (PUDR, 2013; 
GWN, n.41 and 44). In mid-August, the Haryana Labour Department formally rejected 
the application for the new Maruti Suzuki Employees’ Union (MSEU), for apparent 
technical reasons. On August 28th, following a few weeks of ‘underground dispute’, 
the Manesar factory was suddenly invaded by around 400 police officers and illegally 
locked-out.183 Management’s offensive lasted for 33 days, during which a fence was 
erected all around the plant and the whole area kept strictly militarised.  
Throughout this period, Maruti workers built a protest camp outside, while employees 
from Munjal Showa (component supplier for Maruti-Suzuki), Suzuki Powertrain, 
Suzuki Castings and Suzuki Motorcycle organised solidarity strikes (GWN, n.44). In 
an attempt to politically subdue the protesters and prevent further agitation, Maruti’s 
management then started allowing workers in only upon the acceptance and signature 
of a ‘good conduct bond’,184 while operating suspensions, terminations and first 
arrests, especially targeting union members, active workers and those identified as 
leaders. At the same time, while only a minority of workers signed the good conduct 
undertaking and thousands were still protesting outside, the company hired, ad-hoc, 
                                                          
182 While all workers who had been involved in the action were punished with an illegal two-days wage 
deduction per each day of strike. 
183 The whole lock-out was declared a strike and workers’ wages were deducted for the inactivity days.  
184 Imposing quiet behaviour, no disturbing activities during workshift (no singing allowed while on 
duty!), no go slows, no boycott/ sabotage (see gurgaonworkersnews n.44). 
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around 800 new contract workers, in order to replace the ‘striking’ colleagues (PUDR, 
2013; GWN, n.44 and 45). After 33 days, a second agreement was reached, where 
workers finally accepted the good conduct bond, in exchange for the conversion of 44 
terminations into suspensions and the re-employment of 18 trainees who had been 
fired. Surprisingly, when the factory re-opened on October 3rd, management allowed 
only permanent workers in, leaving 1100 - 1200 contract workers outside. Rather than 
silencing the protest, this sort of revengeful behaviour and attempt to break the unity 
between permanent and casual workers that had characterised the struggle since the 
beginning, further inflamed the situation. On October 7th, the workers inside the 
factory, in solidarity with those kept outside, started a second occupation, to demand 
the reinstatement of all contract workers. The three Suzuki plants and other eight auto 
factories immediately followed, rapidly organising solidarity strikes. After eight days, 
on October 14th, police entered the factory premises, closed the canteen and interrupted 
water provision, thus forcing workers to move out. Workers left the plant, but 
continued to protest outside, striking until October 21st (PUDR, 2013; GWN, n.44).  
In the months following the strike, a sort of continued ‘arm wrestling’ took place, with 
the union registration process being dragged out, union members who had led the 
protest being continuously targeted, and the imposition of the ‘independence from 
outside’ conditionality, namely no affiliation to Union Federations.185 In the meantime, 
retaliation for the stoppage took shape: management deducted salary and bonuses for 
the whole period the factory was locked-out, illegally representing it as a strike 
(PUDR, 2013). The Maruti Suzuki Employees’ Union (MSEU) was finally registered 
on 31st January2012, with (permanent) workers’ memberships active since March 
1st.186 During the following months, talks over the ‘Charter of Demands’ presented by 
                                                          
185 Interestingly, this was sought both on management’s and on workers’ side… 
186 According to existing trade union laws, casual workers cannot be union members yet. 
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the workers took place: this addressed issues like excessive pressure and workloads, 
compulsory overtime, end of the imposed incentive scheme. 187 However, despite 
ongoing negotiations, the climate inside the Manesar plant continued to be extremely 
tense: the area was still under police surveillance, the fence still isolated the plant from 
outside,188 working conditions had not substantially improved. On July 18th, the 
‘accident’ that definitively doomed the Maruti struggle, occurred. Following an 
altercation between a worker and a supervisor, apparently started with a casteist abuse 
by the supervisor and a reaction from the worker, the worker was suspended. Within a 
climate of widespread tension, this episode immediately generated a collective 
reaction, workers from the second shift joined the factory, police were called in, 
probably bouncers as well: violence broke out. There was a fire, an HR manager died, 
and several workers were injured. Carpet arrests and violent repression followed the 
accident: since workers had left their accommodation, police started searching across 
all the neighbouring States, in workers’ villages, reportedly harassing families in order 
to find them. Within a month, 546 permanent and 1800 contract workers were 
terminated and almost 150 workers jailed, including all union leaders (ICLR, 2013). 
Although it was proven that arrests were randomly executed189 and no official 
conviction or fair trial were ever conceded, and despite media involvement and 
pressure from outside, 147 workers were kept in jail until March 2015.190 Throughout 
                                                          
187 Honda workers report that these incentive schemes entail the payment of bonuses upon different 
criteria, including performance, discipline, attendance, accidents on the workplace. From a focus group 
held on 31/03/2012. 
188 I visited the Maruti area and the workers’ village in Manesar in April 2012: no outsider could enter 
the plant, police was deployed inside and all around the factory premises, every small gathering was 
monitored as the curfew law was still in force in the whole area.  
189 On this, read ‘The curious case of the alphabetically accused’, on The Hindu, 7/08/2014. It seems 
that due to the arbitrary selection of workers to arrest, the list included also some who were not present 
inside the factory on the day the accident happened.  
190 News from March 2015 report that 81 workers were finally granted a bail of 25,000 INRs, while 
more than 60 are still under detention at the Bhondsi jail in Gurgaon. Read ’77 former Maruti workers 
get bail’ (Business Standard, 17/03/2015) and ’81 Maruti Suzuki workers granted bail’ (IndustriALL, 
20/03/2015). 
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their detention, violence, torture and abuses were repeatedly reported (see The Hindu, 
26/09/2012; ICLR, 2013).  
 
Pic. 6 and 7: Maruti Suzuki plant in Manesar, Gurgaon 
 
 
Source: Taken by the author during a visit to the Manesar area in april 2012. 
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Having briefly reported the dynamics and main phases of a strike that was undeniably 
unprecedented, for its duration, scope and intensity, it is important to highlight what 
makes the case so relevant, before proceeding with a more theoretical and political 
analysis. First, the Maruti protest, and the cycle of struggles that characterised the NCR 
since 2000, proved the relative avail of greenfield strategies pursued by capital. 
Providing that the location in a newly industrialised area, with scarce union 
interference and a less politically experienced workforce guaranteed initial industrial 
peace, this only lasted for a limited period of time. Second, the composition of the 
workforce who engaged in the Maruti strike was particularly meaningful: despite the 
young age, the scarce political experience, the vulnerability related to the casual 
working status, they revealed awareness, courage and determination. The extent to 
which they developed a collective consciousness will be further discussed in the next 
section. Labour composition also relates to the following two points. Third, the 
outstanding participation of casual and contract workers and the exceptional solidarity 
between permanent and casual workers were also unique. These contradicted all 
expectations that the insecurity of temporary, contract positions could act as a deterrent 
against organising, and that the differences in status might impede the creation of 
political bonds. Fourth, and in relation to this, the Maruti struggle was of particular 
significance as it proved how the strategies deployed by capital to control labour, by 
keeping it fragmented191 and obstructing its politicisation, did not prevent conflict. 
Fifth, the Maruti struggle actually signalled an intensification of the industrial conflict 
in the area, whereby actions taken and practices employed were particularly powerful 
and long-lasting. Specifically, the second occupation after the protracted lockout was 
                                                          
191 Not only through the imposition of different employment relations and working statuses, but through 
all the hiring practices. See for example, composition of workers per place of origin, language spoken 
etc. in chapter 5.  
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a symptom of strength, willingness to resist, and bravery. Sixth, however, the Maruti 
strike was not only unprecedented in terms of labour organising, but also as far as 
management repression was concerned. In this sense, facing the inability to prevent 
conflict and even to manage it while underway, capital displayed resilience only 
through the use of – disproportionate – force. The abuses reported by the International 
Commission for Labor Rights (ICLR, 2013) are particularly revealing in this regard. 
The prolonged detention without fair trial, the harassment, beating, torture of jailed 
workers and sometimes of their families, suggest a use of violence that goes beyond 
the simple disregard of labour rights, rather flowing into overt violation of human 
rights. Finally, the Maruti case was paradigmatic in the way management and state 
institutions jointly intervened to silence the protest. On this matter, the Haryana State’s 
position ranged from express connivance with capital, while tolerating labour rights 
violations and anti-union behaviours, to acting as ‘agent of capital’,192 through the 
direct authorisation of police repression and unjustifiable punitive measures.  
Overall, what has emerged in the Maruti case is a full institutionalisation of violence 
and repression, on the grounds of the economic interests of an expanding 
manufacturing hub.193 In this sense, NCR industrial relations have deviated towards a 
complete by-partite system, with no room for mediation within a capital – labour open 
conflict.194 Indeed, considering the premises on which the ‘Maruti revolution’ was 
introduced, praising the harmonious and collaborative industrial relations that would 
                                                          
192 From an interview with NTUI representative, 1/03/2012. 
193 Hence not only the promises of containing labour unrest to avoid discouraging foreign investors, but 
also the continuous threats of ‘moving to Gujarat’, where industrial conflict is practically absent (and 
the State-Capital association is even more solid). 
194 In the sense that Capital and State constitute an only, compact front. From the words of a Labour 
Department official quoted in Roychowdhury (2010:186), ‘The government is now, at best, a neutral 
onlooker; the outcome of an industrial dispute therefore depends on the relative power of management 
and labour. In most cases, the power of management is determined by the fact that they now have access 
to contract labour, outsourcing and so on’. 
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have reigned within the new lean factory, such outcome appears to utterly contradict 
the effective consistency of the Japanese model. 
 
Pic. 8: Maruti Suzuki workers the day MSEU registration was announced 
 
Source: International Commission for Labor Rights (ICLR, 2013:3) 
 
 
6.3 A political analysis of the Maruti struggle: on class formation, autonomy and 
institutions 
 
For the purposes of the present research, our interest is reflecting on the political 
subjectivity of the labour movement emerged in Gurgaon, and on the way this related 
to pre-existing labour institutions. With such an aim, we will attempt to inscribe the 
Maruti struggle within a process of class formation, and then dwell upon the way 
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existing unions dealt with Maruti’s ‘spontaneism’ and on the outcomes of the strike. 
In this sense, the analysis of the role labour institutions played within the Maruti 
struggle is particularly revealing as it discloses major weaknesses of the Indian union 
movement, due to their embeddedness in a wider structure of political relations that 
prevents them from adequately supporting the grassroots needs of the working class 
(on this approach, see Miyamura, 2012). 
With respect to class formation, two premises are necessary. First, although Labour 
Studies of Marxian inspiration have manifested a renewed interest towards the ‘making 
and re-making’ of working classes following neoliberal globalisation of production 
(see for example, Silver, 2014), we agree with Selwyn (2012) that these do not 
sufficiently account for working class agency within the process of capitalist 
development. Silver’s (2014) theory that working class is ‘made, unmade and remade’ 
through capital-labour conflict that perpetually ‘follows’ capital, for example, is not 
completely convincing. Although it is possible that capital strategies – like industrial 
re-location for example – trigger or accelerate processes of class formation, we find 
Silver’s theorisation of working class formation as rather depriving the working class 
of its revolutionary subjectivity and its power to determine the direction taken by 
capitalist development itself. In this regard, we more closely embrace the 
conceptualisation of working class agency as elaborated by Italian Autonomist 
Marxists, discussed in chapter one (see Tronti, 2006; 2010). Drawing on a different 
literature, closer to the political Marxism of Brenner and Wood, and on Thomson, 
Selwyn (2012) rightly points to the need for analysing class formation outside of pre-
determined categories, looking at material determinations that allow organised 
workers to consciously shape the social relations of production they are embedded in. 
In relation to our case, this means that we not only remain unconvinced by an idea of 
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class formation seen as a process induced by capital-fixes à la Silver, but also that we 
don’t believe in a global trend that can equally inform working class struggle and 
formation. While capital certainly adopts global strategies, as we tried to show when 
discussing lean production, and labour may build global bridges, class formation 
depends on local labour regimes and institutional settings. Moreover, always in line 
with a workerist approach, we see capital strategies and capitalist development as 
provoked by working class advancement, as a political reaction to re-balance political 
and economic power ‘from above’ whereby working class struggle has shaken the 
terrain ‘from below’.  
The second premise relates to why we select class as a dominant form of identity that 
has brought NCR workers together, despite the Indian context being so variegated and 
marked by multiple layers of differentiation. This is based on both theoretical and 
empirical considerations. On one side, from a Marxist perspective, class is identified 
as main determinant of social relations (see Poulantzas, 1975); on the other, 
considering the specific context, class has proven to be the principal unifying ground, 
beyond caste, geographical belonging or other sources of identity.  
With reference to the NCR, the Maruti struggle has undoubtedly disclosed a process 
of working class formation and of  the development of a collective consciousness. This 
has occurred despite the absence of a rooted working class tradition, in a recently 
industrialised area. It has occurred despite a labour composition based on multiple 
lines of fragmentation (see also chapter 5), purposely reinforced by capital strategies 
aimed at preventing labour organising. And, as we will shortly argue, it has occurred 
autonomously, before the political interference of pre-existing unions and without 
external ‘guidance’ of institutional structures. Overall, we believe the process of 
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working class formation in the area – emerged with particular strength through the 
Maruti struggle, has been informed by four main factors.  
First, the evident mismatch between the Japanese system of production based on the 
principles of lean manufacturing, and the local working and living conditions (see 
chapter 5). The blind assumption that the same system could be integrally applied in 
the Indian NCR, without experiencing glitches or resistance, has simply proven wrong. 
The imposition of extremely hard working conditions, added to such poor living 
conditions, was simply unsustainable in the long run. The teamwork philosophy, 
installed upon factory hierarchies and the abuses of the contract system, has simply 
failed. Overall, the blatant exploitation of the factory regime resulted much stronger 
than corporate rhetoric, thus facilitating the development of a collective awareness of 
unjust working conditions and uneven power relations.  
The second factor pertains to the very existence of a labour regime built on increasing 
casualisation and on the indiscriminate use of contract labour. Employed in part as a 
cost-cutting strategy, but above all as a means to politically control labour, the 
extensive contractualisation, and the abuses of the system, have revealed such a deep 
level of inequality, exploitation, institutionalised harassment, that labour has come 
together to denounce it, rather than staying fragmented along its lines. In this sense, 
capital has failed.  
Third, working class formation has been shaped by a mismatch in consumption 
patterns. Exposed to increasing costs of social reproduction, within a geographical area 
where the proximity to the shining, consumerist India is driving prices up, working 
class’ purchasing power is becoming lower and lower, leading to increasing 
frustrations and clashing aspirations. Working class living standards, as opposed to 
booming middle class aspirations, have generated explosive discontent.  
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Finally, what has progressively compacted a working class front and welded a 
common identity, has been state – management connivance in the use of violence and 
in the modalities of repression. Whereby any tri-partitism in industrial relations has 
practically collapsed, while labour and human rights violations have been tolerated, 
capital-labour conflict has remained the only battlefield, thus contributing to reinforce 
working class identity.  
Asserting that industrial conflict and labour struggles in the NCR have enabled the 
development of a working class consciousness, also leads us to take a defined stance 
within the debate about spontaneism vs institutions. In our view, and in line with a 
workerist approach as expressed for example by Bologna (1977; Cuninghame, 2000. 
See chapter 1), Maruti’s spontaneism has not indicated lack of organisation or political 
immaturity, but rather a conscious autonomous position articulating an independent 
political identity and the rejection of traditional forms of organisation and 
representation. In this sense, even identifying a union as the only possible structure to 
deliver their demands, Maruti workers have strenuously defended its independence, 
refusing both management and traditional unions’ interference (read also GWN, n.61). 
Comparing their struggle with experiences in the past, Maruti workers’ request for the 
recognition of an independent union might recall the Comitati Unitari di Base (CUB) 
experience in the Italian factories during the 1970s (see chapter 1). Their initial 
enthusiasm for the union, rather than indicating moderation and institutional 
compromise, was actually a sign of strong political identity, whereby it was the symbol 
of victory and unity in struggle (see GWN, n.61). Contrary to the interpretations 
provided by established unions, we also see practiced adopted – including the violent 
peak that led to the 18th July’s accident – as expression of conscious anger, collective 
strength and solidarity, rather than a manifestation of inexperience and immature 
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organisation. Unfortunately, the July accident did represent a setback, and the 
following repression definitely weakened what had been a powerful and courageous 
movement. Such an outcome was due to several reasons, which have to be inscribed 
into the relationship with existing labour institutions, and require us to at least briefly 
outline the background.  
In our view, the institutionalisation195 of an autonomous movement is not a sufficient, 
nor a strictly necessary, step towards the success of a struggle. In this regard, we 
disagree with Tronti’s autonomy of the political as justification of unavoidable 
entryism (see Tronti 2006; 2010; CRS, 2011; Monaco, 2015). Not sufficient, because 
in the absence of a strong class-based identity and grass-roots organisation, the essence 
of a struggle might be dissolved within a mere bureaucratic apparatus, thus being 
doomed to fail. Not necessary, whereby if an autonomous movement manages to 
solidify its modus vivendi196 by enlarging its base or by properly defending an 
independent union or association, the incorporation within a broader political 
structure, which also risks diluting its original identity, may be superfluous or even 
counter-productive. This said, the Maruti movement probably failed to acquire a 
sufficiently solid modus vivendi or to generalise the struggle to the extent that might 
have helped to resist external institutional pressure. However, it is also true that the 
accident of July 18th provided a pretext for a closer intervention of established unions, 
thus dispelling the movement’s original autonomous power.  
Overall, had the existing institutional structure been different, the Maruti movement 
could have probably avoided such a setback. What happened instead was that the 
                                                          
195 Meant as incorporation into broader, pre-existing institutional settings. In this case, the affiliation of 
the MSEU to National Union Federations.  
196 On this, I had the pleasure to have a very inspiring discussion with the Indian Labour Historian Dilip 
Simeon, on 18/12/2014 at SOAS. On working class formation and identity within a similar case, 
although far back in time and occurred in the Indian State of Bihar, see Simeon, 2010.  
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weaknesses of the established union movement interfered with the struggle 
developments, to the extent that management could eventually determine its outcome 
and the strongest potentialities of the movement were not sufficiently grasped.  
In our view, given the existing union structure, there are currently two major 
constraints that prevent working class struggles in India from being successful, and 
that have also played a substantial role in the Maruti case. One is of legal nature, the 
other is predominantly political. The legal barrier lies in the current legislation that 
still does not allow casual workers to obtain union membership. Either in the case of 
an independent union or in case of affiliation to a national organisation, the political 
unity and the solidarity bonds that may emerge on the ground, practically dissolve 
within formal employment relations, denying casual workers the access to official 
representation and negotiation processes. This, considering the substantial proportion 
of casual workers within the sector (and in the country’s labour market overall), 
definitely represents a major obstacle.  
Second, probably the main hindrance that also affects spontaneous working class 
movements, even when they reveal a strong autonomous character like in the Maruti 
case, is the political structure of the current trade union movement in India. As it 
currently stands, the trade union scenario is dominated by a few, large, union 
federations, or Central Trade Union Organisations (CTUOs), and a myriad of 
‘independent’ unions, born out of plant-level disputes or localised issues, not affiliated 
to any national centre, for a total number of 18602 registered unions across the country 
(GoI, 2010). The five main union federations are the Indian National Trade Union 
Congress (INTUC), the All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC), the Bharatiya 
Mazdoor Sangh (BMS), the Hind Mazdoor Sabha (HMS), and the Centre of Indian 
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Trade Unions (CITU), all declaring a membership of above 3 million.197 The main 
issue posed by national union federations has been their strong affiliation with political 
parties,198 which has deeply affected both their policy orientation and the relation with 
their members. Indeed, at least at national level,199 their party line has dictated policies 
much more concerned with their political electorate than with grass-roots needs, 
largely causing a detachment from proper working class issues (see Jha, 2008; Shyam 
Sundar, 2008, 2010; Hensman, 2010, 2011; Janardhan, 2008; Sarkar, 2008).  
This has provoked, in turn, fragmentation of the support provided to spontaneous 
movements, rivalries, together with the consequent proliferation of independent 
unions, seeking to contain both management pressure and national federations’ 
interference (see Hensman, 2011; Sarkar, 2008). The latter phenomenon, which has 
been particularly growing in the past twenty years, while leading to the progressive 
erosion of central bargaining mechanisms and contributing to a further fragmentation 
of the union movement,200 has also represented a sort of ‘democratic push’, overall 
bringing the focus back to grass-roots demands (Hensman, 2011).  
Another major weakness, linked to the legal constraint highlighted above, is the 
substantial incapacity of national union federations to deal with informalisation issues 
and the needs of the fast-expanding number of casual workers (Shyam Sundar, 2008). 
Without dwelling further upon the weaknesses of the current union movement in India 
                                                          
197 There are huge discrepancies between verified and declared membership of all major unions. Figures 
beyond 3 million were verified by the Ministry of Labour through a survey whose results were released 
in 2008. Since then, CTUOs have declared much higher membership. See Jha, 2008; GoI, 2010; 
Business Standard, 2013.  
198 INTUC is linked to the Congress Party, BMS to the BJP, HMS to the Indian Socialist Party, AITUC 
to the Communist Party of India (CPI) and CITU to the Marxist fringe of the Communist Party (CPI-
M).  
199 I have perceived slightly different approaches comparing national offices and local offices (ex. Delhi 
office / Gurgaon branch), with local branches lightly more sensitive to ground disputes. However, policy 
lines are determined at the top.  
200 The only noteworthy attempt to keep the independency from party-lines while seeking to coordinate 
smaller, independent unions is the establishment of the New Trade Union Initiative (NTUI) in 2006. 
This seems to have already surpassed 1 million members.  
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and on what would be necessary for its renewal,201 it is interesting to note how these 
constraints also emerged within the Maruti ‘conflict – management’. While the initial 
enthusiasm towards the scope and the power of the spontaneous agitation led all major 
union federations present in the area to ‘race for the affiliation’, aiming at absorbing 
the Maruti militancy within their rank-and-file, during the later stages of the strike the 
scenario had completely changed.  
When the July’s accident occurred, the different political and ideological orientation 
of the union federations immediately translated into different degrees of violence 
condemnation, with few exceptions.202 Despite following support provided in defence 
of the jailed workers and in the quest for a fair investigation of the case, the original 
involvement largely faded away, and the Maruti workers were broadly depicted as 
‘young, inexperienced, immature militants’, who had failed because of the refusal of 
external guidance.203  
Overall, this revealed a profound incomprehension of the working class autonomy 
demonstrated by the Maruti movement, of the scope of their demands, as well as of 
the depth of the anger they expressed. Indeed, an adequate understanding of the 
independent power of the Maruti workers would have also required a thorough self-
criticism, which none of the national federations showed to possess (read on this, 
GWN, n.61). At the same time, the way established unions failed to properly follow 
up on the Maruti demands, revealed an incapacity to grasp the ‘golden opportunity’ 
provided by the extraordinary unity between permanent and casual workers and the 
exceptional involvement of contract workers. For Maruti workers, a deeper 
understanding of the scope of their struggle and a more substantive class solidarity 
                                                          
201 For a wider debate on trade unions renewal, read Cohen, 2014 and Gillan & Biyanwila, 2009. 
202 See CTUs, 2011. On the opposite side, Global Suzuki, 2012. 
203 This emerged very clearly during the all-trade unions’ roundtable discussion on Maruti, held at the 
CSD, Delhi, 23/08/2012. 
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would have meant a more robust protective network when facing hostilities. A 
stronger, more sensible alliance among established unions would have particularly 
helped when the accident occurred and throughout the workers’ detention period. At 
least to shed light and catch outside attention towards the utter violations that were 
being perpetuated. Indeed, besides localised support, the case fell silent for the past 
two years, until bails were recently conceded.204 Overall, for a stronger and more 
effective labour organisation within the current institutional settings, a complete 
rethinking of established unions’ policy orientations and strategies would be needed, 
which should include not a de-politicisation but a party de-linking (see Janardhan, 
2008), together with a renewed working class-based, grass-roots approach, and a more 
resolute inclusion of casual workers. Without these, the institutional incorporation of 
autonomous movements still appears neither sufficient nor strictly necessary for the 
advancement of the Indian working class.  
Concluding remarks 
Analysing the development trajectory of the National Capital Region strongly requires 
to look at the labour struggles that have accompanied its industrial growth. These are 
read here not as a mere consequence of capital strategies, but as an integral part and 
an inner contradiction that lie inside capitalist development, whose steps are largely 
induced by working class advancement itself. The key importance of struggles within 
capitalist development is highlighted by Tronti (2006), when he claims that 
‘knowledge is tied to struggle’. Indeed, labour struggles are a clear indicator of 
systemic issues and power balances – so much that their investigation may help 
                                                          
204 These are overall comments, differences between different unions who intervened in the case partly 
apply. 
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disclosing the entire politico-economic architecture of historically determined 
development processes. In our case, the analysis of NCR struggles has helped 
unveiling the real – exploitative – working conditions the ‘Maruti lean model’ rests 
upon, capital strategies of labour control based on fierce anti-union behaviour, on the 
abuses of the contract labour system and on brutal repression, and the tight alliance 
between state and capital aimed at preserving the system from ‘political threats’.205 
More than all the previous protests, the Maruti struggle powerfully signalled the main 
contradictions the system is built on. In addition, the Maruti case is one of the most 
interesting examples of development of a working class consciousness and of rejection 
of traditional institutional settings and modes of political representation that India has 
witnessed in the past few decades. Despite its bitter conclusion, it can undoubtedly 
provide lessons to the whole union movement and to future struggles in India.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
205 On the abuses of the contract labour system and on state-capital violence, read also AITUC 
publications from 2012.  
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Conclusions 
 
What you read here is the story of a conflict. A conflict epitomising the 
contradictions of an industrial development model seeking to comply with global 
capital strategies by taking advantage of a local labour regime. A conflict that 
unveils some of the vulnerabilities of the fast-growing Indian giant and of its 
apparent competitive advantages. A conflict that reveals how capital attempts to 
control labour, even when pursuing the most aggressive strategies and securing 
powerful allies, may fail. A conflict that tells how labour, through struggle, 
becomes an autonomous political subject, emerging as a vehicle of antagonism 
within the system. A conflict that lays bare the weaknesses of institutional 
mediation and representation. A conflict whose lessons go well beyond its bitter 
outcome. 
In this work, conflict is interpreted as a crucial moment disclosing the actual power 
relations shaping a development process. As such, it becomes the main terrain of 
analysis, and the primary research site to develop an understanding of the 
overarching power structures that determine the direction development takes. 
Here, following Tronti’s seminal thought (2006; 2009), development is interpreted 
as a reactive formation, where material settings lead to the formation of an 
autonomous class consciousness, driving working class towards revolutionary 
action, and capital strategies are predominantly a reaction aimed at politically 
controlling labour, at neutralising it in order to manage conflict. Within Tronti’s 
Copernican revolution, in this sense, an irreconcilable dialectical conflict is 
triggered by the working class not simply in setting the development trajectory, 
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but in posing a limit to capital. In his view, capital follows, to the extent that its 
moves are, in their essence, nothing but political attempts to control labour. What 
we find, and embrace, is not a reductionist effort to determine where capitalist 
development begins, who sets the process in motion, but rather a perspective aimed 
at giving working class full revolutionary subjectivity, within a political 
interpretation of corporate strategies as imbued with ideological patterns. This is 
Tronti’s actual overturning, a reversal of interpretative keys and assigned political 
subjectivities centred around the primacy of the working class (2006, 2009). 
Thus, inspired by Tronti’s approach and in line with a workerist perspective, the 
investigated industrial conflict is explored here through the lens of the working 
class. Overall, working class struggle is expressly seen as source of knowledge, 
necessary for both a reading of capitalist development and for the translation of 
theory into revolutionary practice. In this sense, Tronti’s (2006) thesis that 
‘knowledge is tied to struggle’ becomes the key principle informing both the 
methodological approach and the theoretical perspective adopted in the present 
research. Along compatible lines, the methodology chosen, which allows us to 
combine a theoretical interpretation based on the ‘point of view’,262 and research 
methods aiming at gathering workers’ knowledge, is the workers’ inquiry. Inspired 
by the original workerist practice defined by Panzieri in the early 1960s (see 
Panzieri, 1976), the use of a workers’ inquiry is meant to facilitate the collection 
of workers’ voices and direct testimonies, in order to analyse class composition, 
struggle dynamics, and ultimately capital-labour relations. Indeed, the decision to 
conduct a workers’ inquiry responds to several calls. Not only it complies with the 
                                                          
262 Practice of the ‘point of view’, that of the working class, leading to a ‘partisan reading of reality’ 
through which the dynamics of the capitalist system are then interpreted (Tronti, 2006; 2009). 
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expressed need of ‘grounding’ a labour study in the material existence of an 
historically and socially determined working class, but also fits within a 
reconsideration of the role of the labour scholar within current academic research. 
In this sense, the choice of a workers’ inquiry voices the need of overcoming the 
political separation between researcher and researched, to jointly produce the 
knowledge necessary for the formulation of a revolutionary political action. More 
than in other forms of grounded action research, a workerism-inspired inquiry 
aims at shaping an intellectual that is not only organic to the working class he/she 
engages with, but fully embraces the political motivations and the objectives of the 
struggle itself.263 
Following the original workerist example, the workers’ inquiry applied in this 
research allowed to firstly map labour composition in the NCR, and then to use the 
picture obtained as a basis for the interpretation of struggles occurred in the area. 
In particular, the analysis of labour composition in the industrial setting 
investigated facilitated the understanding of ongoing processes of class formation. 
It crucially informed the study of the motivations underlying the struggle analysed, 
and of the relations between different actors involved in the industrial conflict. 
Ultimately, at a broader level of analysis, this methodology also helped reflecting 
on the relationship between the autonomous labour movement emerged in the 
NCR, and the existing labour institutions.  
Building on the findings from the present research, we can derive important 
theoretical and political conclusions.  
                                                          
263 For further insights on the debate on participatory action research and the need of pursuing an 
engaged public sociology of work, refer to Stewart and Martìnez-Lucio, 2011; Brook, 2013; Ram, 
Edwards, Jones, Kiselinchev, Muchenje, 2014. 
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Firstly, through an analysis of labour composition, of working and living 
conditions, and of struggles in the NCR, we can have a clear indication of capital 
strategies within the Indian Auto sector. These may contribute to a wider study of 
lean manufacturing practices within the global Auto industry, by shedding useful 
light upon the global/local nexus that characterises both the functioning and the 
limitations of this paradigm. Indeed, an analysis of corporate strategies within the 
Indian Auto industry can not only help debunking myths associated with the lean 
production rhetoric, but also provide some evidence about why lean does not work, 
and where lean may fail. In particular, this study may help disclosing the distance 
between the technical advancement established through the introduction of lean 
manufacturing and management techniques, and the ideological discourse it rests 
upon. Indeed, once the latter is unveiled, whereby the material conditions 
experienced by the working class crash against the lean rhetorical apparatus, the 
possibility itself to politically control labour in undermined. This erodes capital’s 
ability to build a hegemonic regime based on workers’ consent and involvement, 
core pillars of the lean paradigm.  
Secondly, by specifically looking at the Maruti case, we can not only derive 
political lessons for the broader Indian labour movement, but also draw some 
theoretical conclusions on working class formation and struggle, and on the 
relation between spontaneism and organisation (see Bologna, 1977).  
Finally, through an assessment of the way union organisations intervened in the 
Maruti ‘conflict management’ we can also outline some of the characteristics of 
the broader scenario of the current union movement in India.  
 When analysing management and production strategies within the global Auto 
industry, we defined the dominant lean production paradigm as a form of 
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hegemonic control that, resting on specific modalities of labour subordination, 
allowed capital to reverse the labour standards achieved under the Fordist regime 
(see Charron and Stewart, 2004), by perpetuating a systematic ‘ideological assault’ 
upon organised labour (Stewart et al.2009). Building on Miliband (1989) and 
Burawoy (1985), the worldwide promotion of a lean manufacturing model was 
also interpreted as a global manifestation of class struggle from above, aiming to 
subsume working classes through the rhetoric of consent. In practice, the global 
advancement of the lean production paradigm, presented as a universal recipe 
endowed with unconditional validity, has been possible only through the 
exploitation of local labour regimes and local institutional settings. In this sense, 
without favourable local conditions, lean proves to have no universal applicability, 
nor predictable success. The ‘variability gap’ linked to the global/local nexus, also 
brings to the factors that might potentially cause glitches in the acceptance of the 
lean model, and ultimately lead to the impossibility of building an hegemonic 
discourse. Provided that the innovations the lean system entails in terms of 
management and production techniques require specific forms of labour 
subordination aimed at securing consent, two factors seem to particularly affect its 
functioning. One is the local class composition, which can influence the way lean 
is ‘welcomed’. Specifically, class composition crucially implies different degrees 
of resistance to the model introduced. The other factor is the specific labour regime 
on which managerial and manufacturing innovations are nested. Indeed, this 
determines the sustainability of the model in the long run. In the light of the case 
analysed, all this was particularly evident.  
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The lean manufacturing system was introduced in India through the revolutionary 
partnership between the Indian Maruti and the Japanese Suzuki in the early 1980s. 
Such collaboration marked the diffusion of new production techniques based on 
the concepts of teamwork, continuous improvement, on the optimisation of 
working times and spaces in order to guarantee higher flexibility. As our survey 
reported, with reference to the NCR, in practice this involved strict supervision on 
the assembly line, tough rhythms, heavy workloads and uncomfortable working 
spaces. In practice, ‘consent’ to hard working and harsh living conditions was 
achieved through a wide set of means aimed at keeping labour fragmented and 
depoliticised. One was the deployment of a very specific workforce, expected to 
stay silent and unorganised. In this sense, the process of hiring young, politically 
inexperienced, ‘ambitious’264 workers, yet less capable to communicate and unite 
due to profound differences in origin and status (see chapter 5 and 6), expressly 
served this purpose. Another means adopted by capital to politically control labour 
was the widespread use (and abuse) of the contract labour system. Other than 
representing a solution to reduce labour costs and to easily adjust labour 
quantities,265 this proved to be an essentially political strategy to prevent labour 
from organising. This was based on the assumption that the distinct separation 
between permanent and casual workers would have impeded the formation of 
bridges, and on the impossibility for casual workers to become unionised. The 
political nature of the use of casual labour vividly emerged in the aftermath of all 
the major NCR struggles. Following the strikes in fact, management extensively 
replaced dismissed permanent workers with their - more convenient - casual 
                                                          
264 Due to the wider expectations of a highly educated workforce, - in theory – committed to improve 
their working and living conditions to the extent of not risking any political exposure (see chapter 5 and 
6). 
265 See Moody (1997) on numerical flexibility, chapter 2. 
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counterparts – in a process that we could define as ‘casualisation by substitution’. 
Furthermore, once the recent Maruti protest was repressed, the company 
progressively supplanted previous contract workers with new ‘company 
casuals’.266 Publicised as a move to limit the employment of contract workers and 
their continuous in-sourcing, this strategy was instead a way to maintain the 
advantages of casual labour while exercising more direct control upon it.267 
Finally, capital also attempted to contain labour conflicts through the deployment 
of an openly anti-union strategy. This manifested through the continuous 
obstructionism towards existing unions; through systematic attempts at hindering 
the formation of new unions; and, again, through a politics of recruitment expressly 
targeting not-unionised, casual workers.  
However, overall, capital strategies aimed at controlling labour by keeping it 
fragmented and depoliticised, have not worked in the NCR. The labour 
composition engineered by capital has not acted as a deterrent against labour 
organising, whilst actually leading to the progressive formation of a collective 
political consciousness. The labour regime on which the lean model was 
implemented, and the contract labour system in particular, have neither guaranteed 
the flexibility sought by capital, nor helped capital preventing conflict. Actually, 
the use and abuse of the contract labour system has instead powerfully revealed 
the unsustainability of the ‘Indian version of the lean paradigm’. In fact, crucially, 
when mechanisms of labour subordination stop functioning, lean may fail. As 
without consent, all the myths built to sustain the ‘hegemonic discourse’ inevitably 
collapse. 
                                                          
266  Casual, but directly hired from the company and not through a contractor. See Gurgaon Workers’ 
News n. 61. 
267  From an interview with M. Abraham, leader of the 2000 Maruti strike. Delhi, 26/08/2012.  
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From our analysis of labour composition and struggles in the NCR, and from our 
interpretation of the Maruti strike in particular, we can also derive significant 
theoretical and political lessons in terms of working class formation and 
organising. Indeed, the strong character and the determination the emerging labour 
movement showed, which reached its highest peaks during the recent Maruti 
struggle, signals the significant rise in class consciousness by NCR workers and, 
arguably, the consolidation of a new political subjectivity. This was achieved 
despite the scarce tradition of political organisation in the area and without the 
initial guidance of established labour institutions. In this sense, the Maruti case 
proves how a process of class formation may be triggered autonomously, 
regardless of external influence, depending on material circumstances allowing the 
development of collective thought and action. Within our context, in our view, four 
main factors led to a common understanding of shared exploitative conditions, 
which then turned into action. First, there was an evident mismatch between the 
corporate rhetoric on lean production, and the actually lived working experiences. 
Second, there was an extensive, abusive deployment of casual labour. Third, 
workers experienced a growing gap between desired consumption patterns and 
effective possibilities of social reproduction. Fourth, workers developed a sense of 
unity against both capital and the State, as both formed a strong coalition to repress 
struggles through violent means (see chapter 6).  
Overall, a collective class-consciousness emerged despite capital strategies 
intended to fragment, control, and depoliticise labour, in an area where it was not 
expected to emerge, and from a workforce that was not supposed to organise. Most 
importantly, workers’ collective awareness of their own exploitation and their firm 
resolution to take action overcame the barriers imposed by extensive casualisation. 
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The separation between permanent and casual workers and the actual, greater 
vulnerability of the latter did not prevent the formation of strong solidarity bonds. 
In a sense, despite the violent repression that followed the strike, and State-capital 
connivance in abusing labour and human rights, this was Maruti’s happy story. A 
story that sets an important precedent in the history of the Indian working class, 
but that can also provide inspiring lessons for labour organising in general.  
The strong and independent character displayed by the Maruti movement also 
prompts some necessary reflections on the relation between spontaneism and 
institutions. In this regard, we interpreted Maruti’s ‘spontaneous revolt’ not as an 
indicator of disorganisation or political immaturity, but as a sign of political 
independence and autonomy, and of conscious rejection of traditional mechanisms 
of union representation. After such a spontaneous revolt, facing severe managerial 
attacks, and not adequately supported by formally recognised labour organisations, 
the movement failed to generalise its struggle, solidify its modus vivendi, and 
sustain its original autonomy. In similar cases, the institutionalisation of 
spontaneous movements, i.e. the incorporation into established labour 
organisations, may be an option, in order to facilitate the continuation of a struggle 
and help avoiding unwanted outcomes. However, as we have argued, such 
institutionalisation is neither sufficient, nor strictly necessary. It is not sufficient, 
because in the absence of strong class-based and grass roots organisations, the 
political essence of a struggle and its autonomous character might dissolve, and 
get absorbed within a merely bureaucratic apparatus. It is also not strictly 
necessary, because whereas a movement manages to solidify its modus vivendi and 
develop a strongly independent form of organisation, the incorporation within a 
broader union structure might dilute its identity and original demands; a move that 
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may even be counter-productive. In this regard, we disagree with both Tronti’s 
autonomy of the political (Tronti, 2006; 2010; CRS, 2011; Monaco, 2015) and 
Negri’s autonomy of the social (see Corradi, 2011; Negri, 2007; Turchetto, 2008), 
as both may lead to either an a priori advocacy of entryism, or to the justification 
of an unrealistic detachment from the political sphere. In this sense, the success of 
an autonomous movement depends on a balance between the conservation of a 
strong, independent class identity, and the consideration of the broader political 
structure in which this identity is embedded. Knowledge of the institutional setting 
and the creation of wider solidarity networks may help facing periods of crisis or 
peaks of violent repression, whilst avoiding self-destructing mechanisms able to 
affect the political potential of working class movements.  
The question of the potential institutionalisation of spontaneous movements also 
leads to an assessment of the current status of labour organisations in India. As we 
argued when discussing the inadequate union intervention within the Maruti case, 
we also addressed some of the main reasons behind their weaknesses and political 
blindness. We traced these in their high fragmentation, in their political affiliation 
to national parties, and in their substantial incapacity to deal with processes of 
casualisation. These have generated a progressive detachment from working class 
demands, and a diffused inability to incorporate current challenges affecting the 
Indian labour movement. In this sense, in order to effectively renew their mandate 
and to strengthen their political leverage, Indian unions should follow three main 
directions. First, they should consider a substantial de-politicisation, not in terms 
of dilution of their ideological apparatus, but in terms of a de-linking from the 
strong party-logic that still too often prevails over workers’ needs (see Janardhan, 
2008). In this sense, a defined ideological character and a strong political 
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background may be an asset only to the extent that they do not prevent the 
organisation to properly represent the working class constituency. Whereby the 
party-logic obscures the workers’ original mandate, the union structure has lost its 
significance and its possibility to gain legitimacy. Therefore, secondly, union 
organisations should go back to a more defined class-based, grass-roots approach, 
getting closer to their base. Third, they should develop mechanisms for a proper 
inclusion of issues related to casual workers. Until then, workers will keep bravely 
fighting alone, but unfortunately many golden opportunities for the advancement 
of the Indian working class will still be wasted.  
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Appendix A 
 
Questionnaire about Working and Living Conditions in the 
Automotive Sector – NCR  
 
Dear Workers,  
This questionnaire is part of a PhD field research on Working/ Living Conditions and 
Labour Practices in the Automotive Sector, NCR. All the answers will be kept confidential 
and the questionnaire will be kept anonymous. Your information will be restricted to be 
used in this research only. To answer the questions, either put a tick in the appropriate 
box(es), or write your answer in the spaces provided. You can choose to answer either in 
English or in Hindi, in both cases please write clearly in order to facilitate the following 
transcription/ translation. Thank you very much for your time and your collaboration.  
 
मह प्रश्नावरी ऩी.एच.डी पील्ड रयसचच का एक हहस्सा हैं. सबी जवाफ औय प्रश्नावरी गोऩनीम याखी जामेगी. 
आऩके द्वाया डी हुई जानकायी ससपच रयसचच हेतु उऩमोग कक जामेगी. अऩने उत्तय देने के सरए सही 
का ननशान रगाएॊ मा दी हुइ खरी जगह भें सरखें. अऩने उत्तय आऩ हहॊदी मा अॊॊगे्रजी ककसी बी बाषा भें 
दे सकते हैं. कृऩमा अऩने उत्तय सपाई से सरखे ताके वो फाद भें आसानी से ऩढ़े जा सकें . आऩके भूल्मवान 
सभम औय सहमोग के सरए धन्मवाद.  
 
 
A) Personal Details  
 
1) Gender: □ Male □ Female  सरॊग : ऩुरुष □ स्री □  
2) Age: उम्र 
_______________________________________________________________________
___  
3) Place of Origin:  Hometown जन्भस्थान 
__________________________________________________  
 
District जजरा __________________State/Territory याज्म/ प्रदेश 
_______________________________ 
 
4) Language Spoken: □ English □ Hindi □ Other बाषा : अॊॊगे्रजी □ हहॊदी □ अन्म □  
_______________________________________________________________________
_____________  
5) Status: □ Married □ Unmarried □ Widowed वववाहहत □ अवववाहहत □ ववधवा □  
6) Family: □ No Children □ With Children, ऩरयवाय : फचे्च □ फचे्च नहीॊ  
 
Number सॊख्मा 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
7) Education Level: शैक्षऺक मोग्मता  
 
_______________________________________________________________________
_____________  
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B) Working Conditions  
 
B1. General  
 
8) Which Company do you work for?   
 
आप ककस कंपनी में क ॊाॊ यरत हैं ?  
 
_______________________________________________________________________
_____________  
 
9) What is the Company producing?  
 
 आपकी कंपनी में क्य उत्प दन होत है ?  
 
 
10) How long have you been working for the same Company?  
 
आप इस कंपनी में कब से सेव रत हैं ?  
 
 
 
11) What kind of job are you doing / what tasks do you execute?  
 
आप क्य क म करते हैं ?  
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
12) How long does it take to perform each operation?  
 
एक क म करने में आपको ककतना समय ऱगत है ?  
 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
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13) How many times per day do you repeat the same operation?  
 
एक क म को आप हदन में ककतनी ब र दोहर ते हैं ?  
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
14) Is the position you are required to assume in order to perform your task 
comfortable?  
 
जजस शायीरयक जस्थनत भें आऩको काभ कयना होता है, क्मा वोह आयाभदामक है ?  
 
□ Yes □ No, हााॉ □ नहीॊ □  
 
because 
कू्मॊकक_________________________________________________________________ 
  
15) Are you ever asked to move to different workstations during your shift? □ Yes □ No  
 
क्मा ऩारी के दौयान आऩको कामच कयने कक जगह फदरने के सरए कहा जाता है? हााॉ नहीॊ 
  
15a) If Yes, how often? 
_________________________________________________________________ 
  
अगय हााॉ, तो ककतनी फाय ___________________________________________________________  
 
 
B2. Working Hours / Shift  
 
कामच सभम / ऩारी  
16) How many hours do you work per day/night? 
___________________________________________ 
 
एक हदन/ यात भें आऩ ककतने घॊटे काभ कयते हैं ? _________________________________________ 
  
17) How many days per week? 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
सप्ताह भें ककतनी फाय ? ____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
18) Do you ever work on night shifts? □ Yes □ No  
 
क्मा आऩ कबी यात कक ऩारी भें काभ कयते हैं ? हााॉ □ नहीॊ □  
 
19) Do you ever work extra hours? □ Yes □ No  
 
क्मा आऩ सभम से अधधक काभ कयते हैं? हााॉ □ नहीॊ □  
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19a) If Yes, how often? In a week? _____________In a month? _____________In a 
year? ___________ 
 
अगय हााॉ तो ककतनी फाय? सप्ताह भें ______________ भहीने भें ____________ वषच भें __________  
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19b) Do you generally decide to work overtime or is it the Management asking you? 
क्मा आऩ खुद अऩनी भर्ज़ी से ओवय टाइभ कयते हैं मा भैनेजभेंट के कहने ऩय?  
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
19c) Are you paid for your overtime work? □ Yes □ No  
 
क्मा आऩको ओवय टाइभ के सरए अरग वेतन सभरता है ? हााॉ □ नहीॊ □  
 
19d) How much compared to normal working hours?  
 
________________________________________ 
 
साभान्म वेतन कक तुरना भें ककतना ? __________________________________________________ 
 
20) How many breaks do you have in a shift? 
_______________________________________________  
 
एक ऩारी भें ककतनी फाय बे्रक का सभम सभरता है? _________________________________________ 
  
20a) How long do they last?  ककतनी देय के सरए?  
 
 
20b) Do you consider these breaks enough to satisfy your needs? □ Yes □ No, because  
 
क्मा आऩको रगता है कक इतना सभम कापी है? हााॉ □ नहीॊ , □ कू्मॊकक  
 
21) Do you ever get days off? □ Yes □ No  
 
क्मा आऩको कबी छुट्टी सभरती है ? हााॉ □ नहीॊ □  
 
21a) If Yes, how many? अगय हााॉ तो ककतनी Per Week? सप्ताह भें  
 
______________________________  
 
Per Month? भहीने भें 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Per Year? वषच भें 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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B3. Facilities                                                                                                                                                             
22) Do you think there are adequate facilities inside your plant? □ Yes □ No, this should 
be improved  
 
क्मा आऩको रगता है कक सॊमॊर भें सायी सुववधाएॊ हैं ? हााॉ □ नहीॊ, इन्हें औय फेहतय ककमा जा 
सकता है □  
 
22a) Is there an adequate number of washrooms? □ Yes □ No  
 
क्मा ऩमाचप्त सॊख्मा भें शौचारम हैं ? हााॉ □ नहीॊ □  
 
22b) Are they sufficiently close to your workstation? □ Yes □ No  
 
क्मा वह कामच कयने कक जगह के ननकट हैं ? हााॉ □ नहीॊ □  
 
22c) Is a canteen provided in your plant? □ Yes □ No  
 
क्माॊ आऩके सॊमॊर भें कैं टीन है ? हााॉ □ नहीॊ □  
 
22d) If Yes, do you make use of it? □ Yes □ No  
 
अगय हााॉ तो क्मा आऩ उसका उऩमोग कयते हैं ? हााॉ □ नहीॊ □  
 
22e) If No, do you think it would be needed? □ Yes □ No  
 
अगय नहीॊ, तो क्मा आऩको रगता कक कबी कयेंगे? हााॉ □ नहीॊ □  
 
B4. Safety  
 
23) Do you consider your workstation as potentially risky? □ Yes,  
 
क्मा आऩको रगता है कक आऩके कामच कयने के स्थान भें कोई खतया है ? हााॉ , □  
 
Because कू्मॊकक 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________ □ No नहीॊ 
□  
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24)Have you ever had any accident on your workstation? □ Yes □ No  
क्मा आऩके कामच कयने के स्थान भें कबी कोई दुघचटना हुई है? हााॉ व नहीॊ □  
 
24a) If Yes, what kind? अगय हााॉ तो ककस प्रकाय कक  
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
  
24b) Did it cause any permanent/ serious damage? क्मा उस से कोई गॊबीय चोट आई है?  
 
□ Yes, the following हााॉ, इस प्रकाय से  
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 _______________________________________________________________________ 
  
□ No नहीॊ  
 
25) Is Safety Equipment arranged by your Employer? □ Yes □ No  
 
क्मा सुयऺॊा उऩकयण कम्ऩनी द्वाया हदए जाते हैं ? हााॉ □ नहीॊ □  
 
26) If Yes, which of the following Safety Items are provided by the Employer?  
 
अगय हााॉ, तो इनभे से कौन से सुयऺॊा उऩकयण हदए जाते हैं?  
 
(You may choose more than one) ( एक से अधधक चुन सकते हैं)  
 
□ Helmet □ Gloves □ 3. Safety Belt □ 4. Insulated Shoes □ 5. Protective Goggles □ Mask 
□  
 
१.हेले्भट □ २. दस्ताने □ ३.सुयऺॊा ऩेटी □ ४.इनु्सरेटेड जूते □ ५. सुयऺॊा चश्भे □ ६. भास्क □  
 
७. Other मा अन्म 
___________________________________________________________________  
 
8. None of the above □ ८. इनभे से कुछ बी नहीॊ □  
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B5. Recruitment / Contract बती  
27) How have you been recruited for your current position? □ By Regular Application 
and interview □  
 
Employment agency □ By phone call □ Through personal acquaintances □ Contractor’s 
call □ Other  
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
  
इस नौकयी भें आऩकी बती कैसे हुई? 
  
साभान्म अजी औय इॊटयव्मू □ योर्ज़ज़गाय एजेंसी □ पोन □ जान ऩहचान □ ठेकेदाय के द्वाया □ मा अन्म □  
 
28) Which of the following best describes your employer? □ Company Manager □ Plant 
Manager □  
 
Contractor □ 
Other___________________________________________________________________ 
  
इनभे से आऩके फाॉस का क्मा ऩद है ? कॊऩनी भेनेजय □ सॊमर भेनेजय □ ठेकेदाय □  
 
अन्म ____________________________________________________________________  
 
29) Did you sign an employment contract for your current position? □ Yes □ No  
 
क्मा आऩने इस नौकयी के सरए कोई काने्रक्ट ऩय साइन ककमा है ? हााॉ □ नहीॊ □  
 
29a) Were terms and conditions of this contract clear when you signed it? □ Yes □ No 
  
क्मा साइन कयते सभम आऩको साये ननमभ औय शतें भारूभ थी ? हााॉ □ नहीॊ □  
 
29b) Are you currently performing exactly the tasks stated in the above contract? □ Yes 
□ No,  
 
क्मा आऩ वो ही सफ कामच जो काॊरेक्ट भें सरखे हैं, अबी कयते हैं ? हााॉ □ नहीॊ □  
 
I’m rather doing अफ भें मे काभ कयता हाॉ  
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
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30) What kind of contract do you currently have?    □ Permanent □ Temporary □ Casual 
□ As a Trainee/ Apprentice □ Other  
इस सभम आऩका काॊरेक्ट ककस प्रकाय का है? - ऩभचनेनेट □ कैजुअर □ - रेनी/ अप्रेंहटस □- मा अन्म  
 
_______________________________________________________________________  
 
31) Is your name listed on the Company/ Plant’s Attendance Registrar? □ Yes □ No  
 
क्मा आऩका नाभ कॊऩनी के यजजस्टय भें दजच है ? हााॉ □ नहीॊ □  
 
32) Who keeps a record of your attendance/ working hours?  
 
□ Company Manager □ Plant Manager □ Contractor □ Myself □ Other  
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
  
आऩकी हाजजयी औय कामच सभम का हहसाफ कौन यखता है ?  
कॊऩनी भेनेजय □ सॊमर भेनेजय □  ठेकेदाय □ स्वमॊ □ अन्म □ 
____________________________________ 
 
33) Who takes the responsibility in case any issue / dispute / accident occurs on your 
workplace?  
 
□ Company Manager □ Plant Manager □ Contractor □  
 
Other__________________________________ 
  
कामचऺॊेर भें ककसी वववाद / झगडे मा दुघचटना के सभम ककसकी जर्ज़ज़मे्भदायी होती है ?  
 
कॊऩनी भेनेजय □ सॊमर भेनेजय □ ठेकेदाय □ अन्म □  
 
_________________________________________  
 
34) Have you ever been fired / dismissed / suspended? □ Yes (please specify)  
 
क्मा कबी आऩ फखाचस्त / डडससभस / सस्ऩेंड ककमे गए हैं ? हााॉ □ ( सॊऺॊेऩ भें फताएॊ)  
 
 
  
□ No  
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34a) Were you given any notice? □ Yes (how 
long?)________________________________ □ No  
क्मा आऩको कोई नोहटस हदमा गमा था ? □ हााॉ ( ककतने सभम का) _______________________नहीॊ □  
 
34b) Was a regular procedure followed in that case? □ Yes □ No (please specify)  
 
क्मा उस सभम आऩके साथ साभान्म प्रक मा अऩनाई गमी थी जैसी सफके साथ? हााॉ □ नहीॊ □  
 
 
 
 
B6. Salary  
 
35) Are you regularly paid a salary? □ Yes □ No  
 
क्मा आऩको सभम ऩय वेतन हदमा जाता है ? हााॉ □ नहीॊ □  
 
36) Who pays your salary?  □ Company □ Contractor  
 
आऩका वेतन कौन देता है ? कम्ऩनी □ ठेकेदाय □  
 
□ Other अन्म □  
 
 
 
 
37) How is your salary calculated? आऩका वेतन कैसे धगना जाता है ?  
 
□ Hourly rate: घॊटे के हहसाफ से □ ______________________ Indian Rupees/ per hour 
रुऩमे प्रनत घॊटा  
 
□ Daily rate: हदन के हहसाफ से __________________________Indian Rupees/ per day 
रुऩमे प्रनत हदन  
 
□ Weekly rate: सप्ताह के हहसाफ से ____________________Indian Rupees/ per week 
रुऩमे प्रनत सप्ताह  
 
□ Monthly rate: भहीने के हहसाफ से ____________________ Indian Rupees/ per month 
रुऩमे प्रनत भाह  
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38) Has it ever happened that your Salary was not paid or delayed? □ Yes, in this 
circumstance____________________________________________________________
_ □ No  
क्मा कबी ऐसा हुआ है कक आऩके वेतन का बुगतान नहीॊ हुआ हो मा देय से हुआ हो ? हााॉ □  
इस जस्थनत भें ___________________________________________________________________  
नहीॊ □  
 
C. Living Conditions  
 
C1. General  
 
39) Do you live nearby the plant? □ Yes □ No 
  
आऩ प्राॊट के ऩास यहते हैं ? हााॉ □ नहीॊ □  
 
40) If Not, how far, more or less, in Km? अगय नहीॊ तो ककतनी दूय, ककभी. भें ? 
______________________________________________________________________ 
  
41) How long does it take you to travel to the plant every day?  
 
पेक्री तक जाने भें योज आऩको ककतना सभम रगता है 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
  
42) How many members does your Family have?  
 
आऩके ऩरयवाय भें ककतने सदस्म हैं ? 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
43) Is any other member of your family perceiving a regular salary? □ Yes □ No  
 
क्मा आऩके ऩरयवाय का कोई औय सदस्म बी कभाता है ? हााॉ □ नहीॊ □  
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44) Please indicate the annual income you and your family received last year (in Indian 
Rupees)  
अऩने औय अऩने ऩरयवाय कक सभराके एक सार कक आभदनी फताएॊ ( रुऩमे भें ) 
  
Your income: आऩका वेतन  
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Your spouse’s income: आऩके ऩनत/ऩत्नी का वेतन  
 
 
 
Other (please specify) अन्म ( सॊऺॊेऩ भें फताएॊ )  
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
  
Your household income: आऩके घय कक कुर आभदनी  
 
 
  
45) How much do you (as household) averagely spend for living expenses, on monthly 
basis?  
 
आऩके घय का भहीने का खचच अन्द ककतना होता है ?  
 
Rent/ Build House ककयामा / भकान  
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
  
Food बोजन  
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
  
Medical Care भेडडकर/ दवाइमाॊ आहद 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Transportation आना/ जाना  
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
  
 
Education ऩढाई/ सू्कर  
 
_______________________________________________________________________  
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Extra अन्म खचे 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
46) Do you generally have spare time? □ Yes □ Few □ Almost Never  
 
क्मा काभ के अनतरयक्त आऩके ऩास खारी सभम फचता है ? हााॉ □ नहीॊ □ कबी नहीॊ □  
 
46a) What activities do you prefer doing in your spare time?  
 
अऩने खारी सभम भें आऩ क्मा कयना ऩसॊद कयते हैं ?  
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
C2. Social Benefits  
 
47) Are you entitled to any Gratuity? □ Yes □ No  
 
क्मा आऩ गे्रजु्मटी के हकदाय हैं ? हााॉ □ नहीॊ □  
 
48) Do you have access to PF/ ESIC schemes? □ Yes □ No  
 
क्मा आऩके ऩास प्राववडेंट पॊड /इ.स.आई.सस . स्कीभ कक सुववधा है ? हााॉ □ नहीॊ □  
 
49) Do you benefit of any other Social Scheme? □ Yes (please specify)  
 
क्मा आऩ ककसी औय स्कीभ का राब उठा यहे हैं, ? अगय हााॉ □ तो सॊऺॊेऩ भें फताएॊ  
 
□ No □ नहीॊ  
 
50) Do you have any Insurance? □ Yes (please specify) क्मा आऩके ऩास ककसी प्रकाय का 
फीभा है, अगय हााॉ □ तो सॊऺॊेऩ भें फताएॊ 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________
___□ No नहीॊ □  
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D. Labour Rights / Organisation  
51) As far as you are aware, is there any Labour Union inside your plant? □ Yes □ No  
 
क्मा आऩको अऩनी पैक्री भें कोई रेफय मूननमान है? हााॉ □ नहीॊ □  
 
51a) If Yes, is this affiliated to any National Centre? □ Yes □ No  
 
अगय हााॉ तो क्मा मे ककसी अखखर बायतीम कें द्र से सॊफॊधधत है ? हााॉ □ नही □  
 
51b) If No, do you think one would be needed? □ Yes □ No  
 
अगय नहीॊ, तो क्मा आऩ सभझते हैं कक इसकी र्ज़ज़रूयत है ? हााॉ □ नहीॊ □  
 
51c) For which purpose? कू्माॉ औय कैसे 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
  
 
52) Are you personally member of any Union? □ Yes □ No  
 
क्मा आऩ स्वमॊ ककसी सॊगठन/ मूननमन के सदस्म हैं? हााॉ □ नहीॊ □  
 
53) In both cases, do you ever refer to Union Leaders in case issues / disputes / 
accidents occur in your plant?  □ Yes □ No  
 
दोनो ंजस्थनत भें. ककसी वववाद/ झगडे/ दुघाचतना के साभी क्मा आऩ मूननमन रीडय से सभाऩकच 
कयते हैं?  
हााॉ □ नहीॊ □  
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53a) If Not, who do you generally refer to and why?  
अगय नहीॊ तो ऐसी जस्थनत भें ककस से सॊऩकच कयते हैं औय कू्माॉ ?  
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
54) Have there recently been disputes at your workplace? □ Yes □ No  
 
क्मा आऩके कामच कक जगह ऩय कबी वववाद/झगडे हुए हैं ? हााॉ □ नहीॊ □  
 
54a) For which reasons? ककन कायणो ंसे  
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________ 
  
55) Have you read about the last General Strike at National Level? □ Yes □ No  
 
आऩने वऩछरी याष्ट्र ीम स्तय कक आभ हड़तार के फाये भें ऩढ़ा है ? हााॉ □ नहीॊ □  
 
55a) Did you personally agree/ disagree with the demands claimed? Why?  
 
क्मा आऩ व्मजक्तगत रूऩ से उन भाॊगो से सहभत / असहभत हैं ? कू्माॉ ? 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________ 
  
56) In your opinion, at moment, which are the most urgent and serious problems in 
your Company /in your plant?  
 
आऩकी याम भें, इस सभम आऩकी कम्ऩनी भें सफसे र्ज़ज़रूयी मा गॊबीय सभस्मा क्मा है ? 
 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
57) What would you personally consider as a priority in order to improve your working 
and living conditions?  
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आऩकी याम भें आऩके काभ औय यहने कक जस्थनत फेहतय कयने भें सफसे र्ज़ज़रूयी क्मा कदभ हो 
सकते हैं ? 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________ 
  
 
 
This is the end of the Questionnaire. Thank you again for your collaboration. Please feel 
free to leave a personal contact (phone or mail, in the space provided below) in case you 
are available for future correspondence (optional).  
 
मह प्रश्नावरी मही सभाप्त होती है, आऩके सहमोग के सरए धन्मवाद. अऩना पोन नॊफय मा भेर नीचे सरखें 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Date/ Place  
हदनाॊक स्थान 
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Appendix B 
General Checklist for Interviews with Employers / Managers from 
OEMs in the NCR Auto Cluster  
 
 Capital /Ownership 
 
- Current Ownership (Family –run business? Nationality? Presence of JV/ 
Equity/ Foreign Participation? If foreign, when did the business start in 
India?) 
- Ownership in Historical terms (Any change after market liberalisation? 
Any change in participation share following the allowance of different 
Auto Policies?) 
- Capital: Has level of investment changed over time? Have they expanded 
their business/ acquired new units/ relocated production/ invested in new 
technology / R&D? 
- Current turnover/ expected turnover?  
- Capacity utilisation over installed capacity? 
 
 Production 
 
- Location: HQ/ Manufacturing units/ why are they located in this cluster 
and not in others? Which is the basis of comparative advantage in current 
location (consider different State policies with regard to taxation, energy 
provision, land allocation, or also, different labour costs across States)? 
What could attract investors to operate in India/ this cluster? Why/how are 
local products competitive: price, quality, technology employed, quality 
standards, cost? 
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- Component suppliers: same cluster/ other clusters /abroad? 
- Type of production: 2-3-4 wheelers/ models? 
- Manufacturing operations: only assembly or also manufacturing? What is 
done inside and what is outsourced? Evolution over time? Relationship 
with Subcontractors? 
- Inside Units: How are assembly lines organised? Technology employed? 
Metric system? Are they complying with WCM standards? How many 
machines? How many workers? How many shifts per day/ week?  
- Have they been able to operate on full regime even in times of lower 
productivity / demand (in periods of crisis, for example, or even last year, 
as reported in the Maruti case)?  To what extent do employers perceive the 
global Crisis? Which strategies have they preferred in order to bear 
production costs during high peaks of market crisis? 
 
 Market Strategy 
 
- Import / Export levels?  
- Foreign / Domestic market sales? Which countries do they export to? What 
kind of target/ buyer on the Domestic Market?  
- Considering the growing expansion of the Domestic demand (especially in 
terms of passenger vehicles) do employers see the Automotive sector as 
potentially leading Indian Industrial Development? Do they see any room 
for employment generation /absorption, compared to other industrial 
sectors?  
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 Policy  
 
- Any particular production-related constraint due to current Auto Policy? 
Any relevant benefit following Auto Policy 2002? 
- Comments on Automotive Mission Plan 2006 -2016. 
- If employers could claim substantial / more targeted interventions by the 
Central /State Government (depending on the issue), what would they 
currently require? (subsidies, reduction of import duties, infrastructure 
improvement, lower taxation, easing of labour regulations, further service 
provision etc.) 
- Do employers belong to any Association? Do they benefit from belonging 
to it? How? Is there cooperation/ competition about its members?  
 
 Employment – related issued 
 
- How many employees per unit / per line? 
- How can employers describe the current workforce: trained, speaking 
English, young (specify age range), male or female, local or migrant? Why 
do they think this is the case? If you could choose, which type of 
labourforce would you want?  
- Which factors are considered in the recruitment process? How is 
recruitment operated? (interview/ call/ personal acquaintance or through 
agent/contractor) Type of contract they generally prefer? Why do they 
prefer it? If employers use contractors, how do they find them? Is there 
anybody inside the company who is in charge of this? How is this particular 
agent called in the company? What is the benefit to use contractors? Are 
they satisfied with the contractors’ work?  
- Any skills shortage/ mismatch between skills offered/ demanded on the 
local market? Any training provided to increase workers skills level?  
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- Best strategy to deal with labour costs/ to achieve labour costs 
minimisation? 
- Comments on recent labour unrest: has production suffered? Did 
employers ever completely shut the plants? Have they registered 
substantial losses? Do they think labour unrest in other companies has 
affected their position as well / the whole cluster market value (some firms 
are currently opting to localise their plants in other clusters, even to escape 
NCR labour unrest/ organisation i.e. Gujarat/ Maharashtra – what’s their 
opinion?)  
 
 Desired strategy for the future? 
- Capital? 
- Production? 
- Market? 
- Policy – related? 
- Employment? 
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Appendix C 
Checklist for Interviews with Trade Unions /National Centres 
 
1) How is the Centre / Federation structured?  
- Which actors does it gather? 
- What relationship with Industrial Federations? (ex. Steel Workers 
Federation, Construction Workers Federation) 
- What relationship with smaller unions, like company/ plant – based 
unions? (Contacts to share?) 
- Any relationship with IMF (International Metalworkers’ Federation)? 
- Relationship with Business Associations? Type of Bargaining?  
- Relationship with the affiliated Political Party?  
- Government / Representation in Parliament? 
 
2) Have the unions participated in the National Strike on Feb 28th? 
- Which is their position on current National Labour Policies? 
- On current Labour Laws (what is missing/ what should be changed/ what 
should be updated/ what is present but not enacted)? 
- And in particular, on Minimum Wage? 
- On Contract Labour? 
- On Hire&Fire Procedures? 
- On Union Rights treatment? 
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3) Do they follow disputes in the Automotive Sector? 
- In the NCR in particular? 
- Have they been involved in the Maruti struggle? 
- What is at stake there? 
- Ask for explanations about the Independent Trade Union issue, Contract 
Labour, Wage levels etc. 
- What about State – Management relationship? 
- Level of Repression? 
- Apart from Maruti, what differences / similarities with other Companies 
from the same cluster? Similar Corporate trends / struggles? Any 
difference in Labour practices across different clusters? 
 
4) Further Materials / Contacts? 
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